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Abstract 
This thesis explains the results of a research programme which set out to empirically 
create a theory relating to players’ experience of videogame playing and the 
methodology employed in doing so. With the perspective that many empirically derived 
or tested contemporary theories are not sufficient for accounting for engagement in the 
majority of cases, a semi-inductive theory generation methodology was selected, 
interpreted, and employed.  
The theoretical concept so derived is that in order to engage with a videogame product 
players must find an overall sense of cultural value in the products they encounter. This 
sense of value corresponds to games at a feature level, the user making judgements 
about salient design features, and is not fixed but is constantly evaluated as the player 
encounters the game, from when they are selecting the concept of a game, through play, 
to when they are reflecting on the experience in relation to other products. The 
evaluation of features seems to involve the player 'identifying' with the individual design 
features in that there is an implicit intra personal questioning of “Am I the kind of person 
who would play a game with this feature?” which might be described as an expression of 
the user's personal culture or assumed socially relative self sense. If they feel that they 
are the kind of person who would play a game with that feature then this value 
judgement will have a positive influence on their engagement, if they are not then it will 
affect the user’s engagement negatively. The features so evaluated in this way can be 
any personally salient design feature at all, such as game mechanics, graphical 
representation or even packaging. These weighted judgements then act together in 
summation to determine the player's potential engagement.  
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Also included is a justification for the selection, interpretation, application, and 
pragmatics of the Classic Grounded Theory Methodology (CGT), as employed in this 
programme of research. Grounded Theory (GT) was selected as it initially promised to be 
suitably open and exploratory, and advice relating to CGT was employed most often as it 
frequently provided the most reasonable set of methods for proceeding. However 
substantial effort was required in both understanding what the published advice on 
applying the methodology meant, and how it applied to the current problem. Sections 
are included which tell the story of the practical process of both attempting to apply the 
methodology, and understand the implications of that application at the same time, and 
an attempt is made to summarise tricky areas (potential misunderstandings and 
seeming myths) and  explain the understanding of the methodology relative to these 
issues as it was was employed in this research.  
In conclusion the derived theory seems to demonstrate a reasonable degree of 'fit' and 
'relevance'; a conclusion which is supported by a survey of academic and industry 
specialists. As such, the methodology employed might be said to be useful in generating 
novel theoretical results.  Also, the theory can be expressed as a substantive 
instantiation of existing general theories of human cultural behaviour such as Cooley's 
'Looking Glass Self' (1902). It is also felt that the theory could be readily modified to 
account for further insights into the domain. These conclusions suggest that the 
hypotheses generated are useful for investigating the domain of videogame play and 
engagement.  
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To the memory of Daniel Foster 
“men grow old because they stop playing, and not conversely” G. Stanley Hall 
It is a terrible shame that some men never find out quite how much play they are 
capable of.  
  
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is due in part to a funded studentship generously furnished by the School of 
Science and Technology (at the time the School of Computing Science) at Middlesex 
University and for this I am very grateful. 
I would also like to thank the people of the school for their support, encouragement, and 
occasional deep conversation.  
The guidance, encouragement, and most of all patience of my Director of Studies, Bob 
Fields was obviously indispensible over the years. I’m sure he is as glad this process is 
over as much as I am, but I also hope that he has gained something from the experience 
of supervising an awkward sod; I certainly learned a lot from him. 
As I’m thanking my supervisors I must also include Dave Lawrence, as while he left the 
school before this thesis was completed, his input at earlier phases of the research was 
invaluable. 
An influence on the shape (and probably duration) of this programme, were 2 questions 
asked by my old Masters Professor, Emeritus Professor of University College London 
Interaction Centre (UCLIC or what was the Ergonomics Unit while I was there) John Long 
which he asked, at the European Conference on Cognitive Ergonomics 12, the questions: 
‘What do you mean by “theory?”’ and ‘have you identified a core category yet?’. Thanks 
John, see below. 
Other major influences on this thesis were the comments and requests made by my 
examiners Prof. Mark Blythe of Northumbria University and Dr. Mark Springett of 
Middlesex University. Without their input this thesis would be a lot thinner than it is now, 
in more ways than one. In that the supporting theory and the epistemological arguments 
6 
 
would be less well argued, and the overall size of the thesis would have been shorter, 
due to it covering less useful material prior to their input. 
I would be a fool if I didn’t thank my friends and family for their support over the years; 
my parents, Joan and Keith and my Sister, Hilary, who supported a thirty something 
student for the entire duration of my studentship. Also my close friends suffered similarly 
in associating with a poor man-child long after they themselves had done with their 
studies. My girlfriend Jenna probably bore the brunt of this extended period of self-
inflicted poverty. I love you all for the sacrifices you have made for my selfish obsession. 
Lastly I would like to thank my research participants. I hope that my obsession with 
what videogames are to you wasn’t too irritating. 
Thank you all. 
7 
 
Contents 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... 2 
Contents .............................................................................................................. 7 
Section A: Introductions and methodology ............................................................. 12 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 13 
1.1. Objective ..................................................................................... 15 
1.2. Phenomenon of videogame play ..................................................... 16 
1.3. Overview of research into videogame play ....................................... 19 
1.4. Grounded or Empirical literature ..................................................... 23 
1.5. Remaining questions ..................................................................... 46 
1.6. Related concepts .......................................................................... 49 
1.7. Summary of approach ................................................................... 90 
2. Methodology ........................................................................................... 92 
2.1. Rationale for selection ................................................................... 92 
2.2. Interpretation of the Grounded Theory methodology ........................ 111 
2.3. Implementation ........................................................................... 116 
8 
 
2.4. Summary .................................................................................... 124 
2.5. Example ..................................................................................... 125 
Section B: The theory ......................................................................................... 138 
3. Overview of theory: Engagement as negotiation of value to net cultural worth139 
4. First theoretical sub-category: Individual value judgement of feature as socio-
cultural reflection of self sense ..................................................................... 144 
4.1. Identification with features............................................................ 144 
4.2. Failure to identify implies cost or negative value .............................. 147 
4.3. Returns as positive 'cultural value' ................................................. 148 
4.4. Net value after summation ............................................................ 151 
4.5. Summary of identification to features ............................................. 156 
4.6. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in this section ....... 157 
5. Second theoretical sub-category: Process of engagement (selection to reflection)
 ................................................................................................................ 159 
5.1. Overview of the phases of engagement .......................................... 159 
5.2. Selection .................................................................................... 162 
5.3. Play ........................................................................................... 177 
5.4. Reflection ................................................................................... 185 
5.5. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in this section ....... 188 
9 
 
6. Core Category: Negotiated identification of and with a sense of Cultural worth.190 
6.1. Selection as negotiation of potential ............................................... 194 
6.2. Play as negotiation ....................................................................... 208 
6.3. Reflection as negotiation ............................................................... 232 
6.4. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in this section ....... 239 
7. Summary of theory ................................................................................. 241 
Section C: Summaries and conclusions ................................................................. 244 
8. An open account of the implementation of CGT .......................................... 245 
8.1. Early phases ............................................................................... 246 
8.2. Computerisation .......................................................................... 247 
8.3. Discussing the approach at conference ........................................... 247 
8.4. Speeding up ................................................................................ 249 
8.5. Switch to field notes ..................................................................... 250 
8.6. Final Coding Iterations.................................................................. 251 
8.7. Sorting ....................................................................................... 252 
8.8. Writing ....................................................................................... 253 
8.9. Apparent myths of GT from a CGT perspective ................................ 254 
8.10. Challenges in applying CGT in a Ph.D. project ................................ 258 
10 
 
8.11. Summary of applying CGT ........................................................... 263 
9. Concluding discussions ............................................................................ 266 
9.1. 3rd Party Reviews of the Theory (evaluation of Fit and relevance) ....... 266 
9.2. Relevance? .................................................................................. 268 
9.3. Complete? .................................................................................. 270 
9.4. Fit? ............................................................................................ 273 
9.5. Modifiable?.................................................................................. 273 
9.7. Limitations .................................................................................. 275 
9.8. Contribution ................................................................................ 278 
9.9. Further work ............................................................................... 287 
References ........................................................................................................ 292 
Appendix A: Data collected .................................................................................. 302 
Appendix B: Survey presentation ......................................................................... 306 
Slide 1 ...................................................................................................... 306 
Slide 2 ...................................................................................................... 307 
Slide 3 ...................................................................................................... 308 
Slide 4 ...................................................................................................... 308 
Slide 5 ...................................................................................................... 310 
11 
 
Slide 6 ...................................................................................................... 311 
Slide 7 ...................................................................................................... 312 
Slide 8 ...................................................................................................... 313 
Slide 9 ...................................................................................................... 314 
Slide 10 .................................................................................................... 315 
Slide 11 .................................................................................................... 316 
Appendix C: Survey questions ............................................................................. 317 
 
12 
 
Section A: Introductions and methodology 
13 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis will perform two functions: It will report a novel theory about how players 
engage with videogames, and it will also explore the controversial (Glaser 1992) 
methodology employed in creating that theory.  
The derived theory, that users are seeking worthwhile experiences through a process of 
cultural evaluation by identification, reveals apparent conceptual relationships with 
Pragmatist ideas such as those of Cooley (1902), Mead (1934) or Dewey (1934) but was 
not explicitly derived from any of them. Similarly, more modern assertions, such as 
Juul's (2010) 'stages of engagement' or Carr's (2005) 'assemblages of past experience', 
also have elements in common with this theory, but there was no explicit attempt to 
follow any such work. There are also other theories which have been proposed which 
attempt to answer similar questions and how this present theory contributes to these 
perspectives is explored. It is also apparent that some elements of other theoretical 
domains are implied in this work without being explicitly employed (such as semiotics; 
as one must ascribe a meaning to a thing in order to then assign a value). The thesis 
explores these theoretical relationships in order to position the theory. 
Classic Grounded Theory Methodology (Glaser 1978; Glaser 1992) was selected due to 
its supposed domain independence and generative nature (rather than validative). These 
features were felt to be advantageous as in selecting a domain from which to approach 
the phenomenon and thence selecting candidate theories from that domain to validate 
with respect to videogame play would require  assumptions about the domain with little 
empirical basis. The thesis explains why this methodology was selected and how it was 
interpreted and executed. There is also extensive discussion about the use of CGT by 
researchers from outside traditions where interpretations of the methodology are 
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commonly utilised. How easy it is to adopt and perform? Is it suitable for allowing 
reasonably inexperienced researchers to achieve an interesting result with limited 
resources? Is the advice available clear enough for researchers to grasp the 
fundamentals of the methodology quickly? The conclusions in this respect are that the 
methodology is powerful (if potentially isolating), but requires substantial effort in 
interpretation and a great deal of trial and error in attempting to gain skill in it’s 
application. 
The main conclusions of this research are that the theory is reasonable for the domain it 
studied (games players) and has some utility to associated domains (games designers 
and games researchers), an impression which was formed by a small survey of 
interested parties. Reasonable in that, based on an overview of the theory, the core 
principles do appear to capture the main concerns of actors (players) in the domain 
(playing games). As there is little literature which deals with player identity and values in 
quite this way, I have concluded that the work provides a contribution in setting out the 
general issues of videogame play and how players engage with videogames. Further 
work is suggested in possible validation studies, possibly by application of the theory in a 
design process. Perhaps in considering who the potential audiences are and what salient 
issues the identities within these audiences regularly consider, games can be more 
successful in supporting the entertainment needs of more players than are currently 
usually considered by modern design practices.  
This thesis is split into 3 sections. The first section (Section A) sets out the objective of 
the research, introduces the phenomenon of videogame play, summarises empirical work 
that has been performed in producing a theory relating to general videogame play and 
engagement, and examines approaches from other disparate fields which propose 
theoretical positions with some relationships to the resultant theory. This introduction is 
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followed by a justification for the use of Classic Grounded Theory, its position in terms of 
epistemology, and then an explanation of the Methodology in detail. 
The second section (Section B) sets out the theoretical concepts as developed. As 
explained in the section dealing with the methodology, this presentation directly 
represents the 'sorted' theoretical 'memos' produced by the methodology. 
The third and final section (Section C) first tells the narrative of how the idealised CGT 
methodology was implemented, whether the concepts might be considered to be 'good' 
(using the success criteria of 'Fit', 'Relevance', 'Modifiability', and 'Workability'), and 
where this work might lead in terms of future work.  
1.1. Objective 
The motivation for this research was the desire to find out why any one player might 
engage with a game, how this might be accounted for in a general sense, and the small 
number of empirically derived general theories of videogame engagement at the time 
the programme was initiated. 
Thus the objective of this research was to explore the phenomenon of videogame play in 
terms of the experiences that players have with them. That is the research set out to 
explore what factors or features that might promote engagement in players and how 
these factors are discovered and resolved by individual players. The ultimate objective of 
this endeavour was to empirically formulate a theory, or working hypothesis which might 
explain and predict the actions of players (and non-players). The resulting theory can be 
interpreted as a number of overlapping sub-hypotheses from which a global hypothesis 
is derived. That global or meta-hypothesis can be viewed as a lens through which the 
sub-hypotheses can be interpreted.  
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The following sections explain how this was achieved, how this effort relates to other 
similar efforts, what the final theoretical conception is and how it was derived, and how 
potentially useful and novel the resulting theory is.  
Before the phenomenon of interest is explored in detail it would be wise to discuss the 
field from which this exploration was initiated.  
The background of this research is from a perspective of User Experience (a phrase 
attributed to Donald Norman). That is the multidisciplinary field which attempts to 
empirically understand how a person experiences a product in use in order that products 
(specific or general) can be made such that they are safe and efficient to use while being 
agreeable to experience.  Normally such research and practice investigates the utility, 
'usability' and safety as a primary concern, however where the product(s) in question 
have little intended utility the focus must necessarily be on the 'experience' the user has. 
What are the qualities of that experience? What is the user (in the case of videogames it 
would be more accurate to refer to the player) getting out of the experience? What could 
we deem to be a positive or engaging experience? 
In this respect this thesis is essentially an exploration of  how videogames are perceived 
and received by those that encounter them, with the ultimate aim  of developing a 
theory which accounts for not so much the 'usability' of videogames but the holistic 'user 
experience' of such products. 
1.2. Phenomenon of videogame play 
What is a videogame? Videogames, video games, computer games, digital games, 
interactive electronic entertainment or any other synonym are different terms for the 
general category of entertainment products using digital, computer technology (generally 
a form of input, processing and a display) to present an opportunity for play. 
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This thesis is not an attempt to define or delineate videogames, and whatever the 
history of this medium the least that can be said is that there is a fairly well recognised 
phenomenon of people playing games on various technological devices that they were 
not doing 40 years ago. Indeed sales of videogames are reported to have now surpassed 
film sales and box office receipts in the United Kingdom (Wallop 2009). 
For the past decade there has also been increasing academic interest in studying these 
games and their players. The formation of the international Digital Games Research 
Association (DiGRA) in 2003 is an example of the coalescing of interest around this 
common phenomenon. Rather than reiterating the ongoing project of defining what the 
videogame phenomenon actually is, I will simply provide a brief justification for my 
ongoing usage of the term 'videogame' over some of the possible alternatives. While it 
may be possible to use 'computer game', 'video game', or 'digital game' I believe each of 
these apply constraints on the phenomenon: that they are played on computers (PCs, 
mainframes, mini computers, or some other conception of 'computer') or require 
computing technology to work; that they are a function of video technology; or that they 
can only be achieved with digital technology respectively. I believe that 'videogame' has 
become an abstract term for a commonly recognised phenomenon. While there might be 
some grammatical argument for 'video game' over 'videogame' I feel that this 
grammatical purity distracts from the general essence of 'videogame' as a useful catch-
all term. It is true that in the course of performing this programme of research I might 
have had cause to qualify what I meant as the object of my research with subjects, 
encouraging them to think of any games they might play on their mobile phones, set top 
boxes, games consoles, PCs, the local amusement arcade or wherever, but generally the 
term 'videogame' was understood, and as a catch all term will be used for the remainder 
of this thesis to refer to all such games collectively. 
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This short qualification of terms highlights the breadth and penetration videogames have 
in our society. Indeed almost anywhere were we can find a display, some controls, some 
means of interpreting the inputs from those controls and presenting a new state, we 
could find videogames. We can purchase games on disc for our home office computers 
from our local supermarket, we can download games via a web browser and play them 
alongside our casual web surfing, we can browse extensive collections of dedicated 
hardware and software in specialist shops on almost every high street, and even the 
most rudimentary modern mobile telephone will likely come with some kind of 
videogame pre-installed. We can read reviews and analysis of the latest titles and 
equipment in specialist magazines, lifestyle magazines, on websites, and even in the 
traditional printed newspaper press. They are apparently everywhere, and people are 
playing them. 
People play games in all the contexts they exist, on the train, at the bus stop, at home 
via the television, at work when the boss isn't looking, in dedicated amusement arcades 
(though less so these days), and even in large tournaments . However not everyone in 
modern society plays videogames, and even those that do play do not play every game 
at every opportunity in every context. So what is it that has one person play a game and 
another not? What are the principles or factors that determine if a potential player will 
engage with a game? It is the intention of this research to explore this question. 
To clarify what I mean by the terms engage and ‘engagement’ I will refer to the Oxford 
English Dictionary: 
“Definition of engage 
verb 
1 [with object] occupy or attract (someone’s interest or attention):he ploughed on, trying to outline his plans 
and engage Sutton’s attentionI told him I was otherwise engaged 
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(engage someone in) involve someone in (a conversation or discussion):they attempted to 
engage Anthony in conversation 
2 [no object] (engage in or be engaged in) participate or become involved in:organizations engage in a 
variety of activitiessome are actively engaged in crime 
(engage with) establish a meaningful contact or connection with:the teams needed to engage 
with local communities” 
 
(Oxford English Dictionary 2012) 
So an individual could be said to be engaged with a videogame if they are playing it or 
(and this is an important distinction) if it is otherwise occupying their attention.  
1.3. Overview of research into videogame play 
At the time of initiating this programme of research there was relatively little published 
academic work which attempted to address the question of what engages the players of 
videogames, and even less which attempted to do so via formal empirical methods or at 
least with some degree of evidence. 
Much of the work from the 20th Century examined the supposed or purported effects of 
videogames on those that played them, such as the effects of violence (see such as Dill 
& Dill (1998) for one overview) or whether it was reasonable to talk of videogame 
addiction (a reasonably early example of research in this area would be the work of Sue 
Fisher (1994)). As research in these areas is ongoing (eg. Van Rooij et al. 2010), I will 
not cover these areas, as it is apparent from many of these pieces of research that they 
assume that videogames are engaging rather than seek to find out why this is so, and 
whether games make people violent or lock people into a cycle of addiction is not the 
focus of this research, thus these questions will only be examined as part of the whole 
question of the experiences of videogame players. 
Academic interest into what videogames are or represent, beyond the purported adverse 
effects on the mental or physical health of (mainly) children, began to grow toward the 
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end of the 20th century  (e.g. Herz 1997) and into this century, with pioneering 
academics such as Espen Aarseth starting to work in the area around 1997 (Aarseth 
1997). Another trend this century is for research into games which hopes to take 
features of games and employ them in a context other than pure entertainment. This 
serious games movement (for example The Serious Games Initiative 
http://www.seriousgames.org/) has tried to study games as a means of achieving 
specific ends. While 'serious games', such as educational games or experimental 
simulations, have found a place in academia where games are studied in contexts where 
considerations of the merits of purely entertaining games are substituted with extrinsic 
motivations (such as education), occasionally projects in these domains can produce 
insights of interest to the question we are attempting to address here (e.g. Malone 
1981) as in order to understand how to use the motivating aspects of a videogame one 
would need a clear understanding as to what those motivations were and how they 
operate in engendering engagement in players. 
In terms of the total amount of literature produced on the topic of why people play 
games, only a certain proportion have well reported methodologies. And the section 
below this will explore a selection of these. The vast majority of empirical or critical 
research has analysed small aspects of the play experience (e.g. Newman 2002), and 
while these efforts have resulted in an increased understanding of what happens when 
people play games they often fail to address the formal problem of why people play 
games rather than engage in some other activity or what engages existing players in a 
broad sense. For example Aarseth (Aarseth 2004) has argued that as players engage 
with a game the narrative and presentation offered by the game diminish in the player's 
conscious awareness as the player engages with the rules of the game and strives to 
overcome the challenges presented, while Newman has argued (Newman 2002) that to 
analyse play as only cybernetic control loops does not account for when players are 
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passively interpreting aspects of the game (dubbed by Newman as on-line and off-line 
play respectively). These are interesting points, but they give us no idea as to why the 
player is engaged, just in what ways they may be engaged in certain situations. Other 
researchers segment the problem (sometimes apparently arbitrarily) into types of 
games; by genre or more likely 'style' (action or 3D world say, such as Fabricatore et. al.  
(2002). This seems to me to be short-sighted, in that these studies often do not pretend 
that the 'kinds' of games are orthogonal to other kinds of games and as such the 
selection of one kind of game over another is making an assumption about what games 
are interesting or important without clear theoretical or empirical justification.  If games 
can be segmented on some design dimension do players automatically engage with the 
dimensions in different ways? If they do indeed engage in different ways what are the 
dimensions of this engagement difference? If they do not engage in different ways, how 
are the ways in which they engage similar? Could these similarities, if they exist, tell us 
anything interesting? It seems to me that if we look at any arbitrary labels for games, 
such as action, strategy, or adventure, we can easily ask what action is experienced in a 
strategy game or what adventure is to be had in an action game? So even if the design 
features are orthogonal, the experiences of players do not have to be, and do not have 
to map to these features as clearly distinct genres. 
That is not to say a typology of game designs and features (such as Patterns of Game 
Design (Bjork 2005)) is not interesting, just that such a typology does not necessarily 
map onto player engagements, and we should be cautious as to how we take apparent 
features of a game and map them to engagements. For example studies of presence, 
challenge, characterisation and other features, and if adjustments to these features 
affect some measurement of engagement, seem to presume that these factors are 
critical to engagement without necessarily having any theory as to the relative 
importance of the wealth of possible engagement factors, and thus why presence, 
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challenge or characterisation might be more important than other factors. Indeed there 
is some evidence that such elements of a games design might not have significant 
influence overall (i.e. Gackenbach 2007). The work presented in this thesis will not 
consider game features as abstract concepts other than where they are expressed by 
players as having influence on their play activities and engagements. As such a mapping 
of typologies of game features to engagements is not performed in this research.  
Another example of arbitrary delimitation of the domain of ‘videogames’ is to assume 
that all games include some conception of a ‘world’, especially where that world is a 
three dimensional, virtual environment (which might be projected to two dimensions for 
display on a computer monitor or similar 2D display), and as such videogames are a 
subset of what has been come to be referred to as ‘virtual worlds’. While investigations 
of, say, how presence can contribute to engagement with a game that is presented as a 
virtual world are interesting, and valuable to the study of virtual worlds, such a study 
may not account for other possible engagements, as not all games are virtual worlds, 
and as such a study so delimited contributes only a little to the broad question of why 
people play videogames in general.  
So in order to determine what factors might be important and when to invoke them we 
need to perform research which considers games in the broadest sense, and thence 
factors which might engage players.  There are a number of ways we might go about 
doing this. We could critically evaluate a selection of games, applying subjective 
impressions and a selection of theories from other domains to see if we can extract from 
games their qualities and appeals. This approach might help to integrate the study of 
videogames into the studies of other things (such as films, sports or technologies), but 
the risk is that we might miss some unique qualities of videogames; qualities which 
make videogames a distinct phenomenon and not a variant of some other phenomenon. 
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Are videogames films plus the opportunity for control? Are videogames physical skill 
challenges akin to Football? Being technological devices can we discuss games in the 
same way we might discuss a toaster or webpage?  This process of applying 'grand', 
external theories has been rejected by students of games (Aarseth 2001), convinced 
that videogames as a medium offer unique qualities.  
So in order to understand what is going on when players play games some researchers 
advocate actively engaging with games as a player in order to more clearly understand 
what it is to be a player and thus what the experience of playing a game might be 
(Aarseth 2003). By such a process of introspection (or where the cultures of game 
players is considered to be critical, Participant Observation) researchers hope to get an 
understanding of the factors present in both videogames and videogame play, but this 
approach suffers from a potential problem of subjectivity. A report about a single player's 
theoretically guided subjective experience of a game, even with some considerations of 
the attitudes of other players encountered can often be light in transferrable theory and 
heavy in narrative. 
In moving from critical or subjective accounts of engagements with videogames to broad 
substantive theories we must look at the experiences of many players across various 
different types of games in multiple contexts. Each of the pieces of literature reviewed in 
the following section attempt some degree of empirical investigation, varying in the 
breadth of their audience or choice of game type, and how much they are guided by 
theory from outside the study of videogames.  
1.4. Grounded or Empirical literature 
1.4.1. Malone 
Perhaps the earliest specific example of a theory of videogame engagement was that of 
Thomas Malone (1980). In Malone's various writings he reports having tackled the 
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problem in various ways. He seems to have initially conducted a series of interviews 
(Malone 1981) with young school children (US 5th grade, where pupils are normally 10 to 
11 years old), from which he developed three principal factors of fun: challenge, 
curiosity, and fantasy. He then devised a series of experiments to explore the relative 
impact of these dimensions on the engagements of more young players (Malone 1980). 
While there are omissions in the published methodology of his work (for example, by 
which methodology did he structure his interviews and interpret the results?), Malone's 
work is nonetheless very interesting, not least because of the dates he published. 
Malone's theory then is that engaging games contain the aspects of challenge, curiosity, 
and fantasy in different degrees; being variously difficult, presenting incomplete 
information or amusing sensory stimuli, and having presentations and metaphors which 
appeal to the player.  
Malone's dimensions seem to make a certain amount of sense, in that when informally 
evaluating one's own engagements or the engagements of others there is little which 
cannot be included within these dimensions. It seems to be a good approximation of 
what is going on. Only when we start to probe his verifying experiments do we get more 
questions. One of his major findings from one of his experiments (where he devised 8 
versions of a simple game to be used as experimental conditions for eighty 5th grade 
school pupils) was that fantasy (or the representation demonstrated by the game) was a 
key factor in engagement. Malone secondarily observed that boys played for longer than 
girls when the representation was in place (popping balloons with darts). It seems odd 
that at this early stage Malone chose to use sex as the main demographic dimension, as 
the selection of such seems wholly arbitrary, even if it does show an effect: that 'fantasy' 
showed a significant overall effect and that that effect  also varies by the gender of the 
children studied. It is interesting to note that perhaps one of the major reasons people 
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play games is that they can engage with the fantasy of the presentation relative to the 
mechanic of the game. 
We could ask then, if we would we use Malone’s 3 motivating factors to explain the 
motivation of players outside his sample? Could we transfer these findings to other 
cases, such as adults or older children? Surely if we were to attempt to do so we must 
do so cautiously, without first testing for the presence of these factors on other kinds of 
player. Also do we assume that because Malone accounted for this dimension in his 
sample, that gender is a critical demographic factor in determining a player’s 
engagement and motivation to play games with and without strong representational 
themes? Are there other individual differences, which Malone did not account for, which 
might also correlate with engagement, such as age, class, nationality, play experience, 
receptivity to different forms of representation, intelligence, race, parental occupation, 
and so on? That there are correlations between engagement, representation, and gender 
begs the question: what is the cause of this correlation? 
1.4.2. Greenfield 
Some of these questions could be asked of the work of Patricia Greenfield (1984). In 
1984 Greenfield published an ethnographic account of games and the appeals of games 
as expressed by players (primarily children or adolescents) Greenfield encountered in the 
amusement arcades of the time. In her account she puts forward several 'appeals', 
starting with the visual expressiveness of the medium (similar to television in her 
reasoning) and including 'active control'. She also examines Malone's theorised 
motivations in relation to her own observations and interviews. Greenfield's 
interpretation of this data proposes, with loose reference to Malone, that games are 
primarily visual, like television, while allowing a degree of active control not found in 
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television. Much of her discussion relates to the skills and culture expressed by these 
arcade videogame players, but doesn't explicitly relate these to the appeals she raises.  
Could we 'collapse' Malone’s motivations into 'visual appeal' and 'active control'? Surely 
the appeals suggested by Greenfield would result in a hypothesis which states that the 
more visually appealing a game (which is surely not an objective quality) and the more 
control a player is offered will correlate with engagement. I doubt that increasing the 
amount of control will always result in greater engagement. Surely there is a point where 
too much is demanded of the player, and the game ceases to be 'playable', 'enjoyable' or 
'engaging'; though maybe this doubt could be mitigated by Rozendaal et al. (2009), who 
show that there may be a correlation between control and engagement. Ultimately 
Greenfield’s work presents an Ethnographic account of the arcades of the early 1980s. It 
is not clear whether we can assume that these insights relate to subsequent 
developments of the medium, though perhaps the success of the modern industry is due 
in part to the increasing visual sophistication of videogames as well as to advancements 
in control mechanisms. 
Empirical research into what the phenomenon of games playing is seems to enter a 
hiatus for around fifteen years, but around the year 2000 a number of researchers were 
exploring a number of closely related questions. 
1.4.3. Fabricatore 
The Ph.D. research of Carlo Fabricatore (Fabricatore et al. 2002) attempted to tackle the 
question of what makes a good game. At least this seems to have been the initial intent: 
“What according to players’ preferences determines the quality of a videogame? What do 
players want in videogames?” Fabricatore et al. report having used an interpretation of 
Grounded Theory methodology (GT) to develop a model of 'gameplay'. This approach is 
interesting as it is a variant of this methodology that will be reported in this present 
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thesis. The version of GT implemented by Fabricatore starts by narrowing the problem 
space by defining a delimiting research question to focus on 'gameplay', defined as the 
instantiation of usability as it applies to games, and investigating it in 'action' games due 
to that description (action game) fitting a number of popular games at the time the 
research was started. Fabricatore specifically rejects factors related to 'ambience' or the 
emotional draw of a game, due to the difficulty in developing guidelines based on such. 
Other types of games are rejected due to the greater 'historical significance' of action 
games. The research then observed and recorded selected expert players playing a 
preselected sample of action videogames and followed these play sessions with 
structured interviews. The procedure then followed the general pattern of GT by 
iteratively fracturing the data in order to develop comparative concepts. The resultant 
theory is a hierarchical model of a number of different features which may influence the 
perceived quality of the 'gameplay' of an action videogame. This result should be of 
interest to the designers of action videogames in order to ensure that they have a 
sound, usable/playable product. In rejecting ‘ambience information’ in this grounded 
study of playability has Fabricatore missed critical information about players’ 
preferences? It could be argued that in sidelining “mere” perceptual elements of a game, 
which contribute to “creating a specific atmosphere capable of drawing and maintaining 
players’ attention” we will not necessarily answer the question of “what do players want 
in videogames”. 
As Fabricatore so delimits his scope to the playability factors of action videogames, is it 
right to ask if such a model could be transferred to other genres and if so are “ambience 
factors” always difficult to account for? If we compare this approach, and the consequent 
findings, with others (such as those mentioned in this chapter) we can see that factors 
such as fantasy (Malone); perceptive fun (Choi et al); social interaction, and fantasy and 
arousal (Sherry et al), which one might include in Fabricatore’s ‘ambience factors’, are so 
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regularly included that to decide to ignore them, with no rational justification, might lead 
to a theory which misses much of what shapes those preferences? Is this a feature of 
action games or an ungrounded omission by this piece of research?      
Putting such criticisms of scope aside, Fabricatore’s model of the functional aspects of 
action game playability is rich and seemingly comprehensive, and may well be useful for 
understanding the requirements for developing ‘playable’ action games. 
1.4.4. Choi, Kim and Choi 
Choi, Kim and Kim (Choi et al. 1999) asked if designers and consumers have the same 
ideas about what makes computer games fun. To this end they report having 
brainstormed, reviewed writings, and interviewed players and developers to help them 
generate a hierarchy of factors relating to fun games via the Analytic Hierarchy Process, 
which they then report having verified with further subjects. This structure of factors was 
then used to design a questionnaire to determine subjects’ opinions as to whether these 
factors affect the potential of any game to engage players. The questionnaire was then 
administered by survey to people who play games and people who design games, to 
statistically determine if the two groups demonstrate any agreement. 
Interestingly it turns out that there was little agreement between developers and players 
as to what makes a game ‘fun’, even though the subjects were selected because of their 
involvement with games of the same two genres (strategy games and role playing 
games). That there is disagreement between players and designers with respect to their 
opinions relating to what makes a fun game is interesting; it suggests that we shouldn't 
place too much emphasis on industrial concerns when studying game reception, that in 
talking to players we get a more accurate representation of their concerns than talking 
to developers.  
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In terms of the model developed, the factors presented seem incomplete and restrictive 
when we consider other, similar theories. For example the second level of the hierarchy 
(after ‘fun game’) contains the sub factors ‘cognitive fun’ (a sense of intellectual 
pleasure) and ‘perceptive fun’ (a sense of sensory pleasure), and just two nodes at this 
level of the hierarchy seems insubstantial. Formal theories of pleasure such as that of 
Tiger (1992) may include social pleasures or break intellectual pleasures into more 
granular factors (Tiger’s four kinds of pleasure are ideo-pleasure, psycho-pleasure, 
socio-pleasure, and physio-pleasure). This restriction in the number of factors appears to 
be an artefact of the type of Analytic Hierarchy Process employed, where every level of 
the hierarchy must consist of two contrasting nodes. We must then question whether the 
Analytic Heirarchy Process is necessarily a good fit. While such a hierarchical 
deconstruction can be a useful approach in tackling a rational decision making process, 
decomposing the features of the decision by increasing degrees of granularity, the 
question of what makes videogames fun or engaging might not be a rational decision 
making problem which the Analytic Hierarchy Process was created to describe (see the 
extended discussion of Rational Decision Making in the general literature section below).  
As previously noted, the observation that players’ and developers’ opinions of games, 
which might be described by certain genre descriptions (strategy and role-playing 
games), do not correlate is indeed interesting. Thus it is possible that developers do not 
naturally understand what makes games good or engaging to players. Other than this 
clear observation we also have a hierarchical model of fun when reasoning about playing 
strategy and role-playing games. The top level of this hierarchy seems quite narrow 
when compared with factors developed by others working in a similar space; could these 
differences be due to the special needs of the players (and designers) of strategy and 
role-playing games? Could we transfer these findings to the players of other kinds of 
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videogames? Possibly, but maybe the way that the model restricts itself to contrasting 
pairs of factors at each level of the hierarchy forces such a difference when compared to 
models developed without such restriction. As such this hierarchy might need to be 
reinterpreted before it can be transferred to cases outside of those studied.   
1.4.5. Sherry et al 
Sherry, Lucas, Rechtsteiner, Brooks and Wilson (2001) approach the problem from a 
perspective of applied media research by formulating three major research questions:  
• What are the most popular genres of video games among the sample? 
• What are the main reasons people use video games? 
• Do use, genre preference, and reasons for using video games differ between men 
and women? 
From these questions they formulate two hypotheses stated as: 
• Uses and gratifications will be correlated with amount of time playing video 
games. 
• Uses and gratification will be correlated with genre preference. 
As such they are attempting to place their research within the broader tradition of the 
Uses and Gratifications Theory approach to media research which is a perspective which 
seeks to understand what the audience do with media as opposed to what effects the 
media might have on an audience. 
To this end they report having performed an extensive series of quantitative studies. The 
first interesting aspect of these studies is the set of dimensions or variables used. Other 
than just gender the hypotheses include genre and ‘uses and gratifications’.  
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With respect to genre, Sherry et al. describe how they analytically derived fourteen 
mutually exclusive genres by reviewing magazine and World Wide Web reviews. These 
genres were then validated by pretesting with a reasonably large sample of subjects 
(one hundred and twenty). These genres were then subjected to a type of Factor 
Analysis, factoring by subjects’ stated preferences, yielding three main factors 
(“clusters”) within the genres. These three clusters were dubbed Imagination games, 
Traditional games, and Physical Enactment games.   
In the case of uses and gratifications, a previous study by Sherry and Lucas 
(unpublished) had formulated six principal motivations to play, by means of a series of 
focus groups with a total of almost a hundred respondents. These six “dimensions of 
videogame use” (Sherry and Lucas) are: Competition; Challenge; Social Interaction; 
Diversion; Fantasy; and Arousal.  
Surveys, that could be said to represent these uses and gratifications, were then 
created, validated and administered (over 500 subjects) in order to answer the research 
questions by means of testing the hypotheses. Statistical analysis of the results of this 
survey reveals that there are indeed correlations between gratifications and playing 
time, and gratifications and genre preference. Implying that those seeking certain 
gratifications are likely to play more than those seeking other gratifications, and these 
gratifications are manifested differently within the genres. Also these correlations are not 
identical for both genders. 
These results are of interest to us mainly because the uses and gratifications formulated 
are similar to high order factors of engagement like those put forward by Malone (1981) 
or Kline and Arlidge (2003). Also if we hold that the reported time spent playing is an 
indicator of the degree of engagement experienced by the subjects, the specific 
correlations uncovered in answering the first hypothesis tell us which gratifications yield 
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the most engagement. These turn out to be Diversion followed by Social Interaction. The 
fact that different results are gained for the different genders is also interesting, as it 
highlights that diverse players have diverse preferences (different needs perhaps), and 
that some of these variations may be grouped around gross demographic variables (in 
this case gender, but we might also ask if other gross variables, which were not 
captured, such as class or race might also show a difference in preference). 
While the results of this study are interesting, it is obvious that it was not intended to 
answer the same question as our own. The second major research question of Sherry et 
al. (What are the main reasons people use video games?), while being similar to asking 
what is videogame engagement, does not differentiate between games sufficiently well 
to have provided us with any answers; it is as if they had asked “What are the main 
reasons people read newspapers” without asking why more people read one paper more 
than others. One major difference between this research and the research reported in 
this thesis is that the main means of differentiation between games used by Sherry et al. 
is that of genre. This differentiation seems to be a fairly artificial structure. It could be 
argued that as genres are not mutually exclusive, they therefore give us a weak means 
of differentiation between games. For example, considering the similarities or 
dissimilarities of two well known games we could argue that The Legend of Zelda: The 
Wind Waker (Nintendo EAD 2003) and Super Mario Sunshine (Nintendo EAD 2002), both 
for the Nintendo GameCube, might well be put into different genres, but have many 
similar gameplay and stylistic features, and apparently a similar target audience. As 
another example it is difficult to understand what Sherry et al. intend by the genres 
named ‘Arcade’ and ‘Kids’, especially as the genres indicated are intended to be mutually 
exclusive. So what the classification by genre captured, in terms of the commonalities 
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and differences between games, is not made clear, in spite of the attempt to validate 
these conceptions statistically.  
So Sherry et al seem to have a solid answer to the question of videogame engagement: 
in that players primarily seek diversion and social interaction, and sometimes seek 
competition, challenge, fantasy and arousal. However how these factors are manifested 
in any individual’s engagement with a particular game is hard to predict. Here genre is a 
blunt instrument which doesn’t seem to capture the rich variability of games. Also broad 
demographic indicators such as gender may not reflect the behavioural differentiators 
critical to understanding the individual differences of engagement.  
It is interesting to note that the factors put forward in by Sherry el al have 
commonalities with those proposed by Malone, Greenfield, and Ermi and Mäyrä (as 
covered in this chapter), so maybe a consensus about the factors of videogame 
engagement is being realised.  
1.4.6. Ermi and Mäyrä 
Another attempt to empirically derive a set of factors is that of Ermi and Mäyrä (2003). 
They report having performed a broad overview survey on almost 300 children aged 10-
12 and their parents, followed by a series of 15 follow up interviews with 16 of those 
children and their parents. They framed their research question to account for issues of 
'power' and 'control' which we might rephrase as 'engagement potentials' and 'parental 
management strategies' respectively. From their interviews they extract a list of powers, 
or features of a play experience with the ability to engage. This list: novelty and 
spectacle; excitement of combat; game characters; persistence; exploration; 
advancement; unravelling of puzzles; building, creating and controlling; humour; relation 
to one's hobby or interest; audiovisual quality; imaginary world; and winning; seems 
quite comprehensive. In terms of the controls placed on children’s play there seems to 
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be little to help us understand what makes a player engage in a game and so is of little 
interest to the concerns of this current thesis, and so will not be explored here. In their 
concluding statements Ermi and  Mäyrä admit that a comprehensive analysis of the 
'powers' of games was not performed beyond the extraction of the themes listed above, 
but proposed that some of the powers could be summarised as players' “empowerment 
or imaginative liberation”. So their thesis relating to the engagements of videogame play 
resolves to a list of possible 'powers' or engagement features, with a broad 
interpretation of how these features might interrelate, but with an admission that this 
suggested relationship is an initial impression put forward without rigorous analysis. 
The nature of their sample is interesting, as while they restricted their age of their 
subjects to 10-12 years old (reducing the potential for creating a fairly general theory of 
videogame engagement perhaps) they did not restrict the scope of the study by the 
gaming experience of the subjects or the games that they might have had experience in 
playing. Their broad hunch then might suggest that children of this age are drawn to 
empowering and imaginative games in general, but we would be unwise to assume that 
this draw is true for individuals outside this age group, but the fact that their ‘powers’ 
are comparable with other proposed factors might suggest that it could be possible to 
transfer these findings to cases outside the sample they employed. 
1.4.7. Brown and Cairns 
The issue of using understandable terms is an important one. Where Ermi and Mäyrä talk 
of power and control in a way that might not be immediately clear, Brown and Cairns 
(2004) try to clarify what the ultimate gaming experience might be called via an 
empirical methodology. Brown and Cairns focus their attention on 'immersion' and 
attempt, via an implementation of the Grounded Theory methodology to find how game 
players use this term and what being immersed in a videogame experience might be said 
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to be. Their description of immersion includes several levels, starting with 'engagement' 
and ending in 'immersion' which might also be understood as a high level of engagement 
or 'flow' 
It is unclear whether Brown and Cairns derived the importance of ‘immersion’ from data 
in a grounded manner, or if they deduced that immersion must be critical before entering 
the field. Both possibilities raise questions, especially in light of the methodology 
employed. As my own research yielded a single, unprompted, reference to immersion by 
a single subject I feel obliged to question where immersion, as a central theme of their 
theory, came from, or whether ‘immersion’ is the best term to describe a deeply 
engaging experience. 
They have however highlighted a couple of interesting features of engagement. The first 
is that any experience is not a fixed and isolated instance of interaction; players must 
learn what the game has to offer and how to play it effectively in order to potentially 
become increasingly engaged. The second point is that, at least in the early stages of 
engaging with a game, Brown and Cairns feel that there is an investment that the player 
must make early in the process of becoming engaged. This investment is a kind of 
pass/fail gateway which the player must overcome in order to progress to further levels 
of engagement including, ultimately, immersion. However how this investment is made, 
what is invested and what the return is expected to be is not explored. 
However, weather we call a strong engagement ‘immersion’ or something else, Brown 
and Cairns seem to have developed a theory with relations to formal theories relating to 
investments, such as Bourdieu’s Cultural Capital (1984), and deep, value laden 
engagement such as Csikszentmihalyi's Flow  (1990). So this work is interesting as it does 
not list a set of isolated factors, but rather presents a staged process leading from a 
state of no engagement to being deeply engaged. As such this result has features in 
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common with the work presented in this thesis, in that part of the theory presented in 
chapters to follow includes a contextual process which accounts for the degree of 
engagement a potential player might find in any particular game. Also Brown and Cairns 
do not pre-segment the problem in terms of player demographics or game types and as 
such their work represents a rare example of an attempt to develop a theory with broad 
applicability, grounded in empirical data.  
1.4.8. Ravaja et al 
As the above researchers were considering terms by which to explain the phenomenon 
of videogame play, various other researchers were reframing the problem to examine 
theoretically derived game engagement factors. One such reframing is that of Ravaja et 
al (2004) who set out to show the relationship between mood, valence and sense of 
presence with specific personality traits, within a conceptual framework of emotion. They 
state as a central tenet of their approach, “...people seek, and are eager to pay for, 
games that elicit optimal emotional responses (or response patterns)”. This statement 
seems to form a loose hypothesis, but a more clearly stated hypothesis is “Whether the 
responses to games differ as a function of the player's personality”. In order to test this 
hypothesis they experimentally took measures of valence, mood and sense of presence 
and compared them with measures of the personality traits of impulsive sensation 
seeking and self-forgetfulness. 
Ultimately their conclusion is that different videogames elicit “different emotional 
patterns and degrees of presence”. Specifically their results confirm that their 
experimental sample, of 37 rewarded college students, demonstrated correlations 
between emotional response, sense of presence, and personality. They point out that 
that an emotional profile for a game is not necessarily a totally reliable indicator of its 
popularity, citing the popularity of Tetris (Soviet Academy of Sciences 1984) (a version of 
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which was included in their experimental conditions) and the apparently 'poor' emotional 
response of their subjects toward that title. One aspect of this research which seems to 
triangulate with the findings of others is that first-person perspective and challenging 
games both elicit a greater sense of presence. It seems that there are interesting results 
in what this research failed to show as there are in what it did show. Asking subjects to 
self rate their emotions and sense of presence does not seem to guarantee an overall 
valence that could be said to fall foul of disconfirming cases, as shown by their admission 
of the emotionally 'poor' Tetris. So we might suggest that while emotion, the patterns of 
these emotions, and possibly presence may sometimes partly account for the reasons 
why a player, holding a particular set of personality traits, may engage in playing a 
particular game, how this occurs and what the relationships between all these factors 
might be is not clearly explored. One reason for this possible lack of coherence is that 
Ravaja et al seem to take a view on what variables to include in their experiments by 
selecting multiple popular theories as worthy of investigation. It is not uncommon for 
psychologists to discuss emotion and valence, and it is not uncommon for videogames 
researchers to discuss presence as a way of framing engagement, but to assume some 
relationship between these two fields, without accounting for the wealth of other possible 
constructs (see elsewhere in this section) seems fairly arbitrary. For a methodology 
which places such emphasis on quantitative evaluation of experimental data the 
experimental hypotheses are not clearly expressed and as such the conclusions are 
unclear.  How was the hypothesis that self-forgetfulness and impulsivity are the most 
critical traits in videogame response, and was this validated or refuted? Likewise was 
there a hypothesis that valence, mood and sense of presence capture a player’s 
response to games better than other possible measures and was this metric tested? 
Otherwise that there will be a correlation between games and the emotional responses of 
players, seems to be a quite obvious truism, almost a tautology: different experiences 
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are experienced differently. However that challenge and sense of presence appear to 
correlate in this sample raises interesting implications for studying the conditions of 
presence and the effects of challenge on an experience. 
1.4.9. Sweetser and Johnson 
Continuing this, more or less chronological, review of the literature which empirically 
deals directly with the question of what videogame play is and how it engages players 
leads us to Sweetser and Johnson (2004). Their two stage study, specifically addressing 
'game environments', is interesting for two reasons. The first reason is that in 
qualitatively exploring player issues with game environments, they find much 
information about what players enjoy in general. The second is the mix of methods 
employed.  
The methodology employed was to run a four participant focus group to extract  'issues' 
and then run a relatively large scale survey asking users to rate the effect of certain 
variables on their enjoyment of games. Ignoring that they claim to have used a version 
of the Grounded Theory methodology on their initial single focus group (a methodology 
which is by definition iterative), their list of 'issues’: consistency; immersion and 
suspension of disbelief; freedom of player expression; intuitiveness; and physics seems 
to show some degree of consistency with other studies reviewed here. This list of issues, 
possibly in virtue of being developed using just four experienced players, may however 
fall foul of several counter examples. For example 'a strong theme' coming from this 
research was one of consistency (that 'in game' objects should behave in the ways 
players might expect them to based on their experiences, particularly in the real world)  
which seemingly fails to demonstrate 'fit' (a key Grounded Theory quality evaluation 
metric) if one considers 'casual' games which often use an approximation of physical 
properties versus simulations which go to great lengths to replicate the behaviours of 
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real world objects as accurately as possible; as it seems apparent that these two 
approaches to 'consistency' will appeal to different players in different games. Likewise if 
one considers games with environments which are abstract in nature (if we use the 
'Tetris argument' yet again) we can see that the list of issues produced seems to have 
little to say about the engagements or frustrations of players in general. 
The survey element of the research statistically verified the issues they had developed 
(and presumably surveyed for). Other observations from the survey relating to 
experiences and preferred game types are at such a level and are presented in such a 
way that they tell us little about why player x might engage with game k, especially if 
that game does not consist of a virtual environment with aspects which simulate the real 
world in any way. So in terms of the study as a whole we still do not have an answer to 
the question of what engages the players of videogames in general. Can we transfer the 
'issues' raised by a handful of experienced players to the experiences of non-experienced 
players? Does a survey based on such a small pilot study give us sufficient coverage in 
terms of factors to come to any general conclusions?  The issues put forward 
(consistency; immersion and suspension of disbelief; freedom of player expression; 
intuitiveness; and physics) are interesting as they do not seem comparable to other 
issues or factors put forward by others. Other than immersion (Brown and Cairns) the 
issues seem to be similar to a list of possible ‘usability’ issues with general software. This 
difference might be due to the initial study focussing on ‘issues’ or problems with certain 
gaming experiences. As such most of these factors present a list of possible reasons a 
player might become frustrated or disengaged with a game (inconsistency; limited 
freedom; unintuitiveness; and inaccurate physics model), with immersion and 
suspension of disbelief seemingly sitting apart as a possible reason (or couple of 
reasons) to play, rather than opposites of reasons not to play. As such to state that a 
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player will try and suspend their disbelief in order to become immersed in a game world, 
and will be less likely to do so if the game acts inconsistently to player behaviour; forces 
the player to play in a specific way and limits their freedom to try different things out; 
behaves in unexpected or unintuitive ways; or uses a strange model in its presentation 
of physics, seems not unreasonable.  
1.4.10. Carr 
A broadly qualitative approach was taken by Carr (2005) when she performed a series of 
interviews, questionnaires, and longitudinal observations (via a specifically convened 
school gaming club)  in order to investigate the tastes of girls in a South London school. 
While her research set out to investigate gender as a factor, the ultimate conclusion of 
Carr's study is that “Different people will accumulate particular gaming skills, knowledge 
and frames of reference, according to the patterns of access and peer culture they 
encounter – and these accumulations will pool as predispositions, and manifest as 
preferences.” while “Preferences are an assemblage, made up of past access and positive 
experiences, and subject to situation and context.”. This observation suggests that, at 
least for these girls, engagement with a particular game depends on if they are either 
familiar with it (by virtue of themes or prior experience with that game) or are directed 
to it by their social context. 
Could we transfer these findings to cases other than 13 year old girls in a school club run 
in a British school? Tentatively it seems possible that the formal nature of the hypothesis 
and the relationship between these findings and my own findings (using a much broader 
range of subjects) suggests that these observations may well be more broadly 
applicable. 
Another interesting point to consider in this study is that, while it focussed on young 
female players, hypothesised gender preferences (for specifically female avatars or 
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‘female friendly’ themes) did not show as great an effect as one might expect. Maybe 
this weak support of this hypothesised effect was due in part to the ‘safe’, all female 
environment of the club, or maybe other personal factors contribute to preference at 
least as strongly as gender identity. Another related point raised by this research is that, 
when polled, Carr’s subjects expressed certain preferences for games with particular 
features, however these stated preference were not strongly supported by the observed 
behaviour of the girls in the club; with many girls eschewing games with the features 
stated in favour of other games without those features. It seems that the social context 
of the club and the experience of playing different games had a greater effect on the 
actual games played than preconceived notions of what constitutes a good game. This 
last point has implications for any research which relies solely on interview data or some 
other statement of preference, such as that reported in this thesis. Preference then must 
be contrasted with experience, either in interview or, preferably, observation. 
How any individual player might engage with any individual game is generalised out to 
group principles, but we have an inkling that we might need to look beyond the list of 
game features (at least for teenage girls) in attempting to predict what people might 
actually engage with. This study is also interesting as it gives us a somewhat longitudinal 
view of engagement and preference with multiple players being given choice to engage 
at will with multiple games and find pleasure where they can. Perhaps this gives us a 
broader and more representative view than studies which focus on a small number of 
games, and is in stark contrast to 'playability' studies which engage 'expert' players in 
evaluating a single game (e.g. (Davis et al. 2005)), and perhaps this breadth gets us a 
little closer to a general theory of videogame engagement.    
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1.4.11. Barr, Noble and Biddle  
A broad approach, with distinct theoretical underpinnings and conclusions, is taken by 
Barr, Noble and Biddle (2007). Utilising a combination of Activity Theory and Structural 
Semiotics with empirical methods to examine the 'values' present in any game or 
gameplay activity in order to understand how any game “and games generally, actually 
work”; which appears to be an expression of the overall research question we are 
exploring here. 
Barr et al take Rokeach's (1973) definition of value (“An enduring belief that a specific 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an 
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.”), as well as other 
theoretical constructions from their chosen fields, to inform qualitative analysis of five 
distinct single user games, interviewing and recording the play sessions of five players 
for each. In combination with their own structured subjective analysis they take the 
above definition of value to refer to any mode of conduct from “maximising points in 
Tetris” say to “benevolence”; essentially suggesting that ludic motivations or goals are 
value systems (or can be combined into such).  
The example given of one case study (Pippin Barr et al. 2006) is of the values present in 
Fable. This previous work suggested that in playing Fable (Lionhead Studios 2004) a 
player has two key motivations to play: 'play' and 'progress'. Barr et al take these 
previously hypothesised motivations as fundamental videogame values, applicable in a 
universal sense for all single-player games. In this case these motivations, from an 
Activity Theory perspective, could be considered to be goals of the player. Another given 
example of the motives for playing a round of Counter Strike (Valve Corporation 1999) 
includes 'winning' and 'showing off' as the values, goals, or motives of the player. In this 
sense it is difficult to see how this method helps us understand why a player might be 
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playing Counter Strike to ‘win’ and ‘show off’ rather than some other game or activity, 
these stating ‘values’ in this way might suggest that games are set up to be played in 
certain ways, but not what differentiates the engagement a player has for one game 
relative to others. These examples and their expressed application of Structural 
Semiotics reveal a micro-level analysis of the values or value-structures of 'gameplay', 
accounting for the actions required by a player to achieve goals presented by the game 
and the ludic valence of values that might be present. A further example of this micro 
focus on ludic values is given in the analysis of Half-Life 2 (Valve Corporation 2004) 
where Barr et al state a core 'value' of aggression, demonstrated by proposing that the 
converse value of 'pacifism' is discouraged as the player adopting a passive approach to 
play will find it more difficult to progress in the game due to “repeated dying”. It is 
difficult to see clearly how this type of analysis relates to player engagement. Essentially 
this is a semiotic evaluation of games as played objects, accounting for some apparent 
and principally ludic value systems (such as score or level achieved); relating these 
proposed 'value' systems to the reports of players of the selected games in their, 
isolated, play experience. In this respect the approach is an interesting means by which 
we might understand a game from a value centric 'HCI perspective' at the level of 
successful and unsuccessful modes of play, such as winning or losing say, but what is it 
about the opportunities to 'win' or 'show off' that results in a player engaging with 
Counter Strike over, say, a multi-player game of Pro Evolution Soccer (Konami TYO 
2001) which might also present opportunities for the player to win or show off their 
skills? Are there other factors at work than just the values presented by an individual 
game? 
1.4.12. Rozendaal et al 
The most recent publications I will cover in this section are from 2009. Both Rozendaal 
et al (2009) and  Febretti and Garzotto  (2009) take the familiar approach of taking a 
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stance as to what factors influence videogame engagement most and then test these 
hypotheses with respect to their effect on measures of player engagement. 
The approach taken by Rozendaal et al. was to determine that 'richness' and 'control' 
were theorised to contribute greatest to player engagement. Using this position they set 
out to validate this proposition experimentally. They developed a custom game which 
could be modified along the hypothesised dimensions and performed two repeated 
measures experiments. In the first experiment they repeatedly tested ten subjects under 
a comprehensive set of conditions, and in the second experiment they similarly tested 
twenty five subjects under a sub-set of these conditions. Each condition varied the 
degree of 'richness' (or complexity) and 'control' (the amount of influence the player 
may or must have over proceedings). 
The correlated results show that there is a relationship between richness and 
engagement and between control and engagement. However the results are not purely 
linear, showing that ever increasing 'richness' eventually results in a lessening of 
engagement and sense of control. This result is interesting as it shows that early 
conceptions of how games might engage were potentially incomplete (for example 
Greenfield 1984). 
In their conclusions they suggest that there are likely to be other factors in a player's 
engagement with a game such as social factors. This suggestion leads us to believe that 
the results of these experiments should be viewed as interesting observations about two 
potentially influential factors, but these two factors are not the only factors involved. 
How do we contextualise richness or control? 
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1.4.13. Fabretti and Garzotto 
The factors of 'richness' and 'control' might well be related to Fabretti and Garzotto's 
(2009) Usability and Playability in their investigation of 'long term engagement'. In their 
study they report having applied heuristic analysis to eight games which were selected 
on the basis of their commercial success and that the researchers felt that they suffered 
from usability failings. These heuristic analyses were used to rate the games in terms of 
playability and usability. In order to determine how engaging the games were, the eight 
games were tested by users and rated, and media reviews were combined with these 
user ratings to determine an overall engagement rating. The overall hypothesis driving 
these ratings was “Does usability truly influence long term engagement? In particular, do 
usability problems reduce long term engagement? Or is long term engagement more 
strongly related to other design features, those addressing “playability” per se, which 
may overwhelm the influence of usability defects?”. In order to test these hypotheses 
they statistically examined how their various ratings correlated. 
Their results suggest that usability, as rated, has no significant relationship with player 
engagement, though the ratings of playability did. This result might suggest negative 
implications for studies which focus on usability factors, such as that of Fabricatore el al 
(2002). In terms of the individual heuristics used in order to arrive at the ratings of 
usability and playability, it is interesting to note that there is low correlation between 
both 'objectives and feedback' and 'concentration and immersion' and the rating of long 
term engagement, contrary to the fundamental assumptions of theories such as Flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1990) or the findings of Brown and Cairns (2004), where we might 
expect clear objectives and feedback to be a critical indicator of engagement (Flow) or 
concentration and immersion to be the end point or peak of the experience (Both Flow 
and Immersion). There is also no significant correlation between 'control' and reported 
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engagement which is also contrary to the fundamental positions of some such as 
Rozendaal (2009) who place this at the centre of engagement.  
However these results must be questioned in terms of the wisdom of the methodology. 
Is it possible that with a heuristic evaluation of playability that we are capturing some 
measure of the evaluator's subjective sense of engagement with a game, hence making 
a generalised correlation of players' sense of engagement and the derived heuristic 
rating of playability in fact both means of rating the same thing? What of evaluating 
player engagement and then 'validating' their reports with game review scores? Surely a 
game review is often a type of expert evaluation of which the heuristic analyses are a 
formal type. Thus isn't it quite likely that the measures of playability and engagement 
are in fact the same thing rendering the fact that the scores correlate quite 
uninteresting?  
It is interesting to note that the evaluations and ratings of usability seem to have little in 
common with ratings of engagement, that an independent sense of ludic quality, or 
playability, is critical to engagement. Though stating such seems potentially tautological 
(more engaging games will be rated as more playable, while a sense of playability is 
contingent on how engaged in the experience a player was).     
1.5. Remaining questions 
Many of the above approaches employ multiple factors to account for the differences 
between players’ engagements in videogame play From Choi el al with Cognitive and 
Perceptive fun to Ermi and Mäyrä’s list of possible powers. Is it possible to perform some kind of 
meta-analysis on these many factors in order to merge these various theories into a kind of principle 
of game-play and videogame engagement? Can we utilise these theories to understand what is going 
on when individual X plays game G, or can we use these to predict how a that player might engage 
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with new game H? My personal impression is that such an application of such factor based theories 
would be quite difficult without some guiding principle, or fundamental hypothesis related to how 
these factors are resolved in any particular experience. For example, what is the relationship 
between Malone’s Challenge, Curiosity, and Fantasy that has John play Ultimate Imagination Force XII 
all day whereas Jane can barely manage 5 minutes before switching to something else? Are these 
factors properties of the game or the player? Is Malone’s observation that the gender of the 
individual effects the kind of features sought a demonstration that individual differences are key to 
understanding engagement? Are these factors then subjective assessments of an experience rather 
than objective properties of games? Are there other indicators of individual difference which have a 
bearing on videogame engagement, other than gender? Is there a causal relationship to be found in 
any of this? 
Theories with possible broad, and potentially causal, applicability are those such as Carr’s impression 
that past experiences shape taste and thus preference and engagement, and Ermi and Mäyrä’s 
observation that their subjects seemed to be seeking “empowerment or imaginative liberation”, but 
without unpacking how these are resolved, and precisely what influence these effects might have on 
an individual’s behaviour there is still work to do to obtain a unifying hypothesis about just what it is 
that has one player engage with a particular game and others not.       
From the empirically derived or tested theories encountered above we can see that they 
are often bound to observations about specific types of games, or limit their studies to 
certain demographic groups and are thus restricted in their scope for explaining game 
play in a broadly applicable sense and instead focus on subsets of games or narrow sets 
of players. As such we are still looking for an empirically derived or validated theory or 
model of videogame play that accounts for males and females, young and old, 
experienced or inexperienced players playing action games, role playing games, puzzle 
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games, adventure games, and games that haven't been devised yet, at home with 
friends, at home alone, on the bus, at work, in the arcade, at school, in the games shop, 
or anywhere else games might exist. Perhaps there is no commonality between all these 
conditions. Perhaps any conclusion, be it a broad concept or a multivariate model, would 
be so general as to be useless in understanding the specifics of videogame play, such a 
theory necessarily being at a level of universal human subjectivity instead of at a 
granular level of recognisable videogame or features of a game play experience.  
So how would one set out to find such an answer? How would one find out what 
videogame play is or what the fundamental features of videogame engagement (and 
thus disengagement) are? Do we poll theories from other fields and domains and modify 
them to relate to videogame play? Do we select from these theories analytically and 
validate seemingly 'best' candidate theories empirically? Do we forego the idea of a set 
of factors or hypotheses as a useful answer and focus on case studies to suggest a series 
of narratives from which we can draw multiple conclusions at multiple levels of 
abstraction? Do we start from the beginning and extensively examine the domain to 
determine where to look, what to look at, and eventually zero in on what is important? 
Ultimately the approach taken will depend on the type of answer we are looking for, and 
I feel that a most interesting product, at this stage of development in the field, would be 
a broad hypothesis with a degree of explanatory and predictive power (a principal 
dependant variable). So an answer of the form “players play games because X” and by 
extension “Player A plays game J because of an instantiation of X”, is the ideal sought. Of 
the reviewed research the theory which seems closest to this form is that of Carr (2005), 
who suggested that an individual's taste is experientially and socially derived (though we 
cannot be certain that this is not an observation exclusive to teenage girls active in a 
games club); so players play games that they have experienced elements of before or 
have received positive feedback about from their social context. An example Carr 
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presents is where some girls came to play a certain game when they saw others playing 
it and thus experienced it in the agreeable social setting of the games club, but had 
expressed no interest in doing so until they had that experience.  
This level of answer seems most appropriate as a first step. From this point we can look 
for exceptions in the domain and relationships with other theory and quickly see where 
we should adjust our thinking. Taking Carr's example we could suggest that her theory 
might have poor predictive power as it seems obvious that any access to and thus 
exposure to a game is not necessarily going to result in a degree of positive 
engagement, and it is difficult to see how any engagement might occur without exposure 
or recommendation, though we can't dismiss the hypothesis out of hand, we would just 
need to potentially look for conditions and features of this behaviour, and modify the 
theory accordingly. 
In summary then, there are no empirically derived or validated theories which yield 
hypotheses at the level of operation which is of most interest to us at this time. That is 
are there universal factors or principles which can help us predict why any prospective 
player might engage with any game at any particular time. 
1.6. Related concepts 
Having examined some attempts to resolve questions of videogame engagement the 
following subsection will explore how the theory presented later in this thesis relates to 
other ideas from a fairly broad spectrum of fields. 
While there has not been a clear expression in the literature that engagement with 
videogames is determined by a process of continuously summed value judgements set 
against a sense of culturally relative identification, as the later chapters of this thesis 
propose, there have been many theories relating identity, self-culture, and social selves 
and how they might be developed and performed in almost every area of the social 
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sciences. There have also been some attempts to show that an individual's relationship 
with an experience is not an instantaneous and fixed value judgement, but develops over 
time, and has the potential to eventually influence the self-sense of the individual in 
turn.   
In this section I will summarise some of these overlapping theories and highlight, where 
applicable, how and where they might have been used in literature relating to 
videogames and the relationship with the grounded theory to follow. 
The broadest area is that of the personal, yet potentially socially relative, sense that 
players are playing games that they feel that they can identify with. This sense of 
identification with activities could be said to be cultural if we take a definition of culture 
as Tylor's: “Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” (1874), suggesting that 
an individual acquires such things and presumably acts according to them. This is 
distinct from a 'social' frame as the individual might be said to hold and maintain their 
culture (and cultural identity) in the absence of others, so they are acting culturally even 
when they are not acting socially (in the presence of and thus relative to others). 
Theories which have looked at the relationship between the self and society in this way 
have been developed since ancient times, but I will focus on much later theories; 
starting with the American Pragmatist school theories of the self from the Symbolic 
Interactionist perspectives of Cooley and Mead, moving through performative theories 
such a Goffman, and situated cognition theories as applied by Gee, postmodern theories 
as they have been used to refer to games, biological theories of pleasure, psycho-social 
theories of choice, and finally broad theoretical approaches to value and identification in 
Human-Computer Interaction and Game Studies. 
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1.6.1. Cooley's 'Looking Glass Self' 
Cooley's conception of the 'looking glass self' (1902) is an ideal place to start as this 
idea, which went on to help frame what has come to be known as Symbolic 
Interactionism within Sociology, has also helped to contextualise the some of the theory 
presented in this thesis. Cooley's idea is that an individual's identity is formed by their 
expectation of the responses of others. This identity is then performed and maintained 
outside of the social influence of others. So the main observation in this thesis relating to 
identity (that players implicitly seem to ask themselves if they are the kind of person 
who would engage in such an activity) can be reconsidered using the looking-glass self 
to suggest a state of reflected judgement. One might imagine that in the simplest sense 
the player is asking “If I saw another person playing this, what would I think of them?” 
and thus “If someone saw me playing this what would I expect them to think of me?” 
and in combination “If I play this what do I think about me?”. The player then could be 
said to be making value judgements about the meanings expressed by their play 
activities. What is the meaning of their commitment to overcome the challenge 
presented, say, or what does it mean if they play a game with child like presentations of 
the in-game characters? The meanings are ascribed values which are cultural in nature; 
the player applying their socially acquired aims and morals in a personal way, but 
referring them in a relative way. Expressions in the data such as OA's sense that he is 
not the kind of person who would watch a boxing match, so he doesn't seek pleasure 
from beat-em-ups, demonstrate that the assumed identity roles are most often 
expressed as negative cases, the potential player not being the kind of person who 
would engage in such an activity. 
This ascription of cultural roles, or the performance or embodiment of socially acquired 
values, could also be related to other conceptions of social selves and the values 
demonstrated by an individual’s cultural performance. The following section deals with 
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one influential version of socially constructed role performance, in Goffamn’s 
Dramaturgical Perspective, but there are other possible concepts we might relate these 
ideas to. For example, the concept of Habitus is ancient in origin but has relatively 
modern interpretations. Habitus as used by such as Bourdieu (1990) represents a sense 
of the culturally relative behaviour of an individual. The unconscious adoption of social 
norms gives rise to modes of behaviour which are embodied by the individual tacitly. We 
could say that one expression of this habitus is an individual’s identity which is 
constructed in a social context and is thus fundamentally cultural. Habitus, as used by 
Bourdieu, is a concept concerned with observable behaviours and only implicitly accounts 
for values and beliefs, but it is obvious that the two interact (society forming ones beliefs 
and values via enculturation and thence one’s beliefs and values informing ones 
behaviours within society, reinforcing social structures). Bourdieu’s work on taste is 
explored in detail below, but his use of the concept of Habitus is interesting and may 
help to frame some of the concepts developed and explored here. However the theory 
presented in this thesis has a strong sense that subjects present individual identities. 
They do not seem wholly ignorant of these identities and how they are presenting 
themselves; in fact they often seem to consciously locate themselves as individuals 
relative to others, with attendant values and tastes. While it is true that they might not 
ascribe an explicitly social origin for this identity, their identity expressions often betray 
cultural expectations.     
The chapter of this thesis which deals with how an individual engages with videogames 
as an expression of identity, explores the data and the substantive theory that was 
derived from it. As Cooley was an unexpected influence on the expression of the theory 
presented here his ideas are included within the chapters dealing with the theory 
directly, but other concepts with relevance are explored here. For example in exploring 
socially relative expressions of identity we might look to Goffman. 
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1.6.2. Goffman's 'Dramaturgical Perspective' 
This sense of assumed identity roles opens the possibility that a person's actions are 
essentially performative; the individual assuming a role according to the context they 
find themselves in. Goffman's dramaturgical explanation (1959) of social behaviour holds 
that individuals perform a multitude of socially expected roles according to the social 
context they find themselves in; presenting a self role as if it were a character being 
played on a stage in the theatre. While Goffman's primary aim was to show that in work 
situations a worker assumes quite specific roles and attendant attitudes and patterns of 
behaviours in order to maintain a mutually understood set of actions and outcomes, his 
work can be interpreted as relating to the expression of identities in other substantive 
settings. If we consider that games players might be playing roles in this way, especially 
when questioned about their play activities, we could say then that if we assume, as will 
be demonstrated below, that the potential players implicit question of 'am I the kind of 
person who would play this kind of game?' could be rephrased as 'In playing this game 
am I performing an acceptable role in this social context?'. Goffman suggests that these 
assumed roles are not necessarily ‘acts’ which the individual assumes independent of 
some core identity, but in fact aspects of the actor’s fundamental character. This attempt 
to suggest that acts or roles represent the fundamentals of a person’s character or 
identity seems a little bit odd given that Goffman’s theory revolves around a theatre 
metaphor, and the different behaviours observed in different areas of the theatre. So he 
suggests that a role is being played on the 'front stage' in front of the audience, and that 
the actors create an agreeable ensemble performance, but once 'back stage' can drop 
their assumed characters out of view of the audience. If, as Goffman suggests a personal 
identity is simply a set of roles being performed, then he breaks the metaphor and 
removes the concept of the 'back stage', the individual is always 'front stage' wherever 
they are in the metaphorical theatre, 'front stage', 'back stage', or in the auditorium. If 
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we allow for a ‘back stage’ set of behaviours, might we assume that these are the 
individual’s actual identity and character, and no longer a performance? We might 
illustrate this problem outside of the context of the workplace, say in terms of 
Multiplayer games (especially MMOs). Here Goffman's dramaturgic metaphor might be 
somewhat useful in studying role-playing, and party or clan behaviour, but in general 
gameplay (offline, co-located multiplayer, and  not massively but still multi-player online 
games) cases, 'Am I the kind of person who would play a game like this?' becomes a 
little bit more difficult to place front stage or back stage. Is the player front stage, 
playing a particular role in response to the expectations of an audience? If so who is or 
are the audience? Perhaps as Cooley argues, the audience is oneself and an imputed 
impression of how one might be judged by absent others. Is the player back stage and 
performing a non-role; a role, in the absence of an audience which we might imagine is 
a non self-conscious expression of a ‘real’ character?  
If we assume a somewhat heterophenomenological stance to the collection and analysis 
of interview data, and are tentatively confident that the expressed sentiments of 
interviewees, at least in part, describe actual attitudes, we might ask what role or roles 
the subjects are presenting. If they are indeed presenting a role are they in possession 
of a set of persistent cultural values or are we only observing a temporary and 
chameleon like identity? Is each interviewee acting the role of interviewee and 
concealing a set of 'back stage' values? Are the interviewees acting a 'back stage' role 
that represents a kind of core self-sense, which will then be concealed in other social 
situations? It seems quite apparent that when we are exploring the tastes and values of 
individuals relative to leisure activities, applying Goffman's performative system raises 
more questions than it answers. If we compare the stated actions and tastes of several 
people we can draw inference about the overall process of engagement. In order to do 
so however we must assume that, if such a thing exists independent of some core self 
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sense, the interviewee is employing the role of “interviewee” which (one would hope) 
includes a high degree of honesty in what the individual expresses.  
1.6.3. Gee's application of concepts from Situated Cognition 
In thinking about the relationships between roles and identities, and the behaviours 
these might bring about, Gee has taken an approach which seems to fit between a stable 
self-sense and the kind of role performance stance taken by Goffman (Gee 2003). Gee 
suggests that individuals maintain a wealth of relative identities which are then invoked 
in suitable situations. So currently I am writing from the identities of male, English, 
emerging academic and when I shut down the computer for the afternoon I might 
assume the identity of jovial pub patron or relaxed house mate. In terms of 'Am I the kid 
of person...?' Gee's perspective is that the situation invokes the relevant identities and 
then these identities, and the values they represent, are applied, role like, to the 
individual's pattern of behaviour in the current context. This theory seems close to what 
is being proposed in this thesis, but that individuals are composites of an infinite number 
of possible role identities is Gee’s attempt to reconcile the subjective feeling of a single, 
stable personal identity and the apparently inconsistent adjustments in behaviour 
determined by context, while the sense of identity employed in this thesis does not 
employ multiple personalities to account for user’s engagements with videogames. 
Gee's work mainly falls on the side of a Goffman like assumed role position, particularly 
when he explores the motivations to play videogames. Unfortunately here he seems to 
fall into the trap of assuming that “videogame” is a synonym for “virtual world” and that 
in playing such games the player's avatar mirrors the invoked identities of the player. 
The theory I have presented in this thesis places avatars as a single possible factor 
among several suggested points of identification. Often avatars and characters were 
barely mentioned by subjects if at all. If one considers what might be called “the Tetris 
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argument” 1 it is hardly surprising that players are identifying themselves as a 'player' 
not as a player/avatar cyborg much of the time. What kind of player being determined 
by the individual's sense of cultural values, not necessarily the values of the game they 
are playing. That is not to say that players cannot play roles in games, but that they play 
roles they are comfortable with suggests that there may be a fairly stable sense of 
identity exerted by the player in the games they play. 
1.6.4. Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow 
Having invoked “the Tetris argument” it would be wise to introduce a discussion of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi's concept of Flow (1975, 1990). Flow has been used in describing the 
challenge inherent in many action videogames (Sweetser & Wyeth 2005), of which Tetris 
(Soviet Academy of Sciences 1984) might be considered one. The conditions of Flow are 
often taken from Csikszentmihalyi's explanation of how Flow might be achieved and 
maintained for a tennis player, in that the challenge must approximate the player's 
ability. Too great a challenge and the player becomes frustrated and too little challenge 
and they become bored. This seems to mesh quite well with the challenge of an action 
games, such as Tetris, where the game becomes progressively more difficult or even why 
a player might not play a game because it is 'too hard' or 'too easy'. However I believe 
                                           
1  A typical argument against assertions that players are engaged by such 
gameplay features as a story (back story or in game narrative), avatars and characters, 
virtual environments, or graphical quality, in that many many people have been engaged 
by Tetris over the years and it has no story other than a basic ramping difficulty level 
until the player inevitably loses type of abstract narrative structure, no avatars or even 
characters, an environment which consists of a 2 dimension grid of squares, and a 
graphical presentation which is simple enough to be played on any machine with a 
graphical display. 
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that this aspect of Flow has been taken out of context relative to Csikszentmihalyi's 
greater thesis. Csikszentmihalyi states just prior to the above example in “Flow: The 
Psychology of Optimal Experience”, 1990: 
“In our studies, we have found that every flow activity, whether it involved 
competition, chance, or any other dimension of experience, had this in common: It 
provided a sense of discovery, a creative feeling of transporting the person into a 
new reality. It pushed the person to higher levels of performance, and lead to 
previously undreamed-of states of consciousness. In short, it transformed the self 
by making it more complex. In this growth of the self lies the key to flow 
activities.”   
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) then goes on to provide many more examples of Flow activities 
and suggests that they are all means of avoiding psychic entropy (or personal chaos). 
Ultimately he suggests that by applying an overall personal 'meaning' to everything one 
does, one might be able to make life itself into a Flow activity. 
In interpreting Csikszentmihalyi’s use of the term ‘meaning’ (as ‘significance’ or 
‘import’), I would argue that  Csikszentmihalyi is suggesting that people are looking to 
engage in activities they most value, and if they can find activities that allow them to 
grow personally, relative to this value system then they have a good chance of achieving 
an agreeable Flow state. 
How an individual comes upon these meanings or values appears to be informed by the 
social background and individuals' assumed roles within this context. Csikszentmihalyi 
also places importance in an individual’s personality, suggesting that those with a more 
‘autotelic personality’ will be more capable of Flow than others with less of a 
predisposition to engage in things for their own sake. This idea that there may be a 
variable, innate predisposition to engage in activities irrespective of the instrumental 
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value of the outcome seems to suggest that engagement may not be a function of the 
socio-cultural value of the activity. I believe this is not the case. Most of the examples 
Csikszentmihalyi gives are of individuals or groups engaging in activities with little end 
product to show for the endeavour hence his insistence that his concepts deal with 
intrinsically motivated autotellic individuals, however the activities themselves must be 
valued in some way, so while the activity might seem to offer few extrinsic rewards 
rewards are not wholly absent, just more difficult to spot than easy to identify qualities 
such as money or status. 
In light of Csikszentmihalyi’s thesis, that highly engaging activities are their own reward 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1975), it is interesting to note that many potential players of 
videogames are reluctant to become engaged in them, because of the power they have 
to engage. Some subjects report having experienced game playing which they describe 
in terms consistent with Flow, but rather than finding personal growth in this experience; 
rather than feeling that they were being transported to a undreamed of states of 
consciousness, they rather found the hours spent in the activity of game playing to be a 
waste of time. In this respect, I take his sense that a Flow experience must be 
‘meaningful’ (not like watching television to use one of his examples) to suggest that 
they are in some way accepted or valued by the culture of the individual playing them.  
1.6.5. Games as socio-cultural drivers 
Writers such as Raessens (2006), especially those approaching games from a pedagogic 
or other approach related to children and young people, focus on how games might have 
the capacity to shape the cultural identities of players. I have one major problem with 
these approaches, they assume that games are somehow inherently engaging, and that 
as young people inevitably play them they are personally shaped by them; assuming 
roles and values associated with the experience of playing the game (for example see 
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Gallelli and Fanelli 2010 or Christoph, Dorothée, and Peter 2009). A related approach is to 
assume that 'gaming' is some coherent community with well defined practices and 
values (from approaches taken by such as Lave (1991)) and that becoming a gamer 
within a particular genre or especially a particular Massively Multiplayer Online Role 
Playing Game (MMORPG) is 'becoming' or learning the culture of the other players of 
these games. For example Pearce (2006) explores how communities of players move 
from one MMORPG to another. My criticism of these approaches is not to say that 
communities cannot exist around play experiences, or that these communities do not 
have their own sub-cultures which must be learned and adopted by players. My issue 
with such approaches is that surely such an enculturation into the field of the game is 
not universal of all play experiences. Do we imagine that a player is necessarily learning 
a new way of being and behaving (a new culture) in order to play Solitaire on his 
telephone?    
These theoretical positions where a game, or the community associated with playing a 
game in a certain context, influences the culture of the player, only seem to represent 
part of the equation. A player is not a cultural blank slate to be populated with values 
and identity by gaming, rather a player is a socially realised cultural identity, even from 
an early age. This identity informs if, when, and which games will be played, how these 
games are played, and how these games are integrated back into the player's cultural 
identity. To quote a translation of Bourdieu (1990) “The conditionings associated with a 
particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
structures, that is as principles which generate and organise practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing 
a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order 
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to maintain them.”. While I am not claiming that experiences do not shape individuals (or 
their habitus), I am suggesting that to only look at how players are possibly influenced 
by their experiences of playing games might miss critical information about what the 
play experience actually is. That is in integrating these experiences back into the player's 
self-culture, games may have the capacity to shape the identities of players, but they 
have to play them first in order for this to happen, how do they get there? 
1.6.6. McCarthy and Wrights' experiential concept 
One approach which accounts for these cyclical relationships between identity and an 
artefact is that taken by McCarthy and Wright (2004). While their approach is related to 
a broad range of technological artefacts, much of what they discuss crosses over with 
what I have to say in this thesis. Indeed their approach of taking the Pragmatic stances 
of Dewey (1934) and Bakhtin (Collected in 1993) to understand the felt experience of 
using, interacting and living with technology has a great deal of overlap with my 
findings. One point of similarity is that they also recognise that an engagement is not 
simply a single (or repeated) instance of use, but also contains expectation and 
reflection, placing the experiencing subject and the object of experience in the broadest 
context. The breadth of this context extending out into personal conception of personal 
meaning and cultural value of the individual's life, not just their life related to the 
technological artefact. This consideration of the overall felt experience (history, 
reflection, context) of the individual then determines the degree of meaning and value 
they then apply to the experience they are having as they have it. 
Where their position is clearly different from that of this thesis is that they regularly 
expound the view that technology is transformative, that the use and interaction of 
technology transforms the mores of society and hence the culture of individuals within it, 
while the position of this thesis is that the construction and adoption of videogame play 
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is shaped by the culture of those producing and playing respectively. This might seem 
like a minor point, especially as McCarthy and Wright break down the processes of an 
experience into Anticipating, Connecting, Interpreting, Reflecting, Appropriating, and 
Recounting, which can be broadly mapped to the cycle of engagement I have proposed 
here (select, play, reflect), but that a technological product can have an effect on its 
users requires that they first choose to engage with it. This choice is informed by their 
pre existing culture, and only by adoption within that cultural (social or personal) context 
may the product have a transformative effect on further iterations of the cycle. 
So while McCarthy and Wright have focussed on the transformative power of a 
technology, using similar concepts to those I have developed here, I have focussed on 
the conditions of engagement with a specific type of technology. 
1.6.7. 'Meaning' vs 'Value' 
I feel that I must again point out that Csikszentmihalyi, Wright and McCarthy and others 
make use of the term 'meaning' and the derivative 'meaningful' in the sense that a thing 
is important or significant. In this thesis I have preferred to use 'value' to suggest both 
positive or negative  judgement, magnitude, and to avoid confusion with the more 
general semantic or semiotic uses of the terms meaning and meaningful, which may be 
expressed as 'what is signified or intended'. While I am not suggesting that there is no 
place for discussing meaningful experiences or meaningful videogames, it is easier to 
relate the aggregate of judgements I have expressed here as values (in my case socially 
derived cultural values expressed as an identity). There is one possible point of confusion 
in this usage of 'value' that I will also deal with and that is where 'value' is taken to 
represent a high social value such as honesty or courage. This usage is not my only 
intention, rather I intend value to represent the worth or merit of a thing (in my case the 
attitude of potential players to games they might play). This sense of value coming from 
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a Cooleyesque sense of how the player sees themselves, which is similar, but not 
identical to Bakhtin's dialogic construction of self or Dewey's pro-social, active self. A 
value being a positive or negative judgment toward a thing based on how we feel this 
attitude (and associated action) would represent how we see ourselves.  
It might seem that what we are discussing is taste. Indeed we are, but we might re-
formulate taste as an expression of a socially located self. How this self relates to the 
playing of videogames can be expressed in a multitude of ways from 'hardcore gamers' 
who identify with playing as engaging in a prized activity which rightly takes up much of 
their time, to complete rejecters, who for various reasons, have decided that games 
really are not for them; that games are for other people. 
1.6.8. Bourdieu and cultural capital 
These enculturated values and their relationship to a person’s sense of taste might be 
expressed as the player seeking to reinforce ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1986). Bourdieu 
uses ‘Cultural Capital’ to refer to the knowledge, values, and modes of behaviour that 
promote or confer a potentially elevated position in society. That is culture that has a 
value. He separates cultural capital from economic (money and assets) and social capital 
(valuable interpersonal networks) to suggest a distinct economy, operated in its own way 
to reinforce the position of the privileged social classes. In his book on taste (Distinction, 
1984) Bourdieu proposes that the tastes and culture of a society (particularly his native 
French society) are legitimated by the upper classes. The upper classes determine, by 
their employment of a combination of economic, social, and cultural capital, what is 
‘best’ for society and thus a national culture. It is this culture which is then taught in 
schools, and which the other classes aspire to acquire. The variability in the observed 
behaviours and held values (or habitus) between the classes represents the ability of 
families within those classes to redistribute accumulated capital, by inheritance or gifting 
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of economic wealth, introducing or socialising with individuals with influence, and by 
educating their children in legitimate modes of behaviour both formally at school and 
informally in the familial environment. Upward social mobility then requires accumulation 
of each form of capital. 
As a sociological analysis on power structures and social mobility, and how such mobility 
is manifested in cultural capital as evidenced by the expressed tastes of the different 
classes, Bourdieu’s work is interesting. Indeed we might observe the taste relationships 
he describes in the data collected for this thesis, especially in the expressions of those 
who reject videogames as a legitimate leisure activity. We could say that the videogames 
such people have encountered did not strike them as an activity which they should be 
engaged in, as they lack legitimacy and are thus of no value. They will not learn about 
the intricacies of the ‘hobby’ as it is ‘not for the likes of them’ and anything they do learn 
about videogames will not seem to provide them enhanced cultural capital. Other forms 
of entertainment (theatre say or reading) give them legitimated knowledge, knowledge 
they can use to appear to be ‘cultured’. 
While gender is often discussed in respect to taste in videogames, it is interesting that 
Bourdieu found much greater variation between social classes than he did between 
genders when investigating the tastes of hundreds of French citizens. As a Sociologist his 
emphasis is on social structures that give rise to group behaviours and how groups 
appear to dominate others. To reframe what he has said to relate to experiences at an 
individual level, where an individual embodies the culture they have acquired from their 
own social context, expressed as values and behaviours, we see clear similarities with 
Dewey’s (1934) ‘Experience’ approach to understanding aesthetics, where the life history 
and learning of the individual viewer is critical to their personal appreciation of an object 
as a pleasing art object rather than some inherent property of the object. Bourdieu 
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highlights some of the conditions for how this difference in appreciation might occur, 
however his emphasis on legitimation of culture by a dominant class does not clearly 
account for the great pleasure individuals might find in supposedly illegitimate culture 
(such as videogames). Let’s take an example that is neither art nor videogame and 
consider sport. For many the spectacle of watching a sporting event (say an Association 
Football match) amounts to an intense aesthetic and social experience. For Dewey the 
intensity of this experience would be contingent on the prior experience and knowledge 
of the spectator. The ‘fan’ might have been born in the host town of the team, and hence 
they might have a sense of social connection with their success. They might have played 
football themselves, and thus have an appreciation of the nuances of the skills and 
tactics required to succeed at the game. They might have followed the fortunes of the 
players, the coach, and the team for many years and have a sense of investment in their 
fortunes. They might have many friends who are also football fans, with whom they 
discuss and debate the latest developments of the sport. All of these supporting 
experiences give the individual background upon which their appreciation of an individual 
football match rests. This appreciation is not contingent on the legitimation by a 
dominant class. No the upper classes are potentially otherwise playing their upper class 
sports in their own way, and there is no sense that Association Football needs such 
legitimating in order to attract huge investment, a huge following, and yes, to be taught 
in schools. Videogames are a little bit different to football. The specialist press often 
contains articles about videogames as an art-form, but yet game-like interactive digital 
art is seldom seen in galleries, especially the large public galleries (such as The Tate 
Modern in London say). If Bourdieu is right, this slow adoption by the fine art world is 
possibly due to a lack of adoption by the art appreciating dominant classes. So 
videogames are not an established art form, and playing them will therefore be deemed 
by some as a waste of time compared to appreciating a painting, reading a good literary 
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book, watching a well directed film, eating at a fine restaurant, watching a well reviewed 
play, or listening to a well conducted musical performance, but videogames still engage 
huge numbers of people. Bourdieu suggests that the paranoid grasping at the trappings 
of the upper classes is a middle class affliction, and it may be that the people I 
interviewed who feel videogames were not for them; a waste of time, may well be 
described as middle class and thus prone to this affliction more than others who might 
be from other classes, though this is not a factor which was sampled for and the implicit 
demographic spread of interviewees might (gamers and non-gamers of apparently 
working to middle class origins) not support this claim. It seems to me that in order to 
resolve Bourdieu’s observations about the tastes of classes to account for individual’s 
observed behaviours and expressed opinions, a sense of identity needs to be included. 
Thus if an individual feels that they belong to a certain class, then they may well assume 
specific value positions to cultural objects according to their view of the correct positions 
for someone of their class. Thus class forms habitus, and personified habitus I would 
argue is an expressed and embodied identity. In relation to a sense that identity is 
contingent on context, and can shift according to circumstance (Gee) or expected role 
(Goffman), Bourdieu suggests this is another affliction of the middle classes. In striving 
to demonstrate their upper class credentials, the middle classes are committed to 
interpreting the symbolic relationships between the classes and are “haunted by the 
appearance he offers to others and the judgement they make of it.”. That those of 
intermediary position must constantly shift their values and presentation in order to fit in 
with the context they find themselves in. Such an assertion, that conveniently assumed 
roles and identities are the affliction of a particular class, also seems to argue against a 
sense that an all individuals’ senses of identity are formed by an impression of imputed 
judgements of others also argues against Cooley’s Looking Glass self. Suggesting that for 
the highest and lowest classes of society, values and behaviours are not informed by a 
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process of self reflection, but are simply acquired as habitus by being enculturated into 
their particular social strata. 
The important ideas to take from Bourdieu for this thesis are that certain cultural 
artefacts (ideas, behaviours, objects, or social values) will constitute a form of capital, 
desired, sought, and invested in by those with the means (financial means, social 
contacts, or time). I will argue that whether an individual values one thing more than 
another may be determined by their class, but may also be determined by any other 
effects on their culture, that is anything which may influence their identity or habitus 
including their age, nationality, gender, social contacts not contingent on these other 
factors, or any other influence on who they are. Which variable has most effect is not 
explored, as to do so would be to explore the very nature of identity, which is beyond the 
scope of this current thesis, but may well form the basis of future work. 
1.6.9. Summed values and choice    
Bourdieu places the symbolic choices people make in the space of investment in 
(cultural) capital. That is some cultural stuff is valued more than other stuff and will be 
pursued with greater investment, where some stuff is not valued and no investment will 
be made in the acquisition and retention of it. For Bourdieu the decisions regarding what 
to invest in are made by the individual’s habitus, the values and behaviours they have 
acquired from their social background which are performed tacitly, without conscious 
reflection.  
Another body of work which addresses humans evaluating and acting upon values is 
known collectively as Rational Choice Theory. 
Often seen primarily as an approach taken to explain collective behaviours such as 
economic behaviours, by accounting for individual, rational choice, Rational Choice 
Theories are based on the assumption that people will generally seek to maximise the 
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good things in their lives and minimise the bad. If, as Utilitarian philosophers such as 
Bentham (1789) argue, we take anything which is pleasurable to be positive and 
anything painful as negative, then a rational individual will seek to make the most of the 
pleasures and avoid the pains. It is this sense of rationality which has formed much of 
the study of human decision making and choice in the last three centuries, often 
(especially when dealing with economic behaviour or the behaviour of large groups) 
employing a type of algorithm, possibly similar to that of Bentham’s Felicific Calculus 
which attempts to enumerate the pleasures and pains felt by people and arrive at a 
moral value of a thing for those individuals. So how people make decisions, according to 
this classical model could be said, in general, to them maximising the ‘goods’ in their life 
and minimising the ‘bads’. A more recent expression of this type of reasoning within 
Sociology is that of Homans: "The more valuable to a person is the result of his action, 
the more likely he is to perform the action." and "In choosing between alternative 
actions, a person will choose that one for which, as perceived by him at the time, the 
value, V, of the result, multiplied by the probability, p, of getting the result, is the 
greater.” (Homans 1974). These statements seem similar in form to the kind of 
evaluation suggested in this thesis, however the degree of similarity rests on whether we 
think the choice rests on some sense of objective value, whether such value can be 
literally enumerated, and whether we think the final result can be expressed as the 
product of rational behaviour as much as the choice being made on rational values. 
To comprehensively cover the millions upon millions of words written about Rational 
Choice in the last 3 centuries would much more space than available in this thesis, as 
such rather than exhaustively cover all the different perspectives of Rational Choice from 
areas such as Economics, Criminology, Politics, and industry as well as alternative views 
such as Sociological Choice Theory (Rational Choice with an explicitly Sociological 
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perspective rather a supposedly Psychological one), Naturalistic Decision Making (an 
alternative view which supposes that often decisions are made with incomplete 
information under time pressures with the decision maker employing expertise and bias), 
and Game Theory (where choice is viewed as a competitive process in a closed system), 
and all the ways these approaches have been criticised and discussed, this section will 
explore some works that have presented a position which touches on the findings of the 
research presented in this thesis. In that we are not supposing that our problem is a 
sociological question of collective action and choice; we do not assume that a player 
becoming engaged in a game is doing so in a context of time pressure (whatever the 
game mechanics); nor are we assuming that players are competing to achieve the best 
engagement available. So the theory presented in this thesis is not one of Rational 
Choice which is usually considered to be a field of study concerned with political and 
economic collective action. Indeed, the move to present rational choice in terms of 
purely cultural values is a contentious one (Shapiro 1998), but one that has been 
attempted in several ways (e.g. Boudon 1996). Rather that the theory of engagement 
potential as a function of summed values by identification, and various models of rational 
choice as calculated value to the individual, both contain a summation or calculation of 
value is a connection worth highlighting.  
One influential figure in the study of Rational Choice was Herbert Simon. In his book 
Administrative Behavior (1947) Simon suggests several adjustments to Classical Rational 
Choice Theory in order to bring that field more in line with observable human 
behaviours. Of most interest to the current concern of this thesis is that he stresses that 
all decisions are mixtures of values and facts; that many decisions can ultimately be 
traced to an overarching socio-cultural value system. However values are not as easy to 
manage in an organisational decision making process (his focus) than more objective 
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information or ‘facts’. Another key point that Simon raises is that any decision must be 
made within a system of ‘bounded rationality’; that is a decision maker cannot know 
(and thus choose from) all possible options, nor can they evaluate those options 
perfectly, knowing the probabilities of the outcomes of the possible choices with no real 
precision. This combination of values and bounded rationality results in decisions being 
made on reinforced habit where a successful sequence of actions is repeated as long as 
it seems to apply to a new situation, or by ‘satisficing’ where decisions are made based 
on available information or stimuli suggesting the possibility of a successful enough 
outcome. So an organisation might be striving to maximise profits by producing goods. 
That the organisation exists to make profit is an undisputed value. The goods selected 
for producing profits may be selected based both on market conditions (fact) and what 
an agreeable good would be (value). This agreeability would be based on what the 
organisation has successfully produced before and what a socially acceptable profitable 
good should be. Thus the selection of goods is based on a mix facts and values. How the 
goods might be most efficiently produced is based on an increasing reliance on facts 
(allowing for values in the mix such as a happy, unexploited workforce say). So to use 
some very simple examples: producing arms in a peaceful country and selling them to 
foreign governments in order to perpetrate warfare overseas might be a very profitable 
enterprise (fact), but might be seen by some sections of society as morally corrupt 
(value). If this trade is made illegal the company might only have the knowledge to 
diversify in relatively specific ways such as into producing non-lethal versions of their 
existing products or to different but similar clients. Using a less extreme example at a 
lower level of corporate decision making: buying shoes to sell in a shop, the buyer needs 
to get the best product for the best price; they could source low priced goods (fact) from 
sources with less worker protection (value) than other sources who treat their workers 
well, but produce a more expensive pair of shoes. This buyer cannot know all possible 
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sources of shoes or the true working conditions in all the factories they might source 
their goods from (bounded rationality), so they source shoes at as low a price as they 
can while still reassuring themselves that the goods are being produced in factories that 
treat their workers with sufficient fairness (satisficing). Simon argues that these types of 
decision are performed in all organisations at every level of decision making. 
How might we relate hierarchical values and facts, ‘bounded rationality’, and satisficing 
to individual engagement with videogames? It seems that when we are concerned with 
decisions relating to pure entertainment, values become more critical to the decision 
making process than facts. That one experience is likely to be more agreeable than 
another is a subjective evaluation with little objective evidence as to what game, book, 
film, country walk or whatever will be better than others. The limits of rationality in 
engagement in entertainment are even further restricted than even Simon holds for the 
behaviour of organisations. Essentially an entertainment choice is rational if the 
individual thinks it is rational and for no other reason. We could however consider 
satisficing as an alternative to Homans’ evaluation criteria. If an individual encounters an 
experience they feel will be pleasing enough (because it conforms to their values) then 
there is a possibility than they will engage in it. They will not consciously or 
unconsciously weigh it up against all the other activities they could be engaged in, 
though they might have an idea of a few alternatives, and they will not have a clear idea 
about how well it will meet their need to be entertained before they start. It might be a 
similar experience to that they have engaged in in the past and they may hope, through 
habit, to gain pleasure from this new interaction.  
If values are entirely subjective how do we account for them in the way people make 
decisions and behave in an entertainment consumption context? Carver and Sheier 
(2001) propose that there is little difference between values and goals with each being 
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expressible in the language of the other. They propose that all objectives, whether 
valueful or practical, be considered goals, but that we might consider that there is a 
hierarchy of goals of two different types. Superordinate “be” goals yielding subordinate 
“do” goals. “Be” goals are states of being. For an individual the goal at the top of the 
hierarchy might be a concept of an idealised self, under this level will be sub-values that 
might constitute the idealised self, possibly at the level of Rokeach’s (1973) elemental 
human values (such as honesty or generosity say). These overarching values then yield 
subordinate values as we decompose the hierarchy, up to the point that a goal describes 
a course of action or a “do” goal; moving from ‘why’ to ‘how’. At each level of the 
hierarchy feedback is compared to expected success and behaviour is adjusted 
accordingly. This shaping of behaviour against goals seems to present an alternative way 
of exploring choice, and again personal, identified values are considered to be the super-
ordinate factor from which all other values and goals flow. We might suggest that Carver 
and Sheier’s ‘values’ and ‘goals’ are similar to Simon’s ‘values’ and ‘facts’ respectively. 
Placing self and the drive to achieve a satisfactory sense of self (whether individualistic 
or as part of a collective) at the top of this hierarchy apparently places these types of 
theories in a similar place to that of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1954) but possibly the 
other way around. Maslow suggesting that basic needs (biological needs, shelter, 
procreation and such) must be met before ‘higher order needs’ (personal development, 
self-actualisation, and such) be pursued, where Carver and Sheier suggest that higher 
order needs decompose into lower order needs which are performed in support of the 
higher order needs. Although these two perspectives seem to say the same thing, if as 
Maslow suggests, basic needs must be met before satisfaction of higher order needs can 
be pursued it might be very difficult to imagine how a person might achieve such a 
mental state as Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow (1990) where the individual might forget about 
subordinate needs, such as eating, in pursuit of some growth toward some superordinate 
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goal (say self-actualisation). Carver and Sheier’s reframing of these need states as goals 
allow for this, but at the same time it is difficult to see where Maslow’s subordinate 
‘needs’ might be introduced into a hierarchy of “be” or “do” goals, unless there is also an 
overriding set of goals of the kind “Be Alive” “Do being alive by eating food when 
hungry.” which suggests a need hierarchy like that of Maslow’s. It seems though that 
when we are considering behaviour directed toward entertainment we might allow for 
occasions when a person may ignore some basic biological needs in order to pursue 
some valued goal, but in day to day behaviour the relationship between biological needs 
and high order personal/cultural/social values is much more complex. 
So in terms of hedonic or entertainment pleasures such as videogame play, we might 
surmise that people make choices and act in a more value driven way than in a need 
driven way. However we might also suppose that values are evaluated in some semi-
rational way, with individuals seeking activities which satisfice their value needs or goals, 
which are assessed according to both established habit and some sense of the likely 
outcomes of the choices, in terms of the possibility that value goals might be met. 
The theory presented in this thesis has features in common with Rational Choice Theory 
in the ways suggested above, especially if we allow for the satisficing of choice and 
engagement via personal cultural values as goals. As will be explained in the relevant 
chapters below, players appear to take some interpretation of the cultural value of 
prescient features of a game and arrive at a tacit sense of overall value. One problem 
with such feature summation approaches is that the overall sense of value can influence 
and is influenced by the summed value of the features of the experience. So a player 
who does not like a particular kind of game (overall that kind of thing does not fit into 
their system of value goals) will criticise the experience at a sub-feature level. While 
another individual who feels that the sub-features they have encountered meet their 
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needs will have some sense that the overall experience does too. In other areas such as 
the interpretation of texts this problem has been called the Hermeneutic Circle 
(Heidegger 1962), where any interpretation of a text must account for the interaction 
between the whole text and salient parts of the text at the same time. The Hermeneutic 
Circle is not seen as an insurmountable problem, only that any analysis must account for 
both the interpretation and understanding of parts of the text and the sense of the 
meaning of the text as a whole. Similarly if we understand that an overall impression of 
the value of a game is both formed of and forms the impression of the value of the parts 
of a game then we do not have an inconsistency when we have an example of an 
individual who dislikes a particular experience and thus criticises it as being, say, too 
difficult to play, or having a boring narrative.     
1.6.10. Biological pleasure 
The previous sections seem to ignore the possibility that the reason people choose to 
engage in certain activities, either consciously or tacitly, is due to a system of possibly 
socially acquired (or cultural) values. However surely there are some pleasures which are 
universal. Perhaps the way people respond to pleasures and thus engage in entertaining 
activities is just as likely to be due to biological drives or instincts as it may be to do with 
learned patterns of behaviour or culture. It is this approach, to assume that biological 
drives are an equivalent cause to socio-cultural factors in determining the experience of 
pleasure in individuals, that has been taken by such as Tiger (1992) who argues that 
pleasures must be a complex set of cultural and physical principles, before breaking the 
concept of pleasure down into 4 overlapping constituent types: Physiopleasure (physical 
or sensory pleasure); Sociopleasure (pleasure of acting in a group); Psychopleasure (the 
pleasure of attainment and accomplishments); Ideopleasure (the pleasure in 
experiencing or creating concepts or ideas). Tiger argues that we are predisposed to 
pleasures of these kinds by virtue of our biology; that in any pleasurable activity we 
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could determine a set of predispositions which could be said to make that activity 
pleasurable. We are predisposed to enjoy sweet food, warmth, and orgasm 
(physiopleasure); the company of others and a sense of belonging (sociopleasure); the 
satisfaction from having done a good job, completing our goals (psychopleasure); and 
experiencing a work of art or learning new things, or creating works of art or creating 
new knowledge ourselves (ideopleasure). Using such a typology in the study of games is 
potentially not as straightforward as finding the pleasures and mapping them to 
motivations:  
“Obviously, all practitioners of the arts that please the senses are to some degree 
committed to an aggressive understanding of sensory physiology and psychology. But 
painters, sculptors, and musicians need not always please – they may shock, revolt, 
trouble, abuse, irritate. They may shout or drum or stamp their feet at their audience. 
They may assault the audience’s certainties and excite their fears and ridicule their 
deepest morality. The dramatist may unhinge their expectations of life by the suddenly 
plausible behaviour of outrageous or despicable characters. 
But the chef, or the winemaker, or the confectioner – they must please. Otherwise, in 
any kind of open market they will not survive. The mouth is less tolerant than the brain 
or whichever organ of the body assesses politicians.” (Tiger 1992) 
So how do we unpack Tiger’s pleasures and apply them to the domain at hand? Should 
we assume that choice and motivation for videogame play are based on cultural mores 
as other arts, or is there a biological drive to engage as there is a biological drive to 
consume sweet food? It seems that if we consider the differences in even the preference 
for different flavours of foods in the cultures of diverse societies that the dependant 
variable which accounts for much of the differences observed is cultural rather than 
genetic, nurture rather than nature. Granted we may well have underlying 
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predispositions to learn and engage with other people, but why someone chooses to eat 
Surströmming (Rotten canned fish, a delicacy in Sweden) or Kopi Luwak (Coffee that has 
passed through the digestive tract of a cat like animal, the Luwak, before being ground 
and made into a drink in the usual manner) cannot be explained by their instinct to seek 
out nutritious food alone. Indeed different cultures involve the consumption of different 
staples. One cultures’ source of ready protein is to another a disgusting slimy or crawly 
thing, while another’s source of easily stored source of calories is otherwise a 
unpalatable mouldy thing fit only for disposal. Any attempt to explain preference for 
anything other than the basest of needs quickly comes upon such counter examples. 
Take as an example Tiger’s assertion: “There are three other forms of obvious pleasure – 
sports, popular music, and dance, and television and film – that pleasantly animate 
many people in many communities. I have not discussed them adequately because they 
do not need it.”. From this quote we might assume that these kinds of “popular culture” 
are universally pleasurable, and his comments later in The Pursuit of Pleasure (Tiger 
1992) concerning the universal appeal of American popular culture suggest that this is 
his perspective. However, seen through the lens of videogames again any assertion to 
universality of popular culture, led by North American cultural exports must be 
questioned, especially if we look at the date Tiger published. In the early 90s there were 
other powerhouses in the production and publication of computer and videogames other 
than the US. Japan was especially influential at this time (the era know as the fourth 
generation in terms of home consoles), possibly more so than the US. The majority of 
gaming hardware was being designed and produced in Japan (by such companies as 
Sega, Nintendo, SNK, and NEC), and consequently a large proportion of the games were 
produced by Japanese companies and many of them were translated into other 
languages, becoming enormously successful properties worldwide. While American 
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companies were making successful games for home computers, consoles, and the 
arcade, these products were far from dominant on the global market, or even the 
domestic market. Thus Tiger’s argument that American Popular culture is probably more 
successful worldwide due to the US itself being a homogeneous, immigrant population 
and thus capable of reflecting the global cultures back on themselves seems like a logical 
elaboration too far, as Japan is not a homogeneous people but historically a distinctly 
introspective and heterogeneous group relative to that of the US. 
It is interesting that in supporting his thesis on popular culture Tiger retreats from an 
integrated set of pleasures encompassing physical and psychological factors and places 
the purported success of American popular culture in the cultural identity of the peoples 
of the US and the identification with US peoples’ expression of that identity by other, 
international audiences. Suggesting that popular culture is not as self-evident a pleasure 
to explain away as Tiger suggests it is. Indeed if we look at his example of sports, there 
are few universally appreciated sports. A perfect example is Association Football (Soccer) 
which is popular in many parts of the world is not very popular in North America where a 
different code of Football, American Football is far more popular. This difference in 
patterns of appreciation of sports around the world suggests that the appreciation of 
sports is at least in part socio-cultural.  
1.6.11. Design implications and practical applications 
Some of the concepts mentioned thus far in this review of relevant literature have been 
invoked because they have formed the theoretical backdrop for attempts to explain how 
people engage with products and how this knowledge might be used to produce better 
products. While the work of McCarthy and Wright (2004) was reviewed individually 
above, due to the many connections between that work and that of this thesis, a number 
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of other works from the same general field (human factors, usability, product design, or 
user experience) will be summarised here. 
The work of Patrick Jordan (1997, 2000, 2002) is quite influential in this area. While 
McCarthy and Wright (2004) could possibly be criticised as being quite theoretical, where 
the implications for design practice are fairly abstract (that designers should be aware of 
the experiential nature of the way users will engage with the products they design), 
Jordan attempts to on the one hand create practical procedures for design practice 
(2000) and on the other to create experimentally demonstrated empirical theories 
(1997, 2002). In terms of the theoretical position Jordan has been exploring the possible 
link between the personalities of individuals and the attributed personalities of products. 
That is, is it possible to use the same words to describe properties of the personalities of 
people to designed products? If we can ascribe personalities, or personality like quality 
perceptions to products, what is the relationship between those qualities and the felt 
personality of the perceiving individual? Here there is some relationship with the theory 
presented in this thesis, in that I propose that (videogame) products are evaluated 
according to the perception of what they represent culturally, which if Jordan is right 
might be an evaluation of the personality of the product.  
In Jordan’s first published investigation of product personality (Products as Personalities 
1997) he attempts to repurpose the Myers-Briggs (1962) development of Jung’s (1921) 
multi-dimensional theories of personality to assign personality values to products. In this 
study Jordan attempts to show that there is a correlation between the imputed 
personalities of products, perceived aesthetic quality, and the personality of the imputing 
viewers. The later work (The Personalities of Products, 2002) is intended to be an 
attempt to take the Product Personality Assignment developed in the previous work away 
from the technical terminology of psychoanalysis and, with the help of designers, to 
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create a set of more meaningful (to designers) terms. Taken in combination these 2 
studies can be seen as an attempt to evaluate the hypothesis that if the personality of 
the product is similar to the felt personality of the perceiver (and product personality 
assigner) then the overall experience that perceiver has with the product is more likely 
to be felt to be aesthetically pleasing than if the product is felt to have a personality 
which is at odds with the perceiving individual’s. That these studies have achieved 
variable results relative to this hypothesis seems unsurprising from an a priori 
perspective. If we, for example, consider the aesthetics of a ‘pure’ aesthetic object, such 
as a painting and the personalities it expresses. If we agree the dark, raw, disturbing 
paintings of Francis Bacon offer a desirable aesthetic experience, we might ask if the 
viewer who enjoys this style necessarily needs to have a dark, disturbing personality. 
Even if we consider practical products, which is closer to the intention of Jordan, even if 
a person felt that they were violent and unstable would we really expect them to put a 
violent, unstable electric shaver near their face? 
In essence it is in the design practice, not in the statistical correlations that Jordan’s 
approach seems most useful then. In asking what the personality of the designed 
product might be said to be, the designer might have another instrument with which to 
reason about how best to design and present a project. Is it appropriate to consider to 
what degree a hair dryer be kind or unkind? What about excessive or moderate? 
Serious-minded or light-hearted? Violent or gentle? What if we were designing a gun 
instead? What about a cement mixer? That is not to say that the user of a cement mixer 
would need to be fairly moderate, quite serious-minded, and a bit violent, just that they 
might expect the device itself to present these qualities. This process of breaking a 
problem down by asking probing questions about the nature of the product and the 
relationship it has with the individual is a feature of much of Jordan’s work. In Designing 
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Pleasurable Products (2000) one approach he takes is to ask if Tiger’s four pleasures 
(see the above section which deals with biological pleasure) could be an appropriate lens 
for reasoning about how a design might be perceived.  
This use of a such pleasure based approach is a departure from the usual values based 
approach often employed in marketing (i.e. Jenkinson 1994) and usability focussed 
design, but Jordon does so in a way that would be familiar to those that followed 
Jenkinson, in that Jordan’s approach is to create personae intended to illustrate the 
wants and needs of coherent groups of consumers as individuals. These individuals, in 
Jordan’s case have sets of pleasures they more or less identify with, that products can be 
designed to support. To Jordan this is a holistic approach to design; to take demographic 
data about individuals and reason about what these data might imply in terms of desired 
pleasures (and to some extent needs), it may be possible to use a schema of pleasures, 
such as Tiger’s, to map out what properties the product will need to have in order for 
that individual (and by extension other individuals, beyond that semi-fictional archetype) 
to derive pleasure from a product, and thus engage with it. It seems that many of the 
pleasure positions proposed in this way might be said to be said to represent both a 
pleasure property of the product and a personality of the product, and any engagement 
with that product is often contingent on the personalised socio-cultural value system of 
the end-user or customer and their reception of the posited pleasures and apparent 
personality of the product as socio-cultural offerings. To take Jordan’s specific example 
the design of a new camera should consider the target user and reason about the 
product benefits which would support desired pleasures for the target group (in this case 
young women). So a camera for young women should offer - the physio-pleasure 
benefits of feeling good in the hand; easy to carry around; fits well against the face; and 
usable with long, feminine fingernails - while offering the socio-pleasure benefits of 
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conferring an impression of high socio-economic status to the owner; conferring an 
impression of high cultural status to the owner (see Bourdieu for a differentiation 
between social, economic, and cultural values); and the benefits of taking photographs 
quickly and without disturbing others - similarly the benefits in terms of psycho-
pleasures might be again that the user should be able to take photographs quickly; and 
that the device should be easy to operate at the first attempt – in terms of idea-
pleasures Jordan suggests that the camera should be aesthetically pleasing; that it 
should reflect the user’s sense of femininity; and that it should be environmentally ‘safe’. 
Whether these benefits map neatly to Tiger’s four pleasures is less important to Jordan 
than they are a means of decomposing the problem to discernible design features. With 
a set of such agreed features a designer or design team would be able to work towards 
these ends as design and evaluation targets. That is a designer can take each of these 
benefit statements and ask what the implications are for the design of a camera. So they 
might reason that young women seem to buy more products with rounded organic forms 
than sharp angular forms and so a softer aesthetic would be desirable. The designer 
might also reason that in order to suggest high socio-economic status (without being 
flashy or vulgar) the camera should be constructed from ‘premium’ materials such as 
metal and leather rather than plastics, or it might edge toward a modern form or layout 
rather than an ‘old fashioned’ layout, and so on.   
So Jordan presents us with some familiar analytical tools (personae and product 
specifications) and provides us with a possible way of using these analytical tools in a 
practical way that also includes senses of hedonic or pleasurable experiences. It seems 
though that where purely pleasurable, hedonic, or leisure experiences are concerned 
(that is experiences where a traditional, ‘task driven’, or goals and means description 
does not fit well) we are left with a sense of how socio-cultural values are embodied by 
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individuals as an enculturated personality and how the features of products either 
conform to or support those values and are then adopted by the individual, or do not and 
are thus rejected by the individual. In this sense Jordan’s theoretical position is close to 
both that of McCarthy and Wright (2004) and that of this current thesis, but with a much 
stronger set of practical procedures to how this relationship can be engineered in a 
design process.   
While Jordan’s work focuses on how theoretical concepts might inform a design practice 
which considers utility and pleasure equally, Marc Hassenzahl’s work (e.g. Hassenzahl 
2001; Hassenzahl 2003; and Hassenzahl et al. 2008) focuses on the ways the various 
influencing factors might be evaluated in support of design practice.   
Hassenzahl’s approach is to both attempt to prove and to demonstrate the utility of 
considering two distinct but interacting aspects of the quality of the experience of use of 
products, or a product’s appealingness (Hassenzahl 2001). These qualities are a sense of 
pragmatic quality, that the product does what it is supposed to in a way that can be 
operated or used by the individual (Ergonomic Quality – EQ, pragmatic quality, or 
usability); and a sense of that the product is able to support a positive emotional 
response in the user (Hedonic Quality – HQ, or aesthetics). Hassenzahl shows that the 
reception of these qualities is contingent on the context and the user’s state of mind. So 
while EQ and HQ both contribute to the overall assessment of the quality of the product 
(and thus the product’s appeal), to what extent EQ and HQ contribute to that sense of 
quality is affected by what the user wants from the product at that time. Not just in how 
they intend to use it, but in their particular focus at the time of the interaction, or 
‘regulatory focus’ (Hassenzahl et al. 2008). The individual might be trying to get 
something done with the product (‘do’ing in the sense of Carver and Sheier’s, 2001 ‘do’ 
goals) and will thus be focussed on the ‘prevention’ of expending effort to achieve those 
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goals; or the individual might be focussed on deriving pleasure from the product, 
growing into or striving toward new states of ‘be’ing which Hassenzahl refers to as 
‘promotion’. A user’s engagement with a product is never the same then, as in each 
context where the user uses the product they will be focussed on different aspects of 
what the product offers. The experimental example given in Hassenzahl (2008) is of a 
music playback software product, where there is a ‘function’ (to play music files) and in 
some versions an ‘aesthetic’ (‘enhanced’ sound and graphics functions). Interestingly 
while the subjects who were in a promotion focus showed little strong preference for 
either version of the software, the subjects who were in a prevention focus, and were 
thus pragmatically trying to achieve a set of tasks with the program, showed a decrease 
in satisfaction with the ‘hedonic’ version of the program relative to the ‘pragmatic’ 
version.  
While Hassenzahl’s observations and evaluative methods are interesting in general and 
push the evaluation of design in human-computer interaction forward considerably, from 
a field which accounts for hedonic qualities as a secondary concern to one where there is 
an understanding that the relationship between pragmatic qualities and hedonic qualities 
is potentially more complex than a simple hierarchy, with pragmatic qualities needing to 
be supported in order to allow for hedonic qualities to be supported by this pragmatic 
foundation. As the evaluation of a product is influenced by both the context of use and 
the approach taken by the user Hassenzahl advocates that these factors be taken into 
account in evaluation.  
Most interesting of Hassenzahl’s theories, for our purposes, is that he claims that users 
can adopt a prevention focus or promotion focus for any activity or product including 
videogames. Initially this assertion seems ill placed, in that surely there can be no 
pragmatic qualities which a prevention focussed individual might seek in a game. 
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However if we look at the reasons given for rejecting games in general, or specific 
games, they have a certain ‘prevention’ property to them. For example one participant 
(DA) in the research reported in this thesis used fairly pragmatic reasoning for his 
rejection of games. He reasoned that games could not support his extrinsic needs for 
physical, intellectual, and social activity, as well as other potential sources of such 
stimulation might. At some point in the past though, he had tried a game and became 
absorbed by it. If we accept the regulatory focus principle proposed by Hassenzahl it 
might be possible that DA was more promotion focussed in this period where he engaged 
in play than he might normally be? 
Perhaps in order to understand Hassenzahl’s approach and how we might understand the 
way players (with a suitable focus) might engage with videogames we need an 
impression of what fun, pleasurable, appealing or hedonic properties or qualities of a 
product are. In this respect Hassenzahl suggests that a user forms an impression of the 
‘chararcter’ of a product (Hassenzahl 2003), and this character could be described by 
either pragmatic or hedonic attributes. In terms of hedonic attributes Hassenzahl lists 
three: Stimulation (novel, interesting, or exciting features especially where that an 
opportunity to personal growth or fulfuillment); Identification (opportunity for self 
expression; or the expression of personal values and identity via the way others perceive 
and respond to the individual’s ownership or use of the product); and Evocation 
(presenting ‘past events, relationships, or thoughts’ which are valued by the individual, 
particularly in nostalgia inducing ways). In a sense these three hedonic attributes, 
especially where we are concerned with the ‘character’ of a product has many features in 
common with Jordan’s sense of a product personality (Jordan 2002), and the way they 
encompass broad meanings and learned experiences beyond the experience with the 
specific product shows common ground with McCarthy and Wright’s (2004) exploration of 
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the broad experiential view of product use. It may also be possible to relate each of 
these attributes to a sense that an individual in responding to them is potentially doing 
so as an individual personality with fairly stable enculturated values who is applying 
those values within a specific context. So we could say that the way in which people 
differ in terms of the way they will respond to opportunities for growth and stimulation 
will be in terms of who they feel they are and whether the product presents an 
opportunity to support their personal, unstated, culturally relevant goals; while the way 
they differ in terms of how they choose to express themselves through the products they 
will use will be formed by how they feel they should be presenting themselves in 
accordance with who they feel that they are (if we use Cooley’s 1902 Looking Glass Self 
concept, say); and the difference in which products have the potential to evoke positive 
feelings would clearly be contingent on what the individual has learned to respond to 
positively, which in the literal sense is a personal culture where these products have 
been adopted as symbols with positive personal and social connotations. As such the 
theory presented in this thesis could be said to be consistent with Hassenzahl’s theory, 
but presented at a higher level of abstraction.       
Focussing on broad goals or ‘values’ is framed by Gilbert Cockton, in a similar way to 
Friedman (1996), as the next phase in the evolution of how we conceive of designing for 
Human-Computer interaction (Cockton 2004a and 2004b). He argues that this field has 
passed through 3 earlier phases: system centred design, user centred design, and 
context centred design, but needs to move toward value centred design where while the 
system requirements and limitations are accounted for and communicated; the user’s 
physical and cognitive requirements are accounted for; and the context(s) of use has 
been accounted for, the value each product represents to all stakeholders must be 
included in any design decisions. Although he explicitly avoids defining value at this 
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stage (Cockton 2004a pp.157) he does present an example to illustrate his points. It 
seems that in this example Cockton is using ‘value’ to describe what otherwise might be 
called needs, requirements, objective benefits, and satisfactions rather than exclusively 
sociological values such as those invoked by Friedman. As such Cockton seems to be 
suggesting that we account for a broad range of implicit requirements when designing 
software products. So in his example of a website for a van hire company: The 
management and other financial stakeholders hope that the site will help the company 
be more profitable and promote the brand image; consumers want the website to help 
them save time and money by being a cheaper and more convenient way to book a van; 
while van hire operations staff will want a more efficient process of releasing and 
receiving vans from consumers. These values are probably not all of the same kind 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, seeming to be what would be traditionally known as 
requirements. Comparing these design values with the decision factors proposed by 
Simon (1947) we could suggest that they are a mix of facts (financial costs) and values 
(promoting the brand), with a bias toward facts. With such an example it is difficult to 
see how one might account for the values of pure entertainment products. If, for many 
stakeholders there are no ‘fact’ level returns only costs, how do we ensure that there is 
sufficient ‘value’ to account for the costs. In later work Cockton (2008) deliberately shifts 
to discussing ‘worth’ to indicate that there will be positive and negative values. In many 
ways Cockton’s work has parallels with the work of this thesis. There is a common focus 
on ‘value’ and ‘worth’ to resolve a sense of the quality of a product; however the obvious 
difference is where Cockton has assumed that values are emergent or self evident and 
then attempted to work such values into design practice my work (focussing as it does 
on only entertaining products and their reception) has tried to derive a source of value 
for players devoid of design methods. This difference is made clear where Cockton 
states: “...the most challenging game interactions can be very unpleasant and 
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frustrating, but completing the last mission at veteran level after a week’s struggle can 
be immensely satisfying. Value here lies in achievement – this is so with most work and 
many leisure applications of computing.” (Cockton 2008). Here I would ask whether 
achievement alone is a value. If I achieved any random thing at all, would I value it? If I 
set out to create a three metre high stack of beer cans on my own in a park, would I 
value the achievement if successful? Would my mum value her ‘achievement’ if I asked 
her to replicate my awesome feat? Surely the value is, to a large extent, in the thing 
achieved and the means of achieving it. I propose that the activity and the result must 
match the users sense of what an individual like themselves would find valuable, which 
they learn from their socio-cultural background, so in most contexts I imagine that most 
would consider stacking beer cans to be a worthless activity with a worthless outcome, 
no matter what height I manage to achieve to my stack. If we ignore what Cockton has 
to say about specific examples of value and use a conception of value such as that 
presented in this thesis (cultural value in identification) then Cockton’s ideas about how 
we might develop a Worth Centred Design (WCD) practice, through mapping networks of 
worth and considering them alongside existing design practices, could well lead us to 
better design process than simply trying to get a feel for how values might implicitly sum 
to create a net worth. 
       
1.6.12. Juul's 'Casual Revolution' 
An interesting exploration of the consequences of different design approaches to 
videogames has been performed by Jesper Juul in A Casual Revolution (2010). In his 
book Juul explores the differences between two notional types of videogame experience 
which have become known in the industry as 'casual' and 'hardcore'. The industry 
stereotype is that 'hardcore' players appreciate the 'traditional' videogame features of a 
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dark or negative fictional representation (described eloquently by Juul as the kind of 
experience you wouldn't like to encounter while walking down the street, such as armed 
conflict or intense criminal activity), a requirement for a great deal of knowledge of the 
conventions of videogames, an extensive session by session time commitment, and a 
high degree of difficulty. The supposedly opposite type of player, the 'casual', seek the 
opposite in positive fictions (things you might enjoy if you encountered them in the real 
world, like a game of tennis), little required knowledge of the conventions of 
videogames, a low minimum time investment, and little challenge. Juul's exploration of 
these stereotypes and the games supposedly designed to target them suggests that they 
are essentially fictions with no such easy separation between ‘hardcore’ and ‘casual’ 
players or games. What Juul does highlight however is that, in supporting alternative 
ways of playing (the casual market), the industry has found that those players who did 
not identify with the implicit core cultural values of players suggested by the 'hardcore' 
stereotype constitute a large and thus lucrative market. Combining short minimum 
interaction time, a difficulty that is contingent on the effort the player is prepared to put 
in, neutral themes, and increasingly mimetic interfaces lowers the investment required in 
order for many players to gain the returns they seek. In this respect Juul's findings can 
be integrated into the findings of this research with ease. However we do need to look at 
the 'returns'. Labelling 'casual' and 'hardcore' players (and thence the games they 
choose to play) by the investments they are prepared to make, while not making explicit 
the returns they are seeking seems incomplete. If we were to use a sense of 
investment/return to interpret Juul's work, while he does make apparent that returns are 
occasionally considered, such as the social interaction returns in playing a computer 
mediated quiz game or the light physical exercise in playing a mimetic sports game, 
many of the reasons others wholly reject games in their current form are undisclosed. 
My research into non-players, which helped to formulate the value seeking through 
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identification hypothesis, suggests that there are players for whom current gameplay 
offerings are the antithesis of who they see themselves as culturally. For some playing a 
mimetic sports game is just as worthless as playing a science fiction based first person 
shooter. These individuals (such as OA, DA, and DC ) want to engage in activities with 
the same societal designation of cultural worth as reading a respected novel or watching 
a critically acclaimed play. This sense of 'high culture' seems to be something that 
prevents many from playing games. While a film of a certain type might engage, there is 
a perception that there are few equivalents in videogames, or even that such equivalents 
are impossible in a game (see Roger Ebert’s famous denouncements of video games as 
art as an example of this position e.g. Evert 2010a and Ebert 2010b). In other senses 
that 'casual' vs 'hardcore' market split is entirely artificial as there have been games with 
many of the features suggested in the 'casual revolution' for many years. Mimetic 
interfaces exist in amusement arcades, short minimum interactions are common in 
'twitch' games, positive fictions abound in many genres championed by the 'hardcore' 
(see for example the games that Edge magazine, a notoriously ‘hardcore’ publication, 
has awarded a score of 10/10 in their review ratings, such as those designed by Shigeru 
Miyamoto for Nintendo including titles in the Zelda and Mario series), and some games 
have been criticised for their ease while still being praised for every other aspect of their 
design. Thus it seems that the designations 'hardcore' and 'casual' have as much 
empirical validity as 'twitch' (a type of game where the principal challenge relies on 
testing the player's reactions) or 'art' (a game which emphasises artistic expression over 
'fun' or the traditional representations and challenge structures found in many games) 
games. These arbitrary designations of broad 'genre' come from the player's particular 
sense of what they want from a game, hence what semiotic meanings they ascribe to a 
game. For example, the 'art' game Braid (Number None Inc. 2008) can be described as a 
'platform' 'puzzle' game which applies a distinctive visual style and thoughtful back story, 
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which leaves us the question of what is a player experiencing, a work of art, a Mario 
style platform game, or a time based puzzle game? These designations are arbitrary 
when we are discussing player experience, as the player might experience all of these 
'genres' or only a selection depending on what they bring to the experience in terms of 
their personal preference for play derived from their greater cultural sense. 
Comparing Juul's findings with those presented in this thesis suggests that a detailed 
analysis of arbitrary industry labels for certain groups of experiences with some points of 
similarity, provides some insights into the general engagements of players. However the 
focus on these loose classifications seems to limit the insights gained. 
1.6.13. Is studying gameplaying useful? 
So these meanings are subjective. In being subjective should we take a deconstructive 
(after Derrida (1998)) stance and declare all meaning potentially expressed as 
irreducible? If we take the meanings and values expressed by an experiencing and 
interpreting individual, we do not need to reject a reduction in meaning. We can reduce 
the individual's sense of homogeneous meaning of the whole experience down to salient 
features expressed as heterogeneous values and meanings, in a similar manner to that 
employed in Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Circle (where the interpretation of the whole of a 
text is conditional on the interpretation of its parts and vice versa). These features are 
decided by the experiencing individual and aggregate to form the overall sense of value 
and meaning. How we determine these values in a useful way can be achieved 
heterophenomenologically (Dennett 2003). That is we know that individuals are not 
entirely dissimilar in terms of their intrinsic capacities and that they are not utterly 
dissimilar in terms of their socialisation and hence they can be said to have related and 
somewhat generalisable psychology and culture, so we can make broad predictions 
about what meanings they may make and what values they may hold. 
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One tension which we might take from the literature (Juul 2010) is that the study of 
gameplay experiences requires there to be games to be played, and that there are 
games requires players to play them. So is the most important question what 
experiences games are designed to provide, or what experiences players have with 
games?  
 
1.7. Summary of approach  
Taking the position that any theory should represent perceptible phenomena and thus 
have some predictive power in the domain it represents, a decision should be made as to 
if a theory and thus predictive hypotheses should be analytically selected a priori and 
validated or empirically derived a posteriori from the domain. In the first case we would 
need to be able to find, analyse, and select from a range of acceptable theories, and 
resolve these theories into at least one testable hypothesis of the type which concerns 
us. In the second case we would need a clearly structured methodology in order to 
construct a useful theory from an unordered chaotic domain. Both approaches are 
potentially difficult, but as at the time of initiating this project there were few theories 
which dealt with the domain directly from which to analytically select, the decision was 
made to derive a theory directly from the domain. It was felt that any attempt to apply 
only loosely associated theoretical constructs from other fields and those demonstrated 
with restricted studies on sub-domains would have been less useful than approaching 
the domain in some structured way directly. 
A full discussion of the approach taken is provided in the relevant Methodology section 
below, but simply put, an interpretation of the Grounded Theory (GT) Methodology was 
selected. Grounded Theory methodology (Glaser & A. Strauss 1967) is presented as an 
inductive methodology which if correctly applied should generate a theory from the 
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domain of research rather than from a priori conceptions of the salient features of the 
domain. Using certain interpretations of the methodology (as there are several) the final 
product could be a single hypothesis to which all the other factors and features of the 
domain are related and thus this ‘core’ hypothesis potentially accounts for much of the 
variation in the domain. That GT could potentially produce a theory in the form of a 
single hypothesis rather than a narrative account or multivariate model is the principal 
reason for selecting it over other qualitative methods. 
I should also point out at this point that the final product of this research is expected to 
be a qualitative hypothesis relating to the playing of videogames. That is not to say that 
quantitative data cannot be considered in order to construct the theory, but that the 
theory itself will not be of a quantitative nature nor will it necessarily be statistically 
'verified'.     
As will be discussed later in this thesis, selecting an interpretation of GT was not straight 
forward, but became an approximation of Glaser's (1978) Classic Grounded Theory (or 
CGT). That CGT stresses a single key hypothesis over broad descriptive models is the 
key motivating feature for pursuing this methodological approach. The following section 
will discuss the rationale for the selection of the CGT methodology relative to other 
potential methodologies, and the particular interpretation of GT implemented. It must be 
pointed out that while they share a jargon, not all methodologies which are called GT are 
the same, and it was only by attempting to understand the methodology by doing it 
(according to often seemingly vague advice from various sources) did the advice 
presented by Glaser eventually make the most sense. For example it seems uncommon 
for users of many interpretations of GT to report having performed a theoretical sort 
prior to writing, whereas the sort was critical in producing this thesis. 
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2. Methodology 
This chapter will explain which methodology was used, why this methodology was 
selected, and how this methodology was interpreted and implemented. The methodology 
of Grounded Theory is not an experimental method, but strives to be empirical. 
Interpretations of it have been used widely, but there is disagreement as to what it must 
necessarily consist of (Glaser 1992). As such this methodology section is supplemented 
by chapters relating to the practical application of Classic Grounded Theory which appear 
in the final 'Summaries and conclusions' section of this thesis. 
2.1. Rationale for selection 
As the intention of this research was to explore the phenomenon of peoples’ engagement 
with videogame play, with the ultimate aim of developing a new theory regarding the 
main factors or parameters of this phenomenon or these phenomena, a method or 
methodology was required which could generate theory rather than validate existing 
theory. 
This focus on the production of domain relevant theory rather than the application of 
existing theories related to the domain requires some analysis. In order to establish why 
this stance has been taken we need to explore what the purpose of the project might be, 
and in order to explore the purpose or objective of the project we need to understand 
what kind of knowledge or theory we are attempting to generate and what implications 
that has on how we go about creating it. 
If we are interested in human players and their engagements with something then we 
are evidently working within the realm of social science (whether that be Psychology, 
Sociology, Anthropology or similar), and the epistemological basis of the social sciences 
93 
 
has been extensively debated for centuries. The reader might note the many references 
to empirical work in this thesis, which gives an explicit indication to the epistemology of 
the research undertaken. That is the main concern is to generate a sense of videogame 
play with some demonstrable basis in domain specific data. Assuming an empirical 
stance (rather than a deductive or critical stance) could represent a wealth of different 
approaches and perspectives. We could deduce a theoretical position and then attempt 
to gather data to verify the truth of that position experimentally; we could gather data 
and then attempt to extract interesting features of that data statistically; we could 
gather data and then inductively create a theory about how parts of the data relate; or 
we could reframe data about the domain into a narrative highlighting salient aspects of 
the domain. Each of these approaches are not mutually exclusive and depend in part on 
the state of the existing knowledge about a domain and the particular answers sought. 
For example a modern natural science which might be said to be wholly empirical or 
‘hard’, such as Physics, will often verify deduced theories experimentally, attempting to 
create a state of knowledge about the object of study which is more ‘true’ than the state 
of knowledge that existed before, often by means of reducing the complexity of a 
problem to simpler mechanisms which account for observed phenomena. Perhaps 
Physics can achieve this because there are agreed or legitimated axioms relating to the 
physical world from which it is possible to deduce refinements to the theoretical position 
of Physics; these refinements are often in a state which will yield straightforward 
hypotheses which can be clearly verified, probably experimentally. An example of a 
discipline for which such an approach would be impossible might be Anthropology. An 
anthropologist has few axiomatic agreements to work with as there currently appears to 
be few customs and structures which are universal to all human cultures and societies 
and hence a real or objective universal truth is very difficult to deduce from prior work. 
As such a major focus for Anthropology is to narratively describe, with some recourse to 
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other descriptions, the nature of discreet groups of people. Experimental verification of 
such descriptions is often not attempted, as the complexity and fluidity of human groups 
would make such a verification of the produced descriptions exceedingly difficult at best, 
but more often than not meaningless. Other domains fit somewhere in the middle, with 
varying degrees of established knowledge from which to deduce theories and varying 
degrees of possibilities for verification. In many of the social sciences (i.e. Psychology) 
the extent to which an objective truth is sought experimentally versus the extent to 
which the concerns of the domain are narratively reframed, depend on the problem 
being tackled; the epistemological bias of the investigator; and the expected utility of 
the resultant answer. So a Social Psychologist will have different objectives from a 
Clinical Psychologist and hence will use different tools and will seek a different end 
result. 
The question of end results is at stake here. Is it important that the end result is a 
reproducible fact about reality, objectively realised and true independent of the 
subjective position of the investigators that originate and use it; or is it important that a 
rich account of the subjective experiences and interpretations of, and those that exist 
within, the domain, be received and interpreted by an interested audience? In both cases 
we might legitimately question the utility of each result. These questions are in constant 
flux; it is not strictly true that all scientific knowledge is intended to represent a 
verifiable, reproducible, objective truth from which other theoretical scientists, applied 
scientists, and practitioners in various domains can draw to enhance the work that they 
do. For example a recent review of multiverse theories in Physics and Cosmology by 
George F. R. Ellis, one of Stephen Hawking’s co-authors, and a respected Cosmologist 
and Mathematician in his own right (Ellis 2011), reveals some interesting epistemological 
biases at the fringes of knowledge in these fields. While Ellis is critical in his evaluation of 
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various theories of what might lie beyond the cosmic horizon (the maximum extent of 
the observable universe), a few of his comments highlight a science which would fail 
most tests of empiricism, as surely any theory about things which are literally 
unobservable must. This use of supposition is surely surprisingly antithetical for such a 
‘hard’ natural science such as physics? If ‘soft’ sciences are enamoured with emulating 
the supposed focus on observable, objective facts of ‘hard’ science, how does one deal 
with the reifications of cosmology as an example? Can ‘soft’ sciences operate in a space 
of unverifiable theory just as hard sciences seem to do on occasion? Why does it matter? 
Essentially the question is: what purpose does a theory have? Some would argue that a 
scientific theory represents an attempt at summarising or modelling the real, natural, 
objective world (e.g. McMullin 1984). That no theory is completely or absolutely ‘true’ is 
more often apparent from alternative conceptions of scientific theory and truth. A sense 
of consensus and acceptable inference may be held to be the deciding factor in whether 
a theory is accepted as workable or not. The question then becomes how does one arrive 
at this consensus; a consensus that grants the ability to infer a sufficient degree of 
confidence in the findings in order to inform further research or practice? One particular 
approach to such an inference which is worth mentioning (as it will be utilised elsewhere 
in this thesis) is that of Pragmatics. Pragmatics, after Charles Sanders Pierce, may be 
described as a philosophical position which connects theory and practice. That is does 
belief in a thing (in the absence of real doubt) allow us to act in a useful or meaningful 
way? This mode of thought allows for deductive and abductive lines of enquiry, but is not 
anti-realist, in that we would assume that there is a real world, much of which is 
nomologically governed by law like processes, but how much of that world is objectively 
‘discoverable’ by inductive means is also discovered in the act of enquiry. 
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Pierce argued for three main phases of inquiry: retroductive; deductive; and inductive 
(Pierce 1908). These phases are naturally applied in all successful effots to fix scientific 
belief. Initially a surprising fact is noted, from which ideas are formed about how it might 
be explained (retroduction). This period of argument, attempting to find the best 
explanation, is followed by a phase of expressing that argument as hypotheses and 
thence demonstrating or illustrating the nature of the hypotheses (deduction). Finally, in 
order for a hypothesis to be believed, the degree of fit it has with experience must be 
demonstrated, possibly by gradual increments, by a process of induction. So where a 
physicist observes a surprising phenomenon (say accelerating expansion at some period 
in the life of the universe), there will be a process of abduction or retroduction where a 
researcher attempts to come up with some means of accounting for or explaining the 
surprising fact in light of other knowledge (say that there must be some energy at work 
which we haven’t observed yet). Taking this new idea which seems to account for the 
observed phenomena the researcher will deductively break the argument down to 
deductive hypotheses (say that if there were some energy we hadn’t directly accounted 
for yet, we might find its effects in other places than a surprisingly expanding universe), 
which can then be inductively compared with empirical data (in our example we would 
expect some effort be put into seeking astronomical observations or experimental data 
which are empirically in accord or in contravention to the deduced hypotheses). If the 
experimental data is ‘surprising’ then presumably the sequence of phases starts again, 
otherwise the hypotheses become more convincing and will be accepted as true by more 
and more people. 
Such a notional process admits that experimental science is not a simple process of 
inductively testing hypotheses, but rather that abductive and deductive processes are 
involved to a substantial degree. So we have a situation where scientific theories are not 
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strictly inductively based on data, but are abductively formulated and deductively 
reasoned and as such are not necessarily objectively, demonstrably ‘real’ or definitively 
true. However they are sufficiently useful in promoting understanding and have been, in 
part, sufficiently demonstrated as reasonable enough that people can believe in them.  
Admittedly such epistemological processes are a subject of constant debate within the 
Philosophy of Science, but it seems that there is a consensus that pure induction is 
impossible, as the human propensity to introduce bias in observation is extremely 
difficult to avoid, and pure deduction is undesirable, as a theory without supporting 
evidence does not easily engender belief in an audience (who might have experiential 
evidence or other biases to the contrary).  
This focus of this current thesis on the abductive generation of theory rather than 
inductive validation of existing theory or even deductive resolving theory from related 
domains then was partly due to a dearth of empirical work relating to the overall play 
experience at the time of initiating the research project. Of the empirically derived 
theories that did exist (i.e. (Malone 1981; and Fabricatore et al. 2002; and Kline & 
Arlidge 2003) all had restricted the scope of their studies to address either a subset of 
player types or certain game types or genres of game. For example Malone focused on 
the experiences of children playing games in a classroom setting, as his interest was in 
the pedagogic potential of this new medium. As such it was felt that while there was a 
surprising phenomenon of videogame play (and the occasional deep engagement 
observed in players) that it had not yet been sufficiently accounted for in a general sense 
in the pre-existing work. 
The desire to produce a ‘general’ theory should be explored here. It could be argued that 
in a sense all scientific theories are a type of generalisation. When Newton proposed his 
law of universal gravitation he did not intend to describe the behaviour of some objects 
98 
 
he observed, rather he hoped to describe the relative behaviour of all massive objects 
relative to one-another. He was aiming for a generalisation about objects with mass. We 
might argue that the physical mechanisms studied by Physicists are obviously law like 
and as such general laws are possible or desirable in that field (we could argue that they 
are in fact much more believable) whereas anything which deals with the incredibly 
variable behaviours of human beings is much less law like and is thus less amenable to 
generalisation. True, but a century or two of different branches of the human sciences 
(psychology, sociology, anthropology) have shown that people often behave and arrange 
themselves in consistent ways. Without insisting that an ultimate cause be found in order 
to establish these consistencies (Newton knew nothing of space-time or any other 
subsequent theory about the causal nature of gravitation, but could accurately describe 
and predict the behaviours of massive objects), and becoming prematurely reductionist, 
how can we establish behavioural principles? One approach is to attempt to show that 
there is a statistically significant pattern in a population of people. This approach is 
commonly used in quantitative research in the social sciences. To take a hypothesised 
effect and to statistically evaluate the effect it has in a population. Another approach is 
to study what the population is doing, and look at what patterns there are in the cases 
studied. This latter qualitative approach has been contrasted with quantitative methods 
in terms of which methods allow us to infer a generalisable effect by such as Gobo 
(2004). In order to get a true statistical generalisation we need to make sure certain 
conditions are met. We need to make sure that the sample the generalisation was drawn 
from is statistically representative, and that the statistics used are suitable for the 
sample and the type of data. Gobo argues that the first condition is usually impossible to 
define in advance of the collection of data. While it might be possible to obtain 
demographic distributions (age, gender, or net economic worth say), it might be much 
more difficult to get an accurate measure of the distribution of a behaviour in a 
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population, until after a study is started. Even if such a distribution is available, obtaining 
a sample of just that distribution and of sufficient size to be amenable to statistical 
instruments is often extremely difficult.  So, quite often, statistical generalisations can 
only be said to be generalisable to the samples they obtain. For example patterns of 
non-response or difficulty in obtaining individuals with specific characteristics for use in a 
statistical method may map precisely to critical variables. This may be due to the lack of 
demographic data on the greater population relative to the subject of study. For example 
where would one find data about the distribution of specific unselfish behaviour (Gobo 
2004)? So in order for a statistical syllogism of the form X proportion of the greater 
population behave unselfishly in Y context to be valid, the sample of individuals in the 
context displaying a range of responses must be representative, which may be 
impossible. 
If we look at a model of epistemology such as Pierce’s, we might argue that applying a 
statistical method in exploring a distribution of cases sits at a late phase in fixing 
knowledge. If we are exploring the critical variables of a phenomenon, determining these 
variables and how we might demonstrate their distribution in a population is likely to be 
impossible until those criteria have been retroductively and deductively formulated. As 
pointed out by Gobo and hinted at in the Cosmology example above, in many disciplines 
statistical methods are rarely used. In a wealth of disciplines the inductive experimental 
method is case based (some disciplines such as palaeontology use a case based mode of 
knowledge acquisition almost exclusively, using an abductive comparison of cases rather 
than any experiments or statistical proofs), for example if a physicist can show a case of 
particles behaving in a specific way, that in itself is interesting and capable of spawning 
new theory.       
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So with respect to the phenomenon of videogame play, the tendency to segment the 
problem seems premature without a theory relating to where the lines should be drawn, 
and indeed what the fundamental issues and thus case variables are in the first place. 
With this in mind several candidate techniques which promised to create theories with 
broad coverage and delimiting potential were considered. It was felt that the desired 
technique should cover as many of the possible variables within the domain as possible, 
while determining which of these variables have the greatest predictive or analytic 
power. From this base we might abductively reason about the nature of the 
phenomenon.   
2.1.1. Considering Experimentation 
The methodology which might seem most ‘scientific’ or empirical would be to deduce 
some hypotheses from the contemporary literature and formulate some experiments to 
inductively validate them. However, as mentioned above, at the time this programme 
was started there were few domain specific theories with predictive potential and broad 
coverage from which to deduce hypotheses. While it might have been possible to take a 
deductive stance toward those theories which did exist (even those related to seemingly 
associated phenomena such as watching television or playing sports) and formulate 
hypotheses and thence experiments for those which seemed to infer the greatest 
potential, I felt that the theories so presented were at an exploratory stage and thus I 
believed that they often left gaps in what they covered (sometimes deliberately) and as 
such a more exploratory or retroductive path was desirable. True I could have deduced 
apparent omissions and devised hypotheses with which to probe these surmised effects 
or factors, but such an endeavour quickly becomes retroductive, and in a way this 
exploration of the domain by means of cycles of collecting empirical data, formulating 
hypotheses about this data, and inferring a partial theory is one that was eventually 
taken (see below). 
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I do not reject experimentation as a method of promoting inference and thus fixing belief 
in findings. I would simply argue that experimentation is a useful tool at a stage of 
theoretical maturity beyond the point at which this project started.    
2.1.2. Considering Factor Analysis 
The first type of technique to be seriously considered in this programme was to apply a 
factor analysis, or a similar technique, to a large amount of data. This would be similar 
to the approach taken by Kline and Arlidge (2003), but ideally with no bias relating to 
the genre or type of game. Factor analysis is a technique which seeks to reduce the 
dimensionality of a set of data by looking for patterns of correlations between the 
variables. This type of principally statistical methodology and others like it (such as 
Principle Components Analysis or Cluster Analysis) may, on face value, seem to provide 
an ideal way to reduce the overall problem down to a simple set of dependant variables 
that account for the majority of the variability in any data collected in a domain. For our 
purposes there is a problem however. Statistical factoring techniques such as these will 
only show factors which have been represented in the data by underlying variables. This 
requirement to include all variables of potential interest means that these forms of 
analysis are not suitable for wholly exploratory investigations where the bounds of the 
domain are not yet understood (see the critique of statistical methods above). This 
might suggest that it would be necessary to perform a preliminary study to determine 
the limits of the necessary work in order to capture data about all variables within the 
domain. It is this approach that was taken by Malone (1981), but he doesn’t expand on 
this preliminary phase to any great degree in his reports. Also if one were to perform a 
study to explore the full extent of a domain, with the right method of analysis, one might 
also abductively determine what is interesting about that domain as one proceeds. So 
the subject of the study could be an extensive qualitative study of videogame play in 
general, seeking to draw out theoretical factors or generalizations. 
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Another problem with such a statistical factoring technique concerns the result of such a 
study. Do factors leave us with a rounded theory from which it is possible to deduce 
hypotheses about the behaviour of individuals outside the context of the study? Could 
we infer from these factors (or components or clusters) a causal relationship between 
the findings and the domain? For example factors such as Challenge, Fantasy and 
Curiosity (Malone 1981) might hint at a demonstration of underlying Psychological 
mechanisms, but gives us little clue as to how to infer how they are caused or how they 
might be mediated or resolved by an individual. They are distributions of preference not 
a descriptive or causal theory. This might be fine if we have a theory about what things 
engage players and are seeking a statistical confirmation of their presence and weight, 
or if we have a number of competing cases from a complete set of data and are seeking 
a refactoring of that data more amenable to analysis, but if we are asking what, in 
general, is going on when players play games (or conversely reject a game or games), 
then we might be better served by another method.   
 
2.1.3. Considering Ethnomethodology 
So if we are seeking a means of explaining a phenomenon, and we are not at the stage 
to deduce that we have a theory from which we can extract testable hypotheses about 
the fundamentals of the problem, and we do not have sufficient knowledge about the 
boundaries of the problem in order that we might statistically segment the problem into 
a subset of components, then we need to explore that problem in order to discern what 
those fundamental elements and boundaries are. Such an approach is likely to be much 
more qualitative than it is quantitative. 
A famous approach to qualitative research is that of Ethnomethodology.   
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Ethnomethodology (after (Garfinkel 1984) is named such that one might expect it to be 
a cohesive methodology for the study of Anthropology (Ethno-methodology). It is not; 
rather it is the study of ‘ethnomethods’ or the methods people use to form and make 
sense of their social environment. (the ‘ology’ of ‘ethnomethods’ if you will). This outlook 
relies on there being a community or society maintaining a social order via a series of 
methods, and it is these sociological methods which are of primary concern. So if our 
research question related to studying ‘gamers’ or some other, more recognizable 
community of game players we might find use for an Ethnomethodological approach to 
study games and gamers in society, and how the social order relates to these activities. 
However we are in fact interested in gameplay in general, and how it is engaged in by 
any participant in any context. To assume that videogame engagement rests in primarily 
social factors is an assumption before the fact. Indeed at the initiation of this project I 
was not of the mind that any eventual theory or theories would necessarily be 
Sociological in nature. Instead a methodology was selected which provided the scope to 
construct a theory independent of any single established field of study such as Sociology, 
Psychology, Biology, Chemistry, Anthropology or Cultural Studies. 
We might also ask what the result of applying such a methodology would be.  
2.1.4. Considering Grounded Theory Methodology 
Another well known research approach in some areas (especially sociological studies in 
health care practice) is that of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounded 
Theory is presented as an integrated set of methods which formalise the process of 
obtaining a hypothesis producing theory from a domain by empirical means. It is argued 
(Glaser 1978) that by employing a strict inductive relationship to a domain it should be 
possible to create theory without recourse to ‘grand’ existing theory. Rather the 
argument is that a theory about a domain should be ‘grounded’ or derived from data 
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about that domain. In order to achieve this Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe a set of 
methods or procedures intended to inductively generate hypotheses through iterations of 
sampling, data analysis, and theorising. Glaser suggests that such an approach could be 
utilised in any field (not just Sociology). Grounded Theory could in effect be described, 
following Pierce (1908), as a type of formalised retroduction. A retroductive approach to 
a domain, given the starting position of the project described in this thesis (little general, 
empirically derived or supported theory about videogame play), is attractive. However 
some might argue (i.e. Thomas and James 2006) that a retroductive approach to a 
domain does not require a methodology as such; rather it being a naturally occurring 
process of investigation. This could be said to be particularly true of the social sciences 
(but possibly also true of other sciences) where theory will naturally occur to a skilled 
researcher as they explore the data and existing theory of a domain. In this regard GT 
could be said to be of little epistemological value; that one could not infer any greater 
‘truth’ from a ‘grounded’ theory than one derived through skilled retroductive 
investigation of the domain without following such a strict methodology. However, surely 
not every researcher will be skilled in retroductive explorations and theory development, 
and a formalised process such as GT can act as a guide for those without the knowledge 
or confidence to create theory spontaneously. An individual without the experience and 
skills in retroductive research may well be well served by a ‘cook book’ of procedures 
guiding them to reasonable methods and methodological integration to achieve the end 
product desired. The question then is whether an application of GT can produce 
interesting results if applied by a certain individual. If, without having applied such a 
methodology, such an individual may not have used a retroductive approach and rather 
created a thin set of validations of existing theory, or a superficial description and 
reframing of domain data lacking in theoretical insights, rather than a rich theory 
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obviously related to domain data, then we could argue that the application of a 
methodology is warranted. 
That is not to say that GT doesn’t suffer from problems. Indeed a disagreement between 
the originators over what the methodology is intended to do (See Glaser 1992 for his 
perspective) highlights the need for care in the interpretation and implementation of GT. 
Fundamental to the interpretation of CGT is what Glaser means when he refers to 
‘induction’, ‘sensitivity’, and ‘forcing’. In regards to induction Glaser may appear to 
advocate knowledge development by a type of Baconian method (1620) or comparative 
induction. That is a generalised theory should develop by the logical comparison of cases 
or salient pieces of data, and not by the process of ‘proving’ or ‘falsifying’ other, possibly 
non-empirical, theory. By this rejection of ‘forcing’ theory on data Glaser hopes to 
minimise deduced theoretical bias and ensure a ‘grounded’ theory. However, as pointed 
out by critics (such as Thomas and James 2006) the possibility of creating theory via 
unbiased ‘blank slate’ induction has been disputed for centuries. That said, such 
criticisms downplay Glaser and Strauss’s argument that a researcher must be ‘sensitive’ 
to the theoretical possibilities present in their work. That is that they should retain 
‘theoretical sensitivity’ or a cultivated awareness for what theory may be extracted from 
the domain data as it is collected and analysed. It seems that there is an apparent 
conflict in the way the methodology is expressed or at least in how it may be understood 
(see Urquhart 2002 for an analysis of how this misunderstanding can be interpreted), 
which may be a result of the way it is expressed. If pure induction, free of bias, is 
impossible as argued by subjectivists and postpositivists alike then what why does 
Glaser insist that the methodology is indeed inductive? It seems that this insistence is an 
attempt to militate against the possibility that the GT methodology might be used to 
prematurely deduce how data must fit data into existing theory rather than attempting 
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to rely on data, guided by the researcher’s background, knowledge, and skill (theoretical 
sensitivity) to generate theory. The claim that GT must be inductive is then a sticking 
point for critics such as Thomas and James (2006) or Bryant (2002), but if we allow for a 
rephrasing of the methodology (not a re-specifying or remodelling) to suggest that GT is 
data-driven abduction or retroduction then the methodology makes more sense in a 
postpositivist epistemological frame. The strictures advocated by Glaser in order to 
remain ‘grounded’ in the data (such as avoiding a review of competing theory at the 
outset of a research project or to avoid deductive debate while one is exploring the 
domain data) can then be viewed as advice on how to minimise unwarranted deduction 
during a retroductive examination of a domain. In this light these strictures make some 
logical sense, even if they might be difficult to manage practically. 
So GT seems like a reasonable set of procedures with which one might structure a 
retroductive examination of a domain, but what the final result should be requires 
further exploration. Here again there is a difference of opinion in both approach and 
thence product. Strauss and Corbin (1998) advocate a more closely specified set of 
procedures than those of Glaser (1978). Part of this specification includes a sense that 
social data should be fractured and re-presented in such a way that attempts to describe 
the methods and actions of actors in the domain. This approach then results in 
something which might resemble aspects of ethnomethodological research. As previously 
mentioned, with respect to the domain we are currently interested in (videogame play) I 
feel that we are not obliged to consider social methods as the central point of concern. 
Indeed this ‘forcing’ of a particular frame or theme on the domain, as well as the sense 
that we are looking to describe the factors of the domain as a re-presentation of encoded 
or fractured data are aspects of Strauss’s approach which Glaser argues explicitly against 
(Glaser 1992). Instead Glaser argues that the sense of what is critical should be found in 
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exploring domain data, and the result should be an abstracted hypothesis (or set of 
related hypotheses around a central core) setting out what is critical, supported by data. 
These hypotheses being based not on a ‘complete conceptual description’ but on cases 
which seem to be most prescient and are connected to the majority of the salient (both 
confirming and dis-confirming) cases collected; the prescience and salience of the cases 
being determined by both their recurrence and the researcher’s skill in extracting (or 
creating) them. 
The approach of Glaser seems to be a agreeable methodology then if we have no firm 
research question, but only an interesting phenomenon or domain, and we are looking 
for a result in the form of general or transferable hypothetical propositions without 
assuming that those propositions must be sociological in nature (or some other ‘kind’) in 
advance. 
2.1.5. Considering Ethnography or Phenomenological Research 
If, as Thomas and James (2006) might argue, the strict methodological steps of 
Grounded Theory are not necessary, and if a result in the form of generalised hypotheses 
might seem unnecessarily nomological or even reductionist, then why not reject such 
constraints and perform a study of prescient cases of videogame play to develop a non-
predictive, descriptive account of the behaviours demonstrated and meanings employed 
by the individuals in the setting of our domain of interest (people engaging in videogame 
play)? Ethnography (and in some respects Phenomenology) is one framework within 
which such a case study might be performed. In some regards Ethnomethodology and 
Grounded Theory could be said to be Ethnographic, where Ethnomethodology takes 
behaviours and expressed meanings and makes sense of them as methods, while GT 
takes similar data and distils them into a set of hypotheses rather than a ‘holistic’ 
account. At a retroductive phase of research Ethnographic studies are appealing as 
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expressions of social methods or generalised hypotheses are not expected, but are 
possible. 
Another critical difference between Ethnography and (specifically Glasarian) GT is that 
difference between GT and Ethnomethodology. Ethnography, by its very nature, assumes 
that the delimits of the study are a specific social or ethnic group which can be described 
in terms if unifying behaviours and applied meanings. In studying videogame play how 
might we interpret this division? Do we apply one? Could we, for example assume that 
PC gamers form a coherent social group distinct from mobile telephone gamers, such 
that we could study PC gamers as a social or ethic group? Could we take ‘casual’ gamers 
as a distinct group from ‘hardcore’ gamers? What of those that play no games? While we 
might find communities which occur due to a common appreciation of games, and that 
commonality might be described by any of the above terms, to assume that these 
communities are so easily differentiated seems premature without some idea about how 
these communities do indeed differ. Such segmentation might be possible if we were 
studying a club, workplace, or some other easily identifiable collective of individuals with 
shared goals, but in accounting for the actions and beliefs of disparate groups of people 
in a more general sense a holistic Ethnographic account seems initially restrictive. 
Phenomenology, when taken as an approach to framing social science research, is similar 
to Ethnography as it has similar constraints in terms of identifying a specific community 
or specific shared experience. Phenomenological research can be partly explained in 
contrast to Ethnomethodology. As Ethnomethodology attempts to show what methods 
are employed in creating or maintaining a social order, Phenomenological research 
attempts to reveal the common meanings arrived at and employed in a particular activity 
or community. This focus on meanings means that while an Ethnographer might start 
their research by observing the activities of a group, a Phenomenologist will start by 
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interviewing group members about their experiences and interpretations in order to start 
interpreting their shared meanings as a first step. So while Ethnography focuses on 
common behaviours then shared meanings, Phenomenology focuses on meanings and 
then interpretations of meaningful behaviour.  
Each of these qualitative research approaches eschew a strict set of procedures, which 
confident, experienced practitioners may feel is more suitable for exploring a domain 
retroductively; taking the varying emphases on different aspects of human experience 
(whether that be observed behaviour, shared meaning and interpretation, or social 
methods) as guidance on things to look for and account for in their communities of 
interest. Having taken this guidance they can then explore the domain as seems most 
appropriate at the time, and can analyse resulting data to a level of abstraction they feel 
most comfortable supporting (often as a collection of interpreted observations organised 
around some themes). We might imagine however that where a researcher lacks the 
skill, experience, or confidence to simply take these approaches as a guide to their own 
empirical work (that is they might not be confident in which sampling strategies to 
employ, how one might make sense of their data, how to present the findings in a 
coherent and structured way, or even what kind of findings to aim for) some further 
methodological guidance might be welcome. Also if a thick or narrative account of a 
problem domain is not what is wanted as a result, these methods are not often used for 
the generation of broad hypotheses.     
2.1.6. Summary of methodology rationale 
As the reader will discover, the route taken in the research reported in this thesis was to 
apply Grounded Theory Methodology. This was mainly due to a feeling that thick 
descriptions lack a sense of strong predictive utility, but also because there was no sense 
of a parent field from which to draw an approach or pointers as to what one should be 
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looking for. This research did not set out to be Sociological, nor was it necessarily 
Psychological or Anthroplogical. It deals with people using computer equipment, but 
dealing exclusively with videogames sits at the fringes of the human-computer 
interaction (HCI) field. We might deem it humanistic games studies (or human-game 
experience studies or something), but what that implies in terms of methodologies and 
results remains an open question in the field of games research, which we might say is 
barely a decade old as a coherent field. 
As a narrative or thick descriptive approach was rejected, the decision was also made to 
reject statistical factoring and experimental verification. At the time of initiating this 
research the field of human-videogame studies lacked the maturity to provide a coherent 
theoretical background from which to deduce hypotheses and variables. If the variables 
are not well agreed and there are few established theories relating to the key aspects of 
the experience then a methodology of exploration rather than verification or even 
mapping is surely required. GT sits in an empirical research space which supports 
exploration while also supporting hypothesis formation. We might place it in a similar 
place in knowledge development to Pierce’s retroductive stage, in early phases of GT, 
reaching into Pierce’s deductive hypothesis generating stage in later phases, but stops 
short of inductive verification. 
That is not to say that GT is the only candidate in this space (see Bowers and Schatzman 
2009 for another), nor is it a methodology without problematic issues. It is however 
possibly the most utilised methodology to explicitly occupy this space, and as such there 
is a wealth of advice from a number of sources in how to proceed. 
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2.2. Interpretation of the Grounded Theory methodology 
The necessity for this section describing my view of the methodology is twofold. Firstly 
that GT is a type of methodological approach not often practised within Computing 
Science departments, where statistical, experimental, verificational, notionally inductive, 
traditional scientific approaches to the generation of knowledge are much more 
traditional, and as such some explanation of what such a methodology sets out to 
achieve is prudent. Second, I have attempted to follow Glaser's approach, but he has yet 
to publish a single, easy to obtain, step by step guide to performing this methodology. 
The published work other than the original The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research (Glaser & A. Strauss 1967) that comes closest to a 
guide is Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory 
(Glaser 1978), but this publication has few practical examples rendering the advice open 
to interpretation. This interpretative nature could be said to be the purpose of the 
methodology as a whole. Glaser repeatedly warns against what he calls ‘forcing’. That is 
forcing the data to fit an anticipated theoretical direction. However when learning to 
implement this ‘freeform’ yet structured methodology the lack of real world examples 
makes the process of learning how each  method should be carried out and how one 
method leads into the next, to form a structured methodology, is far from transparent. 
This lack of transparency is evidenced by the variability in interpretation demonstrated in 
the many papers professing to have used a Grounded Theory Methodology and 
numerous books purporting to explain what the methodology entails, while showing 
large differences in their implementations and interpretations respectively. The greatest 
demonstration of the lack of transparency in Glaser’s methodology however is his 
disagreement with his co-author of The Discovery of Grounded Theory, the late Anselm 
Strauss. This disagreement in the interpretation of the methodology even resulted in 
Glaser writing a book specifically highlighting the points where Strauss’s interpretation 
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(Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques; (A. L. 
Strauss & Corbin 1998)) departed from his own; Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: 
Emargence vs Forcing; (Glaser 1992). Strauss and Corbin’s Book (now in its 3rd edition) 
has gained some traction and has influenced the interpretation of GT methodology 
greatly. This is possibly due to the much more accessible, cook-book style it presents. 
Glaser’s objections are centred on the theoretical underpinnings of Strauss’s 
Methodology, but yet there is still not a single source of practical advice in implementing 
Glaser’s view of GT which this author is aware of. There are only collections of papers 
(and apparently vanity published books) produced by Glaser showing the different 
domains in which it might be applied and what one might expect in terms of results. 
This section then will present an interpretation of Glaser’s methodology (which he 
prefers to call Classic Grounded Theory). Starting with what kind of ‘theory’ one might 
expect to produce, followed by what processes one might expect to perform in order to 
produce such a theory, and what these processes might look like in all practicality. I will 
not enter the debate between Classic GT and Straussian GT; if the reader would care to 
know the minutiae of the differences between these two competing interpretations I 
would suggest reading Glaser's critique of Strauss and Corbin (Glaser 1992). The section 
following this one deals with how this interpretation has actually been implemented in 
order to produce the extant thesis, and a later chapter explores commonly encountered 
misconceptions (many of which I myself have fallen foul of at various points) which often 
serve to confound the user of GT.  
2.2.2. Generalized Process 
In the following gross summary paragraph I have attempted to present the process free 
of GT jargon. Where necessary, as the jargon will be used as shorthand later in this 
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thesis, the specific jargon word or phrase is placed in parentheses and italics 
immediately following the concept. 
The Classic GT process is primarily iterative. Data is collected in an ongoing process, 
rather than as a single study or a study broken into a series of predetermined phases, 
and the formulation of theoretical concepts operates in parallel with data collection. 
Indeed, the developing theory directs the collection of data in order to increase the 
efficiency of the data collection process (theoretical sampling). The formulation of 
theoretical concepts is directed via two methods: the generation of themes (category 
codes) and properties of these themes, and the capturing of theoretical thoughts 
(memos). The collection of data, in each iteration, is guided by the theoretical ideas that 
are emerging, with the researcher following interesting leads as much as possible 
(theoretical sampling). These iterations pass through a phase where the theory seems to 
point in one particular theoretical direction (core category) which is then rounded out 
(selective coding) with more iterations focused on this idea, before stopping when this 
direction is theoretically exhausted and the work is no longer producing new theoretical 
ideas (saturation). Once the primary iterative phase is complete the researcher then 
takes his, hopefully many theoretical ideas, and decides how they will best fit together to 
explain the phenomenon via the direction identified (sorting); a process which may well 
yield new theoretical ideas which would also be included in the integration process. 
These integrated ideas are then the basis for the final published work. 
It should be pointed out that the identification of themes is essential to using this 
methodology effectively, indeed in Glaser and Strauss's original disseminations on the 
methodology (1967) it is known as the Constant Comparative Method highlighting that 
the method relies on comparisons within the data set rather than applied interpretations 
to individual datum. 
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All of these decisions cannot be automated and depend entirely on the researcher’s 
‘sensitivity’ to theory. That is the researcher is relying on their own knowledge and 
intelligence to identify the interesting themes and make theoretical judgments about 
them. That is not to say that the process should be deductive; theoretical judgments 
should only be made which appear in and hence can be ‘grounded’ in the data, resulting 
in an abductive or retroductive process.  
One issue that should also be pointed out is the relationship between Memos and 
Theoretical Codes. As I understand it a Memo is a theoretical idea based on Codes while 
a Theoretical Code is a comparison of Codes rather than data, a super-code if you will.  
2.2.3. Practical Process 
In practical terms, for many studies in the Social Sciences this means that GT is formed 
by inspecting each new set of data (interview, diary, article, participant observation or 
whatever else seems to best fund the research) for points of comparison. Where a point 
of comparison is identified it is noted and where it differs from other instances of the 
same comparative code that new difference is also noted as a property code of the 
parent comparative code. These comparison and property codes are then the material 
for theorizing. As theorizing is the purpose of the endeavour, the writing of theoretical 
memos takes priority; the researcher ensuring that theoretical memos are captured 
throughout.  
At some point the researcher will become fairly convinced that they have a good idea 
about what is driving the actors in the domain, what their key concern is, and switches 
focus to selectively flesh out this idea. In selectively coding for this core category the 
researcher isn’t attempting to find every possible value for every possible variable, they 
are attempting to achieve theoretical saturation; saturation of the variables (Theoretical 
memos), not the values of those variables (codes or data). For qualitative research in 
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general this would mean fleshing out the interesting contributing types of property and 
how they affect the core. If the core is going to lead to a good theory one would expect 
most theoretical memos to relate to its properties. When new no new theoretical ideas 
are being noted in memos, this is the general stopping rule for the main part of the 
research.  
The researcher now has a collection of theoretical ideas in the collection of memos, but 
this is, in itself, not as interesting as it could be. The theory needs to be worked up into a 
meaningful whole. While sorting the memos, with the simultaneous aims of integrating 
as many of the theoretical ideas as possible into the theory, and producing a product 
which can be written into a meaningful thesis (or paper), the researcher remains aware 
of new and interesting relationships which may emerge and notes them as new memos 
to be integrated. At the end of sorting the researcher should have a structure for the 
intended publication, and in virtue of the methodology used be able to illustrate 
theoretical points by drilling down from the memos back through the codes to find clear 
illustrative examples in the data to illuminate points made; demonstrating the grounding 
of the theory. 
The precise physical mechanics of each of these stages is not dictated. Glaser himself 
seems to prefer to use paper at every stage of the process, from data collection (post 
hoc and ad hoc field notes) to sorting (paper and scissors), but a case can be made for 
using software to keep track of the relationship between codes and data, and memos 
and codes, and some practitioners use other systems of keeping track of their research. 
The primary aim is keep the project in a fluid, flexible state so that it can account for the 
data in the domain; allow the researcher to maintain an understanding of that data, the 
domain and their theory; and not be constrained by the particular mechanics employed. 
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Other pieces of practical advice can be gathered from Glaser’s writings. The following 
coverage of this advice is not exhaustive, but the points presented have shaped this 
thesis: 
Glaser advocates avoiding literature directly relating to the research domain in order to 
prevent the theoretical influence of these theories on the developing work. Though while 
attempting to avoid forcing a deductive process on the data with directly related works 
he does advocate maintaining a broad scholarship in order to become as sensitive to 
theoretical concepts as possible. Similarly, discussing ones emerging theory before it is 
fully formed can rob the researcher of confidence, being swayed by the opinion of 
colleagues who have not engaged in the grounded process, and so should also be 
avoided.  
Advice on the actual practice and mechanisms of GT are less forceful, however some can 
be ascertained. For example, where sampling is concerned the place to start is 
anywhere; just collect some data and start. Once theoretically sampling one should seek 
out similar data to flesh out properties and different or disparate data to generate new 
comparative codes. Another example is that when coding, a single part of the data 
should inform one code (category or property) rather than many, preventing any 
propensity to create a complex theory from a few data points. However theory 
production in memos is not so constrained. 
2.3. Implementation 
Obviously there will have been practical as well as theoretical or methodological 
decisions to make, such as how to manage data collection, how to capture and track 
codes and how to capture and manage memos during the coding phases and how to 
perform the sort ensuring solid follow through into the write-up. For a complete coverage 
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of my learning process with the attendant dead ends, realizations and inspirations see 
the relevant chapter later in this thesis. This section deals with a somewhat idealized 
rationalization of the implementation of the methodology.  
2.3.1. Data 
The data collection was, eventually, almost entirely reliant on interviewing suitable 
subjects. While I experimented with other methods including observations, diaries, and 
email correspondence none of these provided the rapid and rich information provided by 
sitting down and discussing subjects’ experiences and opinions. A few memos were 
drawn from chance encounters and conversations; a few observations about a partially 
related focus group I observed during professional activities outside this research; and  a 
single trial observational study. The total number of individuals who contributed data to 
this research, including a few which contributed directly memoed notes, from those 
chance encounters mentioned above, to flesh out the sort, is around 25. A non-
comprehensive list of participants is provided in Appendix A. 
Initially the lengthy interviews were recorded and fully transcribed, but once the theory 
was emerging and data collection and coding were becoming more streamlined only the 
recordings were used for coding. Once I had identified a candidate core category I 
moved to making summary field notes and stopped recording or transcribing interviews 
altogether. These were practical decisions intended to speed up the process as I become 
more confident in using the methodology. Transcribing from digital files seems to be less 
well established than transcribing from tape, and as the recordings I made were on both 
Minidisc and using the facility of a mobile phone to record telephone conversations. The 
process of converting digital files and transcribing them can take a great deal of time and 
effort, which arguably could be better spent in collecting more data and strengthening 
the research (Glaser 1998). Similarly audio recordings take a degree of setting up; one 
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needs to carry the equipment when one expects to collect data, find a quiet environment 
in which to make the recording, ask permission of the subject(s) that a recording be 
made, ensure the equipment is performing correctly and that there is enough capacity 
on the storage medium for the full extent of the interview. Almost all issues which I have 
fallen foul of at some stage (though I always ensured that I had informed consent from 
active participants). So as soon as I felt confident enough I followed Glaser’s advice and 
moved to making field notes, forgoing audio recordings, speeding up my iterations 
significantly. 
That is not to say that the production of field notes is not problematic. Producing notes 
and interviewing at the same time slows the interview process and prevents one from 
fully engaging with the subject. However, producing notes after the interview has 
concluded may result in one forgetting to note important points made in the interview, 
focusing instead on their desired outcome. Interestingly Glaser’s preferred method is to 
write field notes after every interview as he believes that this allows the researcher to 
fully engage with the domain and that the notes are then also the first step in 
abstraction from data to theory. I feel that the approach I have taken in this study, of 
moving from full transcript to field notes recorded during data collection is suitable for 
someone with developing skill and experience as a researcher. 
2.3.2. Data management and coding 
Keeping track of the data in the form of both text and audio, while allowing for the 
freedom in coding and memoing demanded by the GT methodology, presents other 
challenges. Using untranscribed audio as a source of data I was obviously unable to use 
a purely paper based system, as recording codes on paper would have been quite 
difficult to tie to a section of a recording, without transcribing it.  Indeed I had decided to 
use some form of software to track my codes and memos and their relationship to the 
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data at a stage before I decided to forgo transcription. The I used software then allowed 
the transition through using only the audio without transcription. 
The various data, the codes and memos were collected together and tracked using 
Atlas.ti (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development GmbH 1993), a software package 
designed for an interpretation of GT. This package was just flexible enough to allow me 
to apply my own interpretation of the methodology and is capable of allowing one to 
attach codes to a wealth of different data types and to attach memos to both the data 
and the codes produced. 
It must be pointed out that Glaser suggests coding in the margins of the field notes and 
writing memos independently of the data (but making reference to specific, traceable 
codes), thus ensuring that individual sections of the data are not over used, and that the 
origin of a code can be quickly traced (however this approach means that obtaining an 
overview of all the codes created is much more difficult than if the data, codes and 
memos are stored separately but linked by some mechanism such as that provided by 
specialist software).  
The actual coding strategy employed in the pursuit of this research was initially guided 
by Straussian methods; noting interesting points about each piece of data (in my case 
salient points made during an interview which may have been a phrase, sentence or 
paragraph). When it became apparent that a primarily comparative scheme was more 
efficient, this method of denoting all points of interest was halted and the points made 
chunked together into comparative groupings which then became comparative codes for 
use in the more Glasarian coding scheme to follow. The originating data and codes in 
each comparative grouping were also inspected to formulate properties of these codes.  
Further coding was then performed in line with this comparative scheme, still accounting 
for the parent category when noting properties. 
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It is interesting to note that a coding scheme whereby the researcher denotes parts of 
the data and summarises them as some label or shortened description at first seems less 
complicated and onerous than comparing each section of the data to all other parts of 
the data looking for similarities and differences. However, in summarising all the data, 
applying any possible label the researcher can imagine, the wealth of codes quickly 
becomes too large to handle, and it was when this was realised that the original coding 
scheme was abandoned, new insights into the methodology were sought, and a new, 
more practical, coding scheme was initiated. A later section of this thesis will discuss 
misconceptions such as this and how they might affect a research programme. The 
above explanation of the false start and eventual recovery are included, because by 
starting to code in the descriptive way and then reforming that code book to be 
compatible with a comparative method of further encoding, the nature of the 
methodology might have been fundamentally affected, potentially producing a different 
result than if only one coding method had been used. It is my belief that as enough data 
was collected to arrive at theoretical saturation and no more (there was a lagom amount 
of data and codes utilised in creating this theory, to utilise a very apt Swedish word), and 
that any further data collection, or coding fully comparatively at a different point in the 
process would have yielded a very similar result. This is a feature of the methodology, in 
that in iterating the data collection until theoretical saturation, no more data need be 
collected than necessary, as further data collection will not further modify the saturated 
theory, and it is the theory which is critical rather than the codes. 
2.3.3. Theoretical sampling 
A fundamental feature of the Grounded Theory methodology is that of Theoretical 
Sampling. As there is no theory or theoretical position at the start of the process of 
collecting and encoding data the only rational sampling strategy is that of Opportunity; 
grabbing the easiest to obtain data and analysing that. Any other strategy would assume 
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that we have some idea as to what kind of result we will expect, pointing us at specific 
places to look, which would require some hypotheses, which should rightfully come from 
a theory. As such it is only as hypotheses are formed that increasingly specific targets 
are sought in the data. In our case this method of sampling means that there should be 
no assumptive decision to sample a set number of game players, from certain 
populations in a specific way. Where other, more validative, types of study might set out 
to sample, by structured interview say, a fixed number of people from both genders, a 
range of ages, specific races, specific nationalities, ranges of intelligence, the 6 NRS 
social grades, action game players, casual gamers, hardcore gamers, World of Warcraft 
players or any other group, we might reasonably ask why this metric was considered 
over other possible sampling dimensions. If no theoretical justification exists for a 
particular sampling dimension then there is no reason to consider it. If the sampling 
dimensions are intended to capture a representation of the population then there is still 
a problem as we do not know what proportions of what dimensions would constitute a 
representative sample, as we do not yet know the critical dimensions let alone the 
possible proportion of representation of that sample in the population. 
Within the GT Methodology, as the opportunity sample is analysed the researcher is 
likely to form ideas about what seems to be going on, what the dimensions are, and 
thus, how the population might differ and thus what types of data might be useful to 
collect next. There are strategies to consider here, in that there are two ways of ensuring 
that the code and memo books are developing in useful ways. Once the researcher has a 
dimension in mind, sampling on that dimension can involve seeking different cases to 
those already included, in order to create more codes and memos, or similar cases to 
those already included, to saturate the properties of the existing codes and thus saturate 
the memo book.  
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The sampling performed in the research presented here focussed primarily on the 
demographic of the sample, with a little exploration of the data collection method. 
Initially the sample consisted of close friends with some known interest in playing 
videogames. The next step was to sample acquaintances of different ages (as there 
seemed to be a sense that experience of play was possibly involved) and from different 
social backgrounds (as it seemed theoretically obvious that my peers would have a fairly 
homogenous view of videogames: we were all likely to have encountered and enjoyed 
similar games). A recurring theme of many 'off record' conversations was that many 
people rejected videogames, and some of the data from people of different ages and 
backgrounds indicated that there were different ways that people encountered games as 
agreeable and became players, as such people who rejected games as well as people 
who would describe themselves as 'hardcore' gamers were interviewed. By this time the 
hypotheses of process of engagement and identification (with identification seeming to 
provide a core hypothesis at this stage) were well established and the sampling strategy 
shifted to short semi-structured interviews with a broad opportunity sample (mainly 
students on various courses) to saturate these concepts. As such the sampling 
dimensions could be said to have been gaming experience and stated preference for 
videogame play as an agreeable leisure activity followed by age (which might also 
capture part of the experiential difference). Social background was covered to some 
degree in the nature of the opportunity sample as was gender, and the theoretical 
direction of the research made explicitly sampling for the limits of these dimensions 
redundant in that it seemed unlikely that I would have found anything which might have 
expanded the theory of negotiated cultural value by talking to individuals who could be 
described as more privileged, educated, impoverished, marginalised, male or female 
than the existing sample other than a longer list of code properties of non-core codes. 
This stopping rule (that only data which expands the theory not the code book) is 
123 
 
important. The 'interchangeability of indicators', where a new piece of data can be said 
to inform the theory in the same way as another, gives rise to a general theory of the 
domain rather than a narrative of the cases sampled. It is my contention that the data 
collected are sufficient for promoting the theory developed, and that further data will 
provide further indicators, supporting rather than substantially expanding the theory. I 
further contend that sampling on any dimension within the domain of videogame players 
(and videogame aware non-players) will yield an equivalent theoretical result. 
2.3.4. Memoing and sorting 
Initially the memos were captured using the memo facility of Atlas, but could have 
originated in other places such as my personal pocket notebook. 
During sorting the memos were printed out in their entirety, cut into individual slips of 
paper, and further memos were produced on hand written slips to be integrated along 
with the printed memos during the process of sorting. 
At the stage of initiating the sorting process the memos suggested that individuals’ value 
judgements towards features of a game were related to their individual sense of their 
expected place in society; the memos were then sorted around this core, creating the 
dense, integrated theory presented below, which also draws in the other major theme 
which was present in the memos, that of a negotiation or process. 
The aim of sorting in this instance was to develop piles of memo slips which contained 
the content for a handful of thesis chapters that could be used to explain the core 
category and how the other theoretical concepts contribute to the core, then to take 
these chapters and further sort them into subsections. These chapters and sections then 
directly informed the theoretical parts of the thesis. 
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2.3.5. Writing up 
Writing up is considered to be part of the GT process rather than an activity which 
happens once the process is completed. That is the activity of creating theoretical 
memos leads into sorting and thence directly into writing. Also, while the theory is 
written as sorted there should also be an attempt to demonstrate where the theory sits 
in the general theoretical context. To this end my literature review at this stage 
(literature reviews are advised against until a core category is identified, in order to 
maintain groundedness in the data), was captured on memos written on different 
coloured paper to be sorted into the relevant section and subsequently worked into the 
eventual written thesis section. The different coloured paper was used to clearly 
differentiate the memos concerning concepts from literature and those from the 
grounded process, while they are all piled up together in the sorted theory.  
Some other writing did take place before saturation, sorting and actual thesis writing. I 
focused this on my understanding of the methodology with some mention of emerging 
codes. This did prove fruitful as feedback did suggest alternative views of the 
methodology which ultimately resulted in greater understanding of the ongoing 
processes and aims.  
Similarly, a brief literature review was performed even before GT was selected as a 
methodology, though no literature relating to theories of videogame play and 
engagement were consulted throughout the coding phases, and the major literature 
review was performed as part of the write-up.  
2.4. Summary  
In summary then the Glasarian (or Classic) Grounded Theory methodology is in Glaser’s 
words, “…a highly structured but eminently flexible methodology. Its data collection and 
analysis procedures are explicit and the pacing of these procedures is, at once, 
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simultaneous, sequential, subsequent, scheduled and serendipitous, forming an 
integrated methodological “whole” that enables the emergence of conceptual theory…” 
(Glaser & Holton 2004).  
It is sequential in that there are 4 distinct phases: Open Coding; Selective Coding; 
Sorting; and Writing. It is simultaneous in that memos are constantly being generated; 
while it is easy to conceive of the coding phases as being sequential (collect data then 
code the data and then memo the codes) these activities do in fact occur all at once. For 
example while the researcher is collecting data they are likely to be implicitly coding that 
data on the fly (noting similarities between what this new data represents and relative to 
previous data collected) and is also likely to be generating theoretical ideas at any time 
at all including data collection. It is subsequent because the results of each level of 
abstraction are directly related to the previous levels of abstraction (The real world to 
the method of data collection to the comparative codes to the theoretical memos to the 
sorted groupings of memos to the thesis). It is scheduled in that the researcher knows 
what they should be doing next, and it is serendipitous because the researcher hopes to 
chance upon a good hypothesis without knowing the nature of that hypothesis at the 
outset. 
2.5. Example 
In order to illustrate the process so that the following sections, which cover the results of 
applying the methodology, can concentrate on theory over data it might help to provide 
a real example of how the process might be performed.  
Focusing on specific codes, starting with the very first interview in the research we can 
compare: 
KA: Yeah, so cartoons; pretty pictures. 
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JS:  Cartoons… You’ve finished Luigi’s Mansion as well. 
KA:  Cartoons, pretty pictures! Platform game. 
JS:  Yeah. 
To later in the interview where we are just running through the games on the shelves in 
the house KA shares with her boyfriend. 
JS:  You’ve never played Colin McRae? 
KA:  Racing, cars. No I have enough problems on driving lessons. 
Immediately we can see that she is making a selection or choice. She is making an 
active choice. So we have a code of ‘Active selection’. These 2 examples give us at 
least 2 properties. Firstly she is selecting games based on their ‘cartoony’ graphical 
style, and in the second case she is choosing to not play a game because of a 
relationship with ‘real world’ activities (in this case KA is looking for distance from a part 
of her real world experience that she doesn’t enjoy), so we have another property of 
relation to real world activities. 
So with these 2 comparisons we have 
Category: Active selection 
 Properties: 
  Graphical style 
  Relation to real world activities     
 
This interview then continues, discussing the selection criteria KA uses to differentiate 
games that she might try vs games that she wouldn’t: 
JS:  You’ve never played Halo. 
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KA: Shooting games, I might get violent. 
 {Jet Set Radio Future indicated} Finished. 
JS: You’ve finished Jet Set Radio Future. Is that because it looks like a cartoon 
do you reckon? 
KA: Well there was… The Xbox arrived… bearing in mind that it’s the first time 
I’ve played computer games since the very first Gameboy, the little black 
and white thing. So it was actually quite new and quite different and 
rather quite scary because it’s all 3D. So it arrived with Halo and Project 
Gotham Racing, neither of which I got. I just wasn’t interested in. And 
then [my boyfriend] has to get that one {Jet Set Radio Future}, because 
he was interested in it, and it’s just a bit more playable as opposed to 
them {Halo and Project Gotham Racing}. They’re cartoons. 
JS: More playable than… 
KA:  Racing games. 
JS:  Racing games… 
KA: All about cars and spins and driving. 
JS:  What about Halo though? 
KA: Shooting! Might get violent. I might go out and kill little Grannies in the 
street. 
JS: <laughs>, but then again you might just go on a big massive sailing round 
the world mission. 
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KA: Yeah, no, but I am actually… Yeah, no, I’m already thinking about that. [a 
friend’s] already invited me to Tazmania. 
JS:  Collecting pearls. 
KA: Why not? Slaying green demons. It’s not exactly the same as killing 
people. 
In this jocular exchange further properties for active selection are exposed. She includes 
the novelty of the experience (“quite new and quite different”) and the supposed or 
perceived affective possibilities of the experience (“I might get violent”). Other 
codes, unrelated to the active selection of games developed from these parts of the 
interview relate to the moral value of the experience and the possible affective power of 
the experience. 
 The next interview with KA’s boyfriend JA yielded a lot more detail about how he might 
try games. How he selected them was seemingly much more ad hoc than KA’s targeting 
of cute, cartoony games. 
JA: Yeah I bought that because I was in the shop. Just before Christmas I 
wanted something to do through Christmas and picked it up. It’s pretty 
much like Lara Croft with vampires and… It’s just having that amount of 
spare time… and I got into it and… 
 
So here we have a new method of active selection, by browsing in shops for 
something (at this stage we’re not sure what), adding to the properties of an active 
selection process. There are other related codes suggested in this passage too. He 
seems to be hinting at investing available spare time and a method of selection which 
involves actually playing the game, but only by comparing this passage with other parts 
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of the interview and parts of KA’s interview could we draw anything useful from this. 
Fortunately JA’s interview is full of these relationships. In terms of looking at the 
properties of an active selection we can keep saturating the code. 
JS: What about the infamous Playstation 2 games, like GTA3, and Vice City, 
and The Getaway and stuff like that, about doing other stuff apart from 
just driving. Would you reckon you’d… 
JA: I don’t think I would, but without having a go I can’t say. I’m not going 
out of my way to have a go. I mean, if I get the chance to play it, and 
enjoy it then yeah, I might get the Playstation.  
 
So he seems to have made a choice this time on the relative availability of a game 
and the game system to play them on. So in terms of active selection we have a more 
passive sense of availability. 
These codes now raise ideas: How does availability push up the possibility of selecting to 
try out? Do we need another code for trying out? If there is a code for trying out, then 
surely we have a process of select, try out, play? In the selection phase what is the 
relationship between these properties and the other codes being developed relating to 
investments, affect, the themes of games, the contexts of games, the memorability of 
different experiences and so on. 
All of the possible relationships between the codes lead us to some questions: Is the 
player selecting games based on their degree of identification with the game? Is there a 
relationship between investments and identifications? Is selecting and playing to try out 
a process of playing or selecting, when does selecting become playing and does it 
matter? 
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These questions are based then on memos that suggest that players are investing some 
resources to get returns; that players are identifying with features of games; that 
selection is the start of a process of becoming engaged, and that selection is not an 
activity performed in a vacuum but one where opportunity and context play a large part.  
In order to evaluate these hypotheses in some way we need to find people who invest 
differently, who play different games, or who select their games in different ways. 
This need suggested that someone with either lots of knowledge about games or little 
knowledge would be appropriate (over the moderate knowledge of both KA and JA). So 
that we could find out if they use this knowledge (or lack of) to structure their choices 
differently. 
JS: Yeah, I know what you mean. Well, alright then, enough talking about 
games that you enjoy and that. There’s a few things that I want to talk 
about in general. How do you decide which games to buy?  
CA: I guess I kind of go with genres I know I like. Like, I would like to buy 
Zelda: The Wind Waker, because I like that kind of game, and the way it 
plays, and I’ve played the ones previously and so I know what I like and I 
know that it’s the kind of game that I’ll enjoy, and, you know, I suppose 
it’s a similar thing as with Final Fantasy. You know what you like and you 
sort of read the reviews and you think you’d enjoy a similar game, so you 
get the sequel or the follow-up. 
JS: Has that ever backfired though? 
CA: Only with VIII, yeah, Final Fantasy VIII. 
JS: Well Yeah. 
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CA: And other time it’ll just be a game somebody’s told me about really. That’s 
pretty much it… 
JS: Do you read reviews? 
CA: Rarely to be honest, rarely. I think it’s just one more… most of the time 
somebody tells me it’s a good game, or I have actually played it 
somewhere before and I have liked it, or in some cases I’ve read a review 
and just liked the idea of a game. Like Silent Bomber or something. You 
know it didn’t get a massively 100%, it was like 75% or something like 
that, but the idea sounded more interesting than a lot of the other games 
and it was fairly cheap, so that was the reason I got that one. But, a lot of 
the time you buy what you know, a general thing you know are good or 
from a company you know makes decent games. I like most of the 
Codemasters’ stuff, and I think most of the genres they do, they do well, 
so I’m more likely to buy Colin McCrae than I would another rally game 
that wasn’t from them, because I know that they do well thought out, very 
well playtested games. 
JS: So, like, publishers or ,I suppose, developers. 
CA: More developers yeah. Well sometimes it’s publishers, you know, Square 
are your pretty safe bet it’s gonna be a good game. 
 
From this passage we can see that CA is using some fairly sophisticated methods of 
selecting a game. His first criterion is to use genre as a mode of selection. Then he 
seems to modify that and talk about games in a series, but backed up by reviews. So 
now we have a few more properties to put in our active selection category genre, media 
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coverage, and similarity with past experiences. He then goes on to add that he selects 
according to recommendation and by following development teams he knows the work 
of, or at least the publishers of those games. 
These codes seem to suggest that CA has strategies for minimising the risk that he will 
end up playing a bad game by relying on a broad network of indicators: from friends 
recommending a game, to developers he feels he can trust to consistently deliver quality 
experiences (like those he has experienced in the past). This last point might add a 
cyclic element to the process of selecting and playing games we have already suggested 
might be happening. It might also hint at a shortcut employed to attempt to ensure good 
returns on the investments required to select and play a game. 
As we can see the data is revealing some interesting properties of how people might 
select games. Combining these codes and their properties gives us a number of possible 
theoretical codes (merging active selection, trying out, and memorability say into a 
cyclical process of engagements). Combinations of codes and theoretical thoughts about 
them are hinting at some kind of investment/return relationship.  
It is when we get to the interview with DB, where he states: 
DB:  Herdy Gerdy. I don’t really like it. My mum kind of likes it, so it’s kind of 
her game. Not mine. 
JS: So you don’t like it. What don’t you like about it? 
DB: It’s kind of babyish.  
That suggests a clear failure of identification (DB is not a baby and thus doesn’t want to 
play games he feels are babyish) that looking closely to all the data that has already 
been collected for instances of identification or disidentification seems important. Is KA 
asserting an identity expression when she says she wants to play games with cartoony 
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graphics? What about when she says that she wouldn’t want to play a first person 
shooter, because she wouldn’t want to become violent? Maybe the first instance is clear, 
but the second instance is one of genuine concern over the purported affective 
consequences of playing games. When CA says he uses recommendations to select 
games who does he seek recommendations from? Does he identify with these people or 
does he simply trust random strangers? Some later backtracking on the idea that one 
might base a decision to play based on review scores suggests that he values the opinion 
of some people more than others. 
These relationships between selection, investments, and identities require further 
saturation.  In this respect we can sample more people without being too fussy about 
how they have got to play the games that they enjoy, though maybe including a few 
people who don’t enjoy games would help in understanding how the selection can be 
wholly negative. Do non-players, especially those that have played games in the past, 
have a feeling that the costs outweigh the benefits maybe? Would this still fit with an 
idea that people play games that they identify with? 
DA:  My impressions; my associations with computer games... 
JS: Yeah 
DA: Probably date back to a... erm... well negative is perhaps too strong a 
word, but... an experience I had when I was a child with a relative of 
mine. We were back in Italy and he was absolutely fascinated by his 
computer games. I can’t even remember what it used to be in those days, 
we’re probably going back to twenty years ago. Was it discs that you had 
or Floppy Discs? Something that you had to slot into the computer to 
make them work, and he had this huge what’s it called a ‘Joy Stick’? 
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JS: Yeah probably. Sounds like an Amiga or ST setup. 
DC: Something like that yes, and he showed me all his new computer games 
and I just sat there, because obviously I didn’t have a computer at the 
time, and I just sat there and yeah... it was all a bit like... well it all went a 
bit like ‘kajung’ like this. 
JS: Straight over your head. 
DC: Absolutely, straight over my head and it never really appealed to me, the 
medium of computer games. Perhaps because of the content, because one 
of the things I associate with computer games is going out to fight a lot of 
virtual people; characters, monsters, whatever... creatures, to get to a 
certain point to get your treasure, or whatever it is that you need to get to 
the next level. That’s my association, or two associations. 
So here we have a man who’s negative association with games, gained though poor past 
experiences and an overall impression of their content (or required interactions) is not 
sufficiently sophisticated for his taste. In this instance there are already codes for 
selecting games based on positive or negative past experiences and based on the 
themes or content, but what is most interesting here is that he obviously didn’t consider 
his relatives love of games to be ‘for him’ and that his impression of games, to a large 
degree, resolves to the simplistic act of killing monsters to get treasure. This is a sense 
that games are not for him. 
Further probes later in the interview ask if it’s because he didn’t get to play his cousin’s 
games which resolves to ‘maybe’. In order to get a sense of identification asking a few 
questions about who plays videogames yields interesting responses such as: 
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DA: Put it this way: I can’t really see a philosophy or arts student play 
computer games all day.  
DA being a performing arts graduate. So we have moved away from saturating only the 
code of active selection and now we have codes about identification building up. 
Theoretical codes of active selection by identification and memos such as “Can the 
types of engagement be broken down into Gameplay features, social contexts and 
identities, and general quality factors?”  are filling the memo book. 
After several more taped interviews it became apparent that the interesting avenue to 
pursue, the one that might tie together selection, contexts, play, trying out, value, 
investments, the process of engagement, challenge, memorability, and a wealth of other 
codes being developed and explored simultaneously, was that the player needed to 
identify with the game, that they needed to feel that they were the kind of person who 
would (should?) engage in that activity in that context. 
Once this decision was made, to saturate the core category of identification, subsequent 
interviews were reasonably brief, focussed on how players got into playing certain games 
and made decisions about what games to play and how they managed their play context 
and play time. 
As this thread of examples is focussed on active selection a wealth of other properties 
were noted, but this was not the main focus, but the final list looked something like this: 
Active selection: Category 
Active selection: Property - Availability 
Active selection: Property - Box (art and blurb) 
Active selection: Property - Bundled 
Active selection: Property - By genre 
Active selection: Property - By graphical style 
Active selection: Property - Challenge type 
Active selection: Property - Competition potential 
Active selection: Property - Copying from friends 
Active selection: Property - Critical mass of other players 
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Active selection: Property - Expansion packs 
Active selection: Property - For extras (minigames, non-central experiences) 
Active selection: Property - Games I am likely to be good at 
Active selection: Property - graphical 'quality' 
Active selection: Property - Hardware constraints (esp. PC users) 
Active selection: Property - Hype 
Active selection: Property - Internet review pages 
Active selection: Property - Known developer 
Active selection: Property - Known publisher 
Active selection: Property - Media coverage 
Active selection: Property - Minimum session length and scope for segmenting 
Active selection: Property - Novelty 
Active selection: Property - Percieved affective consequence 
Active selection: Property - Percieved commitment 
Active selection: Property - Percieved play depth offered 
Active selection: Property - Play context fit 
Active selection: Property - Promise of potential social experiences 
Active selection: Property - promised activities 
Active selection: Property - Provenance (amusing background/development story) 
Active selection: Property - Recommended 
Active selection: Property - Relationship with real world activity 
Active selection: Property - Sequal of previously enjoyed game 
Active selection: Property - Shop browsing 
Active selection: Property - Similarity with past experiences 
Active selection: Property - Social play possibilities 
Active selection: Property - Thematic 
Active selection: Property - Trading 
Active selection: Property - User review scores 
Active selection: Property - Waiting for a certain title in a series to be announced and 
then subsequently released 
Active selection: Property - Word of mouth (not direct recommendation) 
   
 These codes formed theoretical codes and memos with many more codes in the 
collection of memos. For example: 
“MEMO: Technological affinity 
 
   It might be that hardcore gamers are tech fetishists and game rejectors 
are tech reactionaries. For example DA clams that tech minded, goal driven, 
individuals are most likely to play both stand alone games and interact in 
computer mediated spaces, where more philosophy/art type people are 
unlikely to engage in either to any great extent, though the social 
interaction offered by the virtual world might attract some creative types. 
This is probably a self-justification.” 
 
A wealth of these ideas then forms the pool of ideas for the theory presented in the 
sections below. 
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As suggested in the methodology section of this thesis, the memos are expected to be 
ideas, not integrated propositions. The integration of the ideas into solid hypothetical 
propositions comes through the sorting process. At the stage reached in the example 
above the codes are a means by which the data are fractured, to break them down into 
abstracted comparisons. The theory comes from the production of memos related to 
codes about the data, and not necessarily from the data itself. So the theory is grounded 
in data, but is not a narrative re-presentation of the data. The following sections are a 
literal write up of the disparate memos which have been abstracted from the data by 
using codes as material for theorising.   
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Section B: The theory 
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3. Overview of theory: Engagement as 
negotiation of value to net cultural worth 
The following 3 chapters which make up the next section of this thesis will detail the 
theory as developed. As suggested I have formulated a Grounded theory which 
simultaneously views an individual’s value judgements about a game, game system, or 
game type as a set of sub-values. Each of these sub-values are evaluated by the player, 
over the course of an interaction, according to their socio-cultural value set framed as an 
identity. If the player or potential player can negotiate these value judgements to result 
in a positive net worth then the individual will play that game if encountered or will 
continue to play that game if they had already started to do so. Obviously the converse 
is true also, where if the costs (judgements of negative value) outweigh the benefits 
(positively valued features) then the individual will avoid engaging with the game or will 
cease to engage. In simple summary the individual sees an obvious feature of a gaming 
experience and implicitly (though occasionally explicitly) asks themselves “Am I the kind 
of person who would engage in this activity?”. 
The first of these chapters (Individual value judgement of feature as socio-cultural 
reflection of perceived role) deals with how what appears to be an individual’s taste is 
rather an apparent cultural response. This is not simply a response to peer influence, but 
seems to be a more sophisticated positioning by the individual of themselves as cultural 
actors, assuming particular roles within society and how this directly influences their 
potential or capacity to engage and their actual engagements with electronic games. 
Essentially this first deals with the hypothesis that players find engagement with 
games by asking the culturally loaded question “Am I the kind of person who 
would engage with this?” for each pertinent feature of the videogame product. 
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The Second chapter (Process of engagement (selection to reflection)) deals with the 
process of engagement. How a player responds over time to any offering. As I hope to 
show, much of the engagement with a game, system, or game type often happens far 
before the individual physically encounters the product in play. The hypothesis of this 
chapter is that players perform a cycle of engagements; selecting agreeable 
products, then playing with them, and then reflecting on these experiences 
before returning to the product or selecting a new product. 
The third chapter (Negotiated identification of and with a sense of Cultural worth) will tie 
these two together to show how over the course of an interaction, and indeed 
throughout a cycle of interactions the individual is reconciling their perceived role with 
what they encounter in context. It is this which I will refer to as ‘negotiative’ as the 
player or potential player is implicitly negotiating their potential role as a player with a 
perceived social judgement, but these roles and judgements are not fixed and are 
contingent on context. We can also say that the player is negotiating the space of 
potential experiences, seeking those which might be agreeable (or showing a match 
between their culturally mirrored perception of self and the game features which would 
be important to that role, either positive or negative). Thus the hypothesis of the third 
chapter is that potential players engage with videogames via a process of 
negotiated net cultural value. 
In essence the first two sections relating to the sub-hypotheses could be imagined as 
being pillars supporting and accounting for the composite core hypothesis: 
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The style of these next three sections is deliberately abstract or theoretical. That is as 
the previous section suggests, these sections present the substantive theory about 
videogame play and are not a representation of the data as a narrative, nor are they a 
set of data/code relationships. The intention is to present a well integrated theory 
without bloating that presentation with bloated examples which might serve to shift the 
focus to a reinterpretation of data outside of the grounding process and away from the 
theory. Such a shift might remove some of the ‘grab’ of the theory and cloud any 
intuitive sense of fit, relevance, and workability the reader might feel. 
This style of presentation is normal for Classic Grounded Theory and is suggested by 
Glaser in his advice on the method of writing up GT: 
“...the dosage mix for grounded theory is to minimize illustrations, using them for 
support purposes, so that the analyst can maximize use of concepts within the 
allotted space of the paper or chapter. The power of the theory resides in 
concepts, not in description. The credibility of the theory should be won by its 
Figure 1: Illustration of gross theoretical construction 
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integration, relevance and workability, not by illustration used as if it were proof.” 
(Glaser 1978) 
More recently expressed by Judith Holton thusly: 
“To understand the nature of classic grounded theory, one must understand the 
distinction between conceptualization and description. Grounded theory is not 
about the accuracy of descriptive units, nor is it an act of interpreting meaning as 
ascribed by the participants in a study; rather, it is an act of conceptual 
abstraction.” 
And 
“For a classic grounded theorist, what matter are the concepts. The conceptual 
abstraction of classic grounded theory frees the researcher from the qualitative 
paradigm’s emphasis on The Grounded Theory Review (2009), vol.8, no.3  
43 detailed description and elucidation of multiple perspectives. The skill of the 
grounded theorist is to abstract concepts by leaving the detail of the data behind, 
lifting the concepts above the data and integrating them into a theory that 
explains the latent social pattern underlying the behaviour in a substantive area 
(Locke, 2001). The result of a grounded theory study is not the reporting of facts 
but the generation of probability statements about the relationships between 
concepts; a set of conceptual hypotheses developed from empirical data (Glaser, 
1998, pp. 3, 22).” (Holton 2009) 
As with other advice from the Classic Grounded Theory ‘school’ this advice makes sense, 
as to attempt to draw out the thread of how data was substantively coded, theoretically 
coded, theoretically memoed, and then integrated into the form presented below, for 
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each concept presented, would present two major problems. The first is that such a 
presentation would break the flow and intent of the thesis, laboriously documenting each 
point with examples would suggest that the theory represents facts derived mechanically 
and undisputedly from the data collected. That is not the intention here. Rather what is 
presented below are a number of integrated hypotheses about what the major variables 
in videogame play are. The second problem is a practical one. To present the derivation 
of the theory from the data for each and every hypothesis, including all data comparative 
or substantive codes, code comparative theoretical codes, memo fragments, and 
integrated theoretical memos would result in a thesis far greater than the loose upper 
limit for a thesis of this type.   
Where illustrations are presented, they are presented to help the reader to get a feel for 
some part of the data. They are not presented as facts or the totality of the grounding of 
a particular concept. As the illustration in the previous section hopefully shows, the 
comparison of multiple pieces of data yielded very rich and varied codes, which in turn 
yielded many hypotheses as to the significance of each code. Hopefully these illustrations 
provide a sense of the variability and richness of the data. 
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4. First theoretical sub-category: Individual value 
judgement of feature as socio-cultural reflection 
of self sense 
This chapter sets out the memoed theoretical ideas that deal with a player's sense of 
identification with a game or gameplay system. It will show that this sense of 
identification is resolved as a set of summed cultural value judgements, resulting in a net 
or aggregate cultural position toward the gameplay offering. I propose that this is a 
fundamental factor in any player's engagement with a gameplay offering. 
Developing a general theory of the experiences and concerns of game players must 
recognise that different people engage in different gameplay activities. Indeed some 
eschew computer or videogames altogether while others engage with types of games 
and various associated activities as their primary leisure activity and in recognising this 
difference in engagement we should account for it theoretically. Even if we are to take a 
deductive stance that videogames are in some way immersive (Brown & Cairns 2004), 
intended to induce a state of ‘Flow’ (Cowley et al. 2008), or must be ‘fun’ we would still 
be left with an incomplete theory of how games are engaged in in general. I am 
proposing a different theory of engagement, because, via the data collected, the 
methodology has produced a set of grounded hypotheses which have little to do with 
Flow or Immersion and posit that sometimes “fun” can be problematic for some 
individuals as a motivation. At the very least we can state that these descriptions of the 
motivations to play are not universally accepted and sought by all players. 
4.1. Identification with features 
What separates one person’s engagement with a videogame product from another’s? Of 
great importance to this thesis is the hypothesis that players seem to implicitly ask 
themselves “Am I the kind of person who would play a game like this?”. That is, they are 
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seeking experiences which conform to their assumed social role or self perceived cultural 
identity. For example interviewee DB (A male in his early teens Interviewed along with 
his middle aged mother MA)  states that he didn’t play Herdy Gerdy  (Core Design 2002) 
because it was “Kind of babyish.” A criticism he levelled at Final Fantasy VII (Square 
1997) later in an unrecorded section of the interview (during a discussion of the relative 
merits of Final Fantasy VII, VIII (Square 1999) and IX (Square 2000)). This criticism 
suggested to me the hypothesis that DB, as an adolescent male, was attempting to 
assert his identity as an adult male through surface features of the games he plays. In 
the cases mentioned he seems to be referring to the graphical presentation of the games 
as while Final Fantasy VII deals with difficult existential themes in its story and also 
involves complex gameplay mechanics, these features are difficult to reconcile with the 
assessment of ‘babyish’. However the graphical style, where the characters are often 
presented as childlike, is common to both games and it seems that it is this feature to 
which DB took exception in summarising the games as 'babyish'. 
Looking through other data for comparisons, the concept of enacting self perceived roles 
was important in the games that people choose to play. An another example BA (a 
middle aged man) was uncomfortable playing games (such as the Metal Gear Solid 
series (Konami Computer Entertainment Japan 1998)) which requires the player to use 
their avatar for murderous purposes, stating  “I don’t particularly like the fact that you 
can go up to somebody and break their neck, even though it... erm... was an 
experience. The first time around I went ‘hmm, interesting’, but very immoral”. Most 
telling in this regard, and the purpose for seeking out respondents of this nature, is the 
total breakdown in identification with individuals who reject videogame play as a 
worthwhile activity. The field notes for a short interview with DC (a twenty something 
woman) expressed a number of identity orientations including that she didn’t play 
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because she was a girl; because when she was a child she spent most of her time 
playing outside and that when she was younger and working as a babysitter she wished 
the children in her care would go outside and play as she once did, and leave her in 
peace; because she felt that people who engage in games are ‘displacing’ or avoiding 
facing up to real world responsibilities. Similarly DA (a twenty something man) was 
concerned that game players lacked creativity or imagination, being the domain of 
technically minded people or problem solvers;  and that sitting around playing games 
was lazy and a waste of time. He did express interest in the Nintendo Wii as a less lazy 
alternative. Knowing a little about his vocation (performing arts) suggests, based on the 
hypothesis of orientation by identification, that his cultural self identity, which includes 
the sense of being a creative and physically active individual, prevents him from 
engaging with videogames which he sees as sedentary and passive; equivalent to 
“channel surfing” in his own words.  
This enacting of self identified roles might be said to be similar to Cooley’s ‘Looking Glass 
Self’ (1902), the theory that an individual’s sense of self is constructed by reasoning 
about how the individual imagines themselves to be perceived by others in their society 
or immediate social context. We might say that so constructed the individual will behave 
in a way that seeks to reinforce this positive identity image and seek to minimise any 
possibilities that they might be viewed poorly by others. 
What is apparent from this first hypothesis, that players assign value to features by 
identifying with them, is that different players do not view the same game features with 
equal weight. Where some are concerned with the graphical presentation others are 
concerned with moral questions ,while others are concerned with the actual relative 
apparent physical actions involved in play and so on. Most often these orientations are 
stated negatively, in that the individual will state that they are not the kind of person 
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who would find an activity with a certain feature presented in a certain way enjoyable. 
Statements of positive orientation are usually less obviously culturally loaded. For 
example KA (a woman in her twenties) stating that she likes games with a ‘Cartoon’ 
graphical style. Suggesting that she feels herself to be like a cartoon seems foolish, while 
other hypotheses concerning her sense of being a young, fun, vibrant (as cartoons are 
often deemed to be) individual would at this stage be ungrounded, but potentially 
indicative of the complicated nature of personal identification with features of the 
experience. 
4.2. Failure to identify implies cost or negative value 
Sitting alongside this sense of identification with features is a recurring reference to 
costs. The price of the hardware or software, the relative portability of the device, the 
amount of time the player needs to invest in becoming skilful at a certain game or even 
in moving from one convenient exit point (e.g. save point or end of level) point to the 
next, the extra hardware requirement in terms of PC game minimum requirements or 
console peripherals. In exploring these investments I found that they were given more or 
less weight relative to the benefits the user perceived.  For example in interviewing HA, 
HB & OB (three twenty something self-professed 'hardcore' gamers interviewed, and 
field noted as a group), the issue of hardware and software costs was barely mentioned 
(that they would own the latest hardware and the latest games was expressed, but the 
cost was seemingly a low priority) while time costs were mentioned, but only where they 
felt that their online First-Person Shooter (FPS) clan was taking too much time to 
manage. HA expressing with pride at one point, during a discussion of ‘cheating’, that 
only in playing any game at the hardest difficulty setting was he able to feel satisfied, 
and he would persist for as long as it took to complete the game in this way: “The thing 
about it is when we play games, to start off with we always play on the hardest setting 
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as well. It makes it really challenging as a game. Sometimes you don’t enjoy it; you’re 
just trying to do the same bit over and over and over again. So when you finish the 
game: put some cheats in and have some fun after that. You’ve done the challenge, now 
just have some fun.”. Whichsuggests that he was quite prepared to invest substantial 
time and effort in becoming skilful enough to do so. 
So, required investments are forces which can drive down the motivation to engage and 
as such are functionally equivalent with a failure to identify on a cultural level. So we 
could suggest that a failure to identify with a certain feature is a cost. A cultural cost if 
you will. Referring again to The Looking Glass Self, we could rephrase this as the 
individual seeing the activity as something which they perceive might make them lose 
face; that they imagine that they will be viewed poorly by society if they were to admit 
to engaging in such an activity or are caught engaging in such an activity. Essentially 
supplanting their orientations to those that play such games to imagined others, such 
that if they witness a person playing a certain game or playing in a certain way, they 
would apply certain prejudices to that person; prejudices which they do not wish to be 
applied to themselves. 
4.3. Returns as positive 'cultural value' 
Video games seldom provide explicit material returns to offset these investments or 
mismatches in cultural orientations.  A small, unrecorded exploration of where they 
might provide material returns (where I worked with a team developing new gambling 
games, but was refused access to some raw focus-group data for my research) revealed 
that while a promise of possible material return was a motivation to play the investment 
in understanding required by the player to achieve that return was often superseded by 
the sense that the game should be ‘fun’, that various features of a gaming system should 
conform to the players sense of self; does the representation suggest fun, does it look 
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like a proposition for 'serious gamblers', does it look like a proposition for 'mug punters'? 
None of these positions rest either on the presentation or potential for profit, but in a 
strong sense of the 'kind of person' the game seems to be for. Other types of non-
material concrete returns have become more apparent in the ‘casual gaming’ market 
recently with such games as Dr Kawashima’s Brain Training (Nintendo 2005) and Wii Fit 
(Nintendo EAD 2007) being sold on the promise of allowing the player to enhance their 
mental or physical capacities respectively. One type of return which is fairly concrete, but 
not strictly material is that of a parent bonding with their offspring. MA initiated play to 
bond with DB and PA (A thirty something mother) likewise started playing games to 
bond with her son; Investing sense of identity (the perception that middle aged women 
are not game players) for the return of a closer relationship with their progeny. MA says, 
during a discussion of Final Fantasy VIII (Square 1999): “...one day he asked me to get 
him through... he was really frustrated because he couldn’t get through a bit. You know, 
he said, ‘Mum I can’t do it’, and he didn’t have any other games, he didn’t have anything 
else he could play. So I sat there. I said ‘Look. When you go to school; if I have time; if I 
don’t have any jobs on... That was it. That was my downfall <laughs>”, which clearly 
shows that she was playing in order to engage with her son and support him as a good 
mother, engaged in her son’s interests. 
So these cultural and material investment/return relationships suggest that users are 
seeking to achieve some type of return from investments;  that the cultural and material 
costs must be outweighed by cultural and material (or at least concrete or explicit) 
returns in order for the individual to engage with a particular offering. 
I am carefully avoiding referring to individuals' engagements with individual games as it 
seems that these relationships can be applied to game hardware platforms, genres of 
games, game series, individual titles or even parts of games. For example KA expressed 
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that she enjoyed Super Monkey Ball (Amusement Vision 2000), but only the multiplayer 
minigames as an opportunity for engaging with peers, not the main, solo, action-puzzle 
game offering.  
K.A.: Super Monkey Ball's great, because it just gets lots of people involved in 
doing really silly things. It's really easy to give [younger relative] for her 
to just mess around with. It's not even... it's not very complicated. 
J.S.: Well have you played the single player missions up to the really hard 
ones? 
K.A.: <laughs> I can't get past the easy ones, let alone the really hard ones. 
We need to get Super Monkey Ball 2. 
J.S.: What for the... just for the extra mini games? 
K.A.: Yeah. 
J.S.: You think Monkey Ball's more about the mini games than about the actual 
central game? 
K.A.: Yeah, because the central game is pretty repetitive and boring, with... you 
know, you do it a few times and you master it and it's done, where as the 
mini game you can actually, sort of, play lots of players and... party type 
thing going on.  
While HA, HB, and OB were under the impression that the Nintendo Wii as a system was 
designed with a control mechanism which did not suit their ‘hardcore’ demand for 
precision, and were thus not as keen on exploring games for that platform as much as 
other, more traditional, button and joystick systems. 
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4.4. Net value after summation 
It might seem that we could view an individual’s definitive statement concerning the 
feature which represents their failure to engage with a particular offering as the cause of 
that failure. This might not be so. If we look at games which are marginal in the mind of 
the respondent, exploring the pros and cons of that title, allowing the individual to 
express what they liked about it and what they disliked about it, we can see that they 
are implicitly summing these pros and cons. Only if the cons (costs, investments, 
negative factors) outweigh the pros (attractors, pleasures, returns) will the player avoid 
the game or cease playing the game. For example in the case of CA (a twenty something 
male) and his stance towards Final Fantasy VIII: 
CA:  There were some serious flaws I think with the… erm… the game. 
  VII was quality IX’s good, but VIII I don’t really know why it’s so 
  poor. 
JS:  Do you think it might be the graphics? 
CA:  The graphics do smell a little, but I dunno, when I first played it I 
  did really quite like the graphics. I think there were a lot of bits in 
  the game which were dull, like the fact that you couldn’t skip the 
  spells or the summons, and some of them went on for like 2  
  minutes. The fact that you had to fight this dinosaur really early on, 
  and the only way you could kill it was to attack it with the same 
  spell with just one person. I was like 10 minutes of actually doing 
  this thing all the time, and it wasn’t enjoyable it was ted… just peed 
  you off, and there was quite a few bits like that, where it was just 
  like monotony, where it felt like it was just filling up time rather 
  than just trying to progress the story in any way, or actually get 
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  you somewhere, and there’s quite a bit like that. Good intro  
  though. 
JS:  I know what you mean; the graphics were very sexy sometimes. 
CA:  The card game I didn’t really get into and like… The sub-game with 
  the cards, whatever it’s called. 
JS:  Can’t remember now. Yeah, the way you could change the rules in 
  it as well. 
CA:  I’m sure there was good bits in there. I did play all the way  
  through, but it didn’t catch, grab, you know, engage me in any way 
  like Final Fantasy VII od IX did. You know maybe the characters 
  weren’t even good enough.     
So while many aspects of the game were seen as costs (possibly relative to other games 
in the series; a relationship which we will expand on in later chapters), such as the 
unskippable cut scenes, the repetitive combat, and the sub-games, the overall effect was 
one whereby he did engage with the game to the extent that he did play the main 
narrative to completion.  
We could illustrate the relationship I have developed thus far with the following 
equation:  
 
  
 F = Salient feature of note 
 w = Personal weighting to feature 
 i = Feature index 
 V = Overall value felt 
 
∑
i=1
i=n
F i wi=V
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So the prospective player is noting particular features (F) they are weighting those 
features according to their identifications (w), and the sum of these identifications 
(sigma) determines the overall value (V) and hence engagement. One aspect which is 
not explored theoretically (and perhaps presents some opportunity for modification of 
the theory) is the value of the feature beyond identifications. We might consider this 
value to be a sense of quality. For a simple example, consider the graphical quality of a 
game (not the graphical style). So if the game were to glitch and reveal graphical errors 
on occasion, this fact might weigh negatively or if the game efficiently and cleverly used 
the full extent of the platform's graphical capabilities this might weigh positively. This 
weighting must be summed with how much the player cares about the graphical 
sophistication demonstrated by a game. However this quality weighting is under 
explored in this thesis, and is implicitly considered when considering a player's value 
judgement relative to their sense of identification. 
Obviously we are really dealing with qualitative value judgements rather than explicit 
enumerable quantities, so the above equation could never be resolved, but illustrating it 
this way might help some readers visualise the overall meaning of the key hypothesis of 
this section; that a player's engagement with a game can be considered a sum of their 
engagements with salient features of the game. In some ways this summing is similar to 
Information Integration Theory (Anderson 1962), where the values of stimuli are 
integrated into an overall impression. However where there is an implication in 
Information Integration Theory that this function represents a simulatable model in our 
case we are not making any strong claims to any sense that the context dependant, 
momentary, feature-wise valuations represent values which may be simulated. That is 
not to say that such a simulation would be impossible, but the evaluation of an 
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individual’s current orientation toward or away from a salient feature is likely to be a rich 
and complex sum, difficult to instantiate numerically or even ordinally.   
Visualising this hypothesis by means of a diagram may also help: 
 
Figure 2: Visualisation of summed value judgements 
Here the arrows are the salience of the features of various identity weightings (expressed by the sizes 
and orientation of the arrows).  
In order to understand the equation and model above I feel it is necessary to reiterate 
the concept of interchangeable indicators. That is in this discussion of theory I have 
avoided listing all of the types of costs, returns, and identifications as they are 
innumerate and no attempt was made to record all the various features in this research. 
I could retroactively list all that I have encountered, but this may result in the reader 
misunderstanding the purpose of such a list and assume that it represents a complete 
coverage of the possible points of identification. Rather I will state that any point where 
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a player indicates that they did not like or would not play a game for a particular reason 
is a cost (and most likely a social or cultural cost) and instances where they have sought 
out or enjoyed a game for a particular reason is a return (aligning with their culturally 
constructed personal sense of value). Examples of such features include such as the 
game mechanics; the graphical style, the back story; the narrative; the challenge type; 
the opportunity to play with others; the game control system; the aesthetic of the 
hardware; and so on. As suggested, even apparent material costs are weighted 
according to a culturally formed sense of identity. For example time appears to be a 
universal cost, but is viewed differently by different individuals. Respondents such as AB 
(a man in his 30s) and AA (a man in his 20s) engage in play when they have plenty of 
the resource available (valuing other activities more highly); NB (a woman in her 20s) 
would not invest any time in play, choosing to spend her spare time engaged in other 
activities; while HA, HB & OB do not mention the cost of investing time explicitly, 
appearing to invest a great deal  of their spare time in playing games as a matter of 
course. My hypothesis is that AB and AA, being committed students, feel that they 
should be investing spare time in less ‘trivial’ pursuits; NB explicitly states that games 
are only for boys and that none of her peers play; while HA, HB and OB are self 
confessed ‘gamers’ so it might be expected that they will invest time in playing without 
giving too much thought to that time. Another example where a time commitment is not 
expressed as a cost is where JA states that he seeks games that require an extensive 
time commitment to soak up 'down time' while he is working away from home. In this 
case the time required to play a game effectively is a salient benefit or return. 
So partially resolving the above equation for AB, F(time) is a highly salient feature, w is 
strongly negative, and the product of these is a negative value to add to the sigma sum. 
For JA in the context of work breaks F(time) is a salient feature, w  is quite positive 
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which produces a positive value. HA, HB, and OB F(time) is of very low salience, but 
negative w (playing one game eats into the time available to play other, better games) 
producing a slight negative value. 
It is interesting to note that NB mentioned that none of her friends play is an interesting 
one to consider. We might suppose that many of an individual’s cultural stances are 
formed relative to their peers or that friends are selected with similar cultural 
perspectives.  So an individual with no game playing peers would be less likely to be a 
game player. As will be shown in the later analysis of the way in which players engage 
with offerings, the relationship between an individual’s stance and that of their peers is 
not quite so simple. 
4.5. Summary of identification to features 
In terms of the greater theoretical positioning of this hypothesis; while others have 
included concepts of identification in their published works (e.g. (Walz 2003)) the 
concept of the net worth of summed value judgements seems novel in the specific study 
of videogame play. Indeed the majority of theories relate to how users play games as 
discrete, stand alone activities. For example Walz applies concepts of Rhetoric to the act 
of playing a game, with the designer persuading the player to identify via the medium of 
play, using Fritz’s ‘Functional Circles’ (Fritz 1995) to support this approach, but only in 
the context of active play. The hypotheses I am presenting here does not focus on the 
act of playing alone, rather there is a process of identification which may begin well 
before the game is encountered, and pass through play, and into reflection about past 
encounters. While it may be possible to conceive of this process or progression as 
rhetorical, in order to do so we must assume some understanding of the intention of 
designers, which is beyond the scope of this programme (which set out to understand 
how players receive and engage in games as the only focus). 
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What is occurring seems to relate to parts of Cooley's 'looking glass self' (1902) whereby 
a prospective player is judging their own actions (and attitudes) as they might judge 
others, as if judging their reflection in a mirror. This idea that the player is both 
'performer' and 'audience' simultaneously sidesteps problems with such concepts as 
Goffman's dramaturgical perspective (1959) allowing us to consider solo activities and 
general opinions. That is, while a dramaturgical view assumes that individuals assume 
the roles of 'performer' (actor) or 'audience' (designated observer), accounting for the 
social structures that can be observed in the performance of these roles, and the 
identities they engender, in using a more self-reflective stance we have a way of 
considering culturally directed activities where the individual isn't planning, performing, 
or observing a role performance and is instead acting alone in a non-social context. That 
is not to say that self-reflection can only apply to solo contexts, but the observation that 
not all human activity is necessarily a social performance forces to us consider a greater 
number of cases than those of a perspective which seeks to unpack the multiple roles 
(and potentially identities) performed by an individual in different contexts. A more 
extensive exploration of this exploration of social contexts, cultural values, and identities 
is included in the section relating to the relationship between this thesis and other 
knowledge in the literature review chapter of this thesis. 
4.6. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in 
this section 
1. Players ascribe value to personally salient features of 
games 
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2. The salient features are valued according to how much 
the player feels they are the 'kind of player' who would 
or would not engage with that feature. 
3. These value judgements are summed, resulting in an 
aggregate or net value of the offering to the player. 
4. This net value directly drives engagement positively or 
negatively. 
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5. Second theoretical sub-category: Process of 
engagement (selection to reflection) 
This chapter sets out the memoed theoretical ideas that explicitly deal with the cyclical 
process of engagement and re-engagement. This chapter will show that a player 
engages with a game not as a single 'pass or fail', but rather discovers their degree of 
engagement as they select, play, and reflect on their game playing experiences. I will 
highlight some categories that relate to what players select for (and thence hope to find 
in play, based on their reflections on previous experiences) and how they might gain this 
knowledge.  
5.1. Overview of the phases of engagement 
As suggested in the previous section, there is a simple progression which is of interest to 
us; a potential progression or process of engagement. We can break this process of 
engagement down into 3 gross, potentially overlapping phases. There will be a period 
before the player has played with a particular offering, there may be a period of playing 
with the particular offering, and the player would then reflect on this experience. That is 
it is the contention of this chapter is that the process of engagement can be formulated 
as 3 distinct phases. 
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The phases presented here then are then: 
Where: 
• Selection  = before hands-on interaction 
• Play = actual hands-on interaction 
• Reflection = evaluating a game as played 
The above progression is cyclical and implicit. Selection may not always be where a 
potential player forms a deep impression of an offering, but there will at some point be a 
decision where they will explicitly decide to ‘have a go’, and as such they will have 
formed an impression that they will find the experience worthwhile (see previous and 
following sections), so we might say that they have engaged in a selection however brief.  
For example where a player is in a situation where they are invited to play a game as 
part of a broader social gathering, they might not be evaluating the properties of the 
Selection 
3 2 
1 
Reflection Play 
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game and what those properties might represent in an extensive manner.  As with the 
previous section, this process could apply to any offering from hardware platform to 
game level, but more on this below.  
Reflection is simply the process of looking back, either tacitly or explicitly, relating past 
experiences to possible future experiences. This is apparent in the data whenever a 
subject reports their interpretation of past experiences. While this might seem obvious, 
as surely in interview most of the conversation will relate to past experiences, 
occasionally a subject will use distinct reflections and reflections on reflective reasoning 
to support the discussion. As a clear example of reflective reasoning HA, HB and OB 
explained a shift in orientation away from the Nintendo Wii, from amused by the novelty 
offered to annoyed by the ‘family’ 'mainstream' image, appears to be their explanation of 
a reflective adjustment in engagement: “Nintendo have sold out I think, because the 
way they advertise it” and “They wanna just make money to families; to group things. 
It’s not to the gamer anymore.” and “It’s like a console now that would normally be 
played on a Sunday when the family sit down and play it together. It doesn’t seem like a 
gamer would sit down and play it. You know, like a ‘gamer’. A ‘gamer’ wouldn’t play a 
Wii” This example shows that the reflective phase is not simply an internal, personal 
one, but can be influenced by external agents and forces (such as the advertising 
campaigns promoting the game or system as a product). Other reflections which appear 
to have occurred beyond the context of the interview were where JA explained how he 
had deliberately undone a cheat performed by his girlfriend (which had the effect of 
allowing him access to all the 'unlockable' content) on his favourite driving game. He 
relates how he became dissatisfied with the lack of challenge and craved the sense of 
achievement gained by overcoming the game challenges as designed and unlocking the 
content fairly. “That gives it a really small shelf life as far as I’m concerned. It’s like with 
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Project Gotham I nearly got to the end, well I got over three quarters, and then [KA] 
says “Oh well if you just do this, you can unlock all the cars.” I got massively 
disinterested in it after that. It’s only recently I started picking it up again just for the 
driving element.”. This act seems quite reflective and supports the theory that players 
take their impressions of games as played in the past and follow them through to games 
or play sessions yet to be played.  
This cycle of engagements might also be seen in light of the different features of the 
experience I have encountered players paying attention to. So a player who denies that 
videogame play is ever something they might engage in (e.g. DC) is obviously not going 
to actively learn a great deal about differences between hardware platforms or the 
games available for each platform, whereas self identified 'gamers' will potentially have 
knowledge and expectations relating to many games, platforms, contexts and so on. 
In order to explore this process I will take the memoed factors of each phase and 
explore them in more detail in the following subsections. The phases are not purely 
linear, as players may well be reflecting on the game as they play it, which will have 
them forming an opinion of what the game might have left to offer, and thence deciding 
whether to continue playing or not (a form of selection).  
5.2. Selection 
The mechanisms employed to select games are complex and depend on the particular 
individual and their sense of identifications. Tying the cycle of engagements to the sense 
of identity will be explored later in this thesis in the section dealing with the theory of 
negotiation. This subsection and the subsections relating to playing and reflecting will 
focus on generalized patterns and procedures employed by individuals as they engage 
with a proposition. 
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Selection itself can be broken down into broad strategies, situated within contexts. 
5.2.1. Selection of the activity in general terms. 
Obviously some people seem to eschew gameplay while others do not. However this is 
not simply that some individuals see all ‘electronic entertainment’ as worthless, rather it 
seems that the current mass of possible experiences can be rejected. For example HC 
rejects game playing in general, feeling that the time her son spends playing games on 
his Nintendo DS is potentially damaging in some way; however she feels that the 
experiences currently available for the Nintendo Wii (including Wii Fit) may be of  some 
merit, describing the platform as being “more inclusive”. Similarly DA in asserting that 
gaming is for lazy people, but the Wii may have some merit, due to the extra physical 
dimension of the interface, is similarly an expression that the general activity of playing 
games is not entirely rejected, but rather there is a rejection of games in their current or 
past forms: “Could be a hobby; could be out of boredom; could be out of laziness. These 
are the kind of words I associate with it.” and “...ok Nintendo Wii? I can see why people 
might be fascinated with that, and I can see the attraction there, because you need to 
physically move and it’s challenging, but I don’t see why people would find it interesting 
to sit in front of a screen pressing all sorts of keys.” So we can say that in order for a 
potential player to select from a number of different offerings they must first be able to 
identify (and identify with) a perceived potential for agreeable or worthwhile 
experiences, such as the physical or 'inclusive' experiences expressed above. 
If the potential player is capable of allowing for the possibility of their engagement with a 
game or game-like product, then we can examine how players find the games that they 
might enjoy. In this respect there are two types of selection factor: what and how. 
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5.2.2. What 1: Selecting explicitly for a context or situation 
Games are not played in a laboratory environment they are played in a real-world 
context. Potential players often account for this context and select games based upon it. 
For example JA (a male in his 30s) states that he plays games which require a sizeable 
time commitment when he is working away from home with just a laptop for company, 
whereas when he’s at home with his girlfriend he would play games which he can more 
easily stop playing if the social situation demanded, without losing too much progress.  
JA:  If I’ve got nothing to do for a day on a rig, then I’ll just load them up and 
play them for a day. 12 hours, until my shoulders don’t work anymore. 
Sitting there at the desk <acts out exaggerated hunched playing 
position>. I haven’t moved for 12 hours. 
JS: Yeah, but, what? You’re saying… you do that with a console game? You 
play different games on PCs and consoles. 
JA: Well to some extent it’s the environment I’m in, because here at home the 
environment is far more social. You come round. [My girlfriend] is here. 
I’m always interacting. Where when I’m on a rig I can be on my own, 
completely, for 12 hours. 
Similarly CB (a woman in her 30s) seldom plays games on her Nintendo Wii alone, 
stating that she primarily bought the console as a social device, as one might a board-
game: “I don’t really play on it very much. It’s more a social thing I suppose. If someone 
came round who wanted to play on it, then it would go on then.”. These are examples of 
a potential player considering the potential, eventual context of play and selecting 
accordingly. 
The selection shaping contexts I have encountered in this research project could be said 
to be either social (must be able to play multi-player, must be easy to pick up, or must 
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not alienate those I might play with) or anti-social (for a context of minimum distraction, 
and opportunity for concentrated focus or deeply engaging to block out annoyances or 
distractions). An example of the latter is BA’s assertion that he likes to become 
immersed in game play to escape the stresses of daily life, so he would select games 
which would draw him into a fantasy world. “...you are immersed in the game so much 
you are actually in the game. After an hour of gameplay you’re actually there, you’re not 
actually where you are in reality. You get transported into the game.” and “I want a 
game to provide me with an escape from reality, and I need that escape extremely badly 
on many occasions.”. Contrary to a fairly popular view, this motive to play doesn’t seem 
to be very common. While researchers such as Brown and Cairns (2004) take the term 
‘immersion’ as a starting point, as if it must be the most important motivator to play, the 
word was only used by this one participant, unprompted, in the entirety of this current 
research programme, suggesting that the majority of game players might not be seeking 
an immersive experience.  Rather many players are seeking a social experience, 
something they can share with their friends instead of blanking them out by ‘losing 
themselves’ in the game. One feature of a deeply immersive or extremely engaging 
experience is that of the sense of time compression (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), where the 
subject feels that much less time has passed than really has. Some subjects reported 
that while they might experience such time distortion playing videogames, they would 
prefer not to and as such do not engage in gameplay activities which may result in 
‘immersion’ or ‘flow’, but would rather engage in gameplay activities which are more 
‘casual’ or less involved. For example OA expressing one reason that he doesn’t play so 
much these days says “... or realise that you ’suddenly’ spent 6 hours or 3 hours on 
something, that could have been spent on something more useful.”  
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5.2.3. What 2: Selecting specific features 
As suggested previously most of the products of this programme are interrelated, so 
obviously in selecting a game for a specific context we might expect certain features to 
be more suited to some contexts than others. Whatever the contextual considerations 
players select games based on specific designed features.  These features are 
innumerate. Any design decision can be a selection feature. Most commonly these would 
be factors such as style and perceived quality of the graphics, the game mechanics, the 
promised activities (different from mechanic in that we might say that ‘move your avatar 
left and right to collect tokens’ is the mechanic where ‘help Mario to save the princess’ is 
the activity), or maybe the challenge type (does it require intellectual prowess, 
dexterous skill, lateral thinking?). For example KA prefers games with a ‘cartoon’ 
graphical style while JA likes ‘driving’ ‘cars’ in a race (but not ‘flying’ ‘spaceships’ in a 
similar manner), and BA doesn’t want to engage in gaining the requisite dexterity to play 
games which require sophisticated hand-eye coordination, but would rather engage in 
intellectual puzzles. 
As I will show later, mapping these features out, as design patterns say (as Björk et al. 
2003) would be a potentially infinite activity, unlikely to reveal much about the 
experience of players as individuals, as players appear to be vague in their perception of 
features of a game. 
5.2.4. What 3: Selecting a familiar face 
Selecting games according to familiarity can be broken into two sub categories; game 
related and non-game related.  
With respect to non-game related factors, players might select a game which draws 
thematic influences from other areas of life, such as sports, films, books, television 
programmes and so on.  If a potential player has knowledge of the source of this subject 
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matter they may apply their identification with this source to inform their potential for 
identification with the game. For example AA told me that he enjoys music so would 
seek out ‘rhythm action’ type games such as Rockband; IA (a twenty something male) is 
a football fan so he would seek out football games such as the Pro Evolution Soccer 
series or football management games; MC and JA enjoy playing with games which 
involve simulated driving of cars based on real models in somewhat realistic 
environments (or at least tracks intended to represent aspects of the real world); JD 
plays many games with themes based on toy licences; while conversely OA (a thirty 
something man) doesn’t like fighting or pugilism so he doesn’t find an appeal in beat-
em-up style games; and so on. Recognition of this aspect of selection by identification by 
the games industry might be said to be the reason behind a great deal of the releases 
each year that draw their themes from non-game intellectual property (IP) such as 
blockbuster films and popular sporting licences. 
The other major selection by familiarity category is that of selecting games based on 
their similarity to other games. That is games with similarities such as themes, 
interaction styles, or (for self professed gamers) a specific provenance are pre-judged 
based on an individual’s experiences with games they have encountered in the past. So 
CB seeks games which are designed to be multiplayer based on her experience with 
certain Wii games; JA showed interest in GT2002 due to the thematic similarity to Gran 
Turismo; and CA and HA, HB & OB expressed that they would seek games by familiar, 
respected development teams, as this quote from CA illustrates: “A lot of the time you 
buy what you know, a general thing you know are good or from a company you know 
makes decent games. I like most of the Codemasters’ stuff, and I think most of the 
genres they do, they do well, so I’m more likely to buy Colin McCrae than I would 
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another rally game that wasn’t from them, because I know that they do well thought 
out, very well playtested games.”.  
This selection method by familiarity is closely tied into reflection, but stated simply: 
players will seek to repeat experiences they have enjoyed and avoid experiences that 
they haven’t enjoyed, and finding games with features in common with the pleasurable 
games is one strategy for doing this. Often players will refer to ‘genre’ as a means of 
talking about clusters of games with similar features. This is to be expected as the 
principle of applying a genre to works with similar features is common in many forms of 
media. I will not enter a deep analysis as to the precise way in which genres of 
videogames are understood or formed but I will point out that some genre labels have 
become common parlance even amongst those who would not identify with game 
playing as a hobby. The following quote from CA shows how a player might select games 
based on genre that they feel they can identify with: “I guess I kind of go with genres I 
know I like. Like, I would like to buy Zelda: The Wind Waker, because I like that kind of 
game, and the way it plays, and I’ve played the ones previously and so I know what I 
like and I know that it’s the kind of game that I’ll enjoy, and, you know, I suppose it’s a 
similar thing as with Final Fantasy. You know what you like and you sort of read the 
reviews and you think you’d enjoy a similar game, so you get the sequel or the follow-
up.” 
The final part of this quote demonstrates another shortcut for a player to find a game 
that they might find engaging by selecting the familiar. Once a player has played a game 
that they enjoyed they might try to extend or repeat that experience by seeking games 
in the same series or even by obtaining ‘expansion packs’ for the beloved game. This 
way they hope that the sequel or expansion extends the experience in a suitably 
agreeable way. 
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5.2.5. How 1: Trusted opinion 
As the last section was part what players select (games with familiar IP) and part how 
games are selected (by seeking games in the same genre or with similar features) we 
will explore some methods people use to find the games they might enjoy. 
One obvious way players find potentially engaging games is by polling the opinions of 
others. That is they take the experiences of those that have experience with a particular 
offering as evidence indicating whether that offering would indeed be the kind of 
experience they would engage in. While the most obvious of these strategies to gather 
such trusted information may include discussing potential hits with peers, this is not 
necessarily a universal strategy. For example GA and JB (sisters in their teens 
interviewed together) claim not to spend time discussing the relative merits of various 
offerings with their peers (it is my impression that they must on occasion, in order to 
support the assertion that they gain knowledge of new games by swapping cartridges 
with their school friends, but such a topic of conversation is seen as a very low priority 
amongst their peers) rather they use other strategies to obtain potentially agreeable 
products, such as trading. Otherwise, personal experience shows that simply suggesting 
the subject in receptive company will result in said company extolling the virtues of their 
favourite game(s). Similarly I have overheard numerous conversations in public where 
groups in my vicinity have been discussing various offerings in some depth, including 
one memorable instance where a group of middle aged women were enthralled by one of 
their member proselytising the virtues of Crash Bandicoot (Naughty Dog 1996). I’m sure 
the reader will have similar anecdotes. 
Other than ones immediate peers there are other sources of opinion. Reviews available 
in the media are one such source, but the degree to which such opinion is trusted 
depends on the individual’s attitude to the source. For example, HA, HB and OB claim to 
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use certain online review aggregating websites to obtain a number of perspectives (for 
free), while CA claims to take magazine review comments and scores into account when 
selecting an individual title but with reservations: “Yeah, I mean, quite a lot of times I 
buy a game and I don’t particularly agree with the review. I’d give it, in some cases, 
quite a lot higher or lower than they did, like Tomb Raider 2 and 3 and that. I didn’t 
enjoy half as much as they seemed to.” 
Another type of trusted opinion is to form a relationship with an expert specifically for 
the purposes of obtaining recommendations. BA states that his major source of 
recommendation (in the absence of having many peers with which to discuss possibilities 
with) is the sales advice in specialist shops: “I go into the shop and ask the fellow in the 
shop. I’ll spend maybe a couple of hours in the shop saying ‘this is the sort of game that 
I like, what can you recommend?’, and then they go through a whole ‘oh you might like 
this - you might like that’, you know; and that’s how I ended up with the selection I’ve 
got at the moment.” 
5.2.6. How 2: Marketing/Hype 
Another source of information which potential players use to find out about the features 
of available offerings is through the marketing efforts made on behalf of the producers. 
There seem to be two main types of marketing: Advertisements and editorial features.  
While none of the subjects polled stated that they had obtained a game due to 
advertisements, the opposite did occur with the advertising strategy used by Nintendo 
being cited by HA, HB & OB as a reason they were playing on their Wii less.  Though we 
could assume that the single comment by HC, that the Wii is more ‘inclusive’ (than other 
consoles and the games available for them) is due to an identification with precisely the 
same advertising strategy and imagery that HA, HB and OB were influenced by: an 
advertisement campaign which suggested that the Wii is a system aimed at ‘casual’ 
171 
 
gamers and families for the purpose of primarily social play, which was communicated by 
presenting groups of ‘ordinary’ people in ‘ordinary’ settings playing games together, 
occasionally discussing that experience, but with less emphasis on the game-screen than 
many previous forms of videogame advertising. That the influence of marketing arose 
only a couple of times may well be an artefact of our society and its attitude toward 
marketing, and the extensive use of interviews in this research programme, in that 
nobody likes to admit that they are swayed by advertising in general. Though we could 
also assume that people don’t often form their opinions based on advertising, 
recognising that adverts are intrinsically hyperbole and instead preferring to use a more 
trusted source of information. One possible admission of succumbing to marketing 
efforts is in MC indicating that he finds out about offerings directly from the website of 
his favourite publisher. Sites such as these are clearly methods of marketing. To use the 
parlance of the advertising industry: the objective of these sites is to create ‘a buzz’ 
around upcoming products and to ‘support the fan community’ for products which have 
been released to the market. They obviously do not exist to provide the visitor with an 
impartial critique of the output of the company.   
A less obvious form of marketing, but still obviously part of a company’s hype generating 
endeavour, is the publication of various associated features in the specialist media such 
as interviews, company profiles or early previews. This is primarily apparent in the data 
as HA, HB, and OBs’ interest in the provenance of a game; specifically citing a game of 
which they have some knowledge of the reported development process (i.e. developed 
by a small innovative team), which they feel would be worthy of their attention. The 
same group also state that they track upcoming releases, a source of information which 
is carefully managed by development and publishing companies to elicit maximum 
anticipation of an offering. As we will see later, this reliance on ‘hype’ may backfire when 
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the promises made by the producers of the game are not met or weaknesses are not 
highlighted in previews. 
We could also view packaging as part of the marketing effort of the producers. Some 
subjects (i.e. GA & JB) did indicate that when purchasing individual games from a shop 
that they might use the packages as a guide to selecting potentially agreeable offerings.  
GA: “I always judge them by their cover. I know you shouldn’t do that 
<laughs>. If they’ve got good imagery on them then I’ll pick it up and 
read it, on the back or whatever.” 
JS: Yeah 
JB:  “If you read the back and really like it then that’s probably why you’d buy 
it.” 
Other subjects will remember offerings by their packaging, presumably because they 
have gained knowledge of the title primarily from browsing in shops. The available 
information on packages is slight, but telling. Conceptual graphics showing the themes 
presented in the game are common, while selected ‘screen shots’ are usually found on 
the back along with a short description and perhaps a list of unique selling points. In the 
absence of any other input this selection method requires the potential player to identify 
with these few elements in order to obtain the game. This perhaps suggests the 
popularity of games with themes based on licences from other media, such as Doug 
(ImaginEngine 2000) (a game discussed with GA & JB) which is based on a cartoon 
series. It seems that if the subject identifies with the theme and are selecting games 
based on themes then they are more likely to use this method of selection than a 
potential player who is interested in some other feature of the experience (such as game 
mechanic say). 
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5.2.7. How 3: Association 
An individual may form a biased impression of a game based on how it came to be 
encountered. Part of this is related to the individual Selecting a Familiar Face, where 
they encounter information about a game from a similar production company or 
developer and view the game in light of other products the individual has encountered 
from that same company. So a web surfer who finds an unfamiliar game on a known 
publisher’s website will view that game in light of their knowledge of the publisher’s 
other products even if the new game is far removed from any other offering from the 
developer to date (as an example we might ask if Rockstar Games presents Table Tennis 
(Rockstar San Diego 2006) might have received such a warm reception in the press, and 
the sales figures to match, if it had been D3 Publisher presents Table Tennis, even if it 
were the same game.) 
A more common way in which a game might lose or gain favour by association is if it is 
found in the possession of another. Even without enquiring as to the quality of the title, 
the finder’s attitude toward the owner will pull up or push down the finder’s attitude 
toward the game. So if a game is found in the collection of a friend it will be viewed 
more favourably (or at least with more curiosity) than if it were found in a pile of games 
in a second hand shop. This is most evident in the actions of GA + JB where JB stated 
that she swapped games with her friends (as part of a discussion about how she might 
play Gameboy games with a friend):  
JS:  What, you play linked up games or something? 
JB: No we just erm... we trade games and stuff, and play them on the 
different... 
This method of obtaining games might be seen as a shortcutting of the implicit question 
suggested in the previous section, in that if there is a person who is somewhat culturally 
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and socially ‘like me’ who already owns the game, and presumably also plays the game 
(though not necessarily) then surely I am the kind of person who would play this game.  
5.2.8. How 4: Ready availability in a context 
Obviously, quite often players make no conscious decision to obtain a game, it is simply 
there; the only decision then is whether to play or not. The games which come free with 
mobile phones, computer operating systems, and bundled free with hardware upgrades; 
games which are provided as free entertainment in public spaces such as bars; or games 
which associates might be engaged in while sharing leisure time together are not pre-
selected by the naive individual and that individual has invested nothing in obtaining it. 
As such, some of the material barriers are removed (financial outlay, time spent 
researching, time spent obtaining) and the only barriers to trying it are primarily 
cultural. Only if the potential player considers that there will be minimal loss in playing 
will they pick up the controls. For example KA found that in playing the games which 
came free with Microsoft Windows she could pass the time in a previous, boring job, but 
can’t play games at her current job. JA tried the various games which he’d obtained 
bundled with PC hardware, even though they were games of genres which he doesn’t 
identify with and wouldn’t normally install and try. GA, while initially stating that she 
doesn’t play games, later admitted to having played Snake on her mobile phone.   
One common and interesting version of this simple play/don’t play decision is where 
others are already engaged in play and invite the prospective player to join them. This 
then complicates the decision somewhat as while they might well be the kind of person 
who would play this game (and if it is a group of their peers rather than say the 
neighbours young children then they probably are in some way), they will also need to 
consider their status within this group and the nature of the game on offer.  So my 
personal experience of encountering a Nintendo Wii with Wii Sports (Nintendo 2006) 
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while on a weeklong break at a holiday camp, with 8 people between the ages of 25 and 
35 in the same chalet, demonstrated to me that in the right context, with the right 
interaction method, and a game with just the right level of competition potential, might 
result in an enjoyable play activity for most present. I suspect though that if the game 
had been more competitive, had a more ‘traditional’ interaction method, or if the pony 
trekking facilities were still open, several of the party would have drifted off and found 
something else to do much more quickly than they did. Another example of this is the 
family game, such as GA and JB stating that they played Who Wants to be a Millionaire 
on PS2 (Eidos 2001) with the family at Christmas time, a time traditionally set aside for 
group family activities such as board games or charades.  Though, conversely I am 
aware of no anecdotes of families gathering round for an 8 player tournament of Micro 
Machines 2: Turbo Tournament (Supersonic Software Ltd 1994) which would be less easy 
to describe as a ‘family’ game when compared to quiz games such as Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire?. 
5.2.9. How 5: Trying out 
Although trying out is not completely distinct from play, it has been reported as a 
discreet stage of engagement in the past (Salisbury & Fields 2004) while the data also 
includes mentions of 'giving a chance' or 'having a go', suggesting that there may be a 
sense of trial in the user's mind. For example CA: “Similar game to that other one, 
Fantavision. I didn’t like that either. I dunno, I think it’s one of those games you’ve really 
got to play, like give it time on your own and stuff. Learn what you’re doing rather than 
just trying to pick it up and have a go at it, and give up because you can’t work out what 
the hell you’re doing. That’s what I found with Rez, I don’t know, if I was doing it right or 
wrong.”. The problem comes about in deciding when 'trying out' transitions in into 
concerted 'playing'. As I will show in the proceeding subsection, engaging with play is in 
a constant state of 'giving the game a chance', where failures to meet the user's 
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expectations or needs can 'break' the user's engagement at any time. However, in 
accounting for a user's sense that they are still selecting a game during initial encounters 
with actual play we can make apparent the process of negotiation which will be 
discussed later in this thesis.  
Taking the assumption that, via whatever route, the player finds himself actually at the 
controls of a game (or a new machine, game delivery system, or some other ludic 
mechanism which the player has no experience of up to that point), it is apparent that 
the player is at this point purely evaluating the game against what their expectations 
are. These expectations will have been shaped by the various selection mechanisms 
employed and the player's summed value judgement about the activity. So for example 
CA relates having heard good things about Deus Ex (Ion Storm Inc. 2000): “You 
probably give it more of a chance, I’d say, but I… Deus Ex, heard was really good, and I 
can’t be arsed with that, I really can’t. I’ve only played it to that bit. I suppose there is 
that, the same with a film, you give it more of a chance if you hear good things about it, 
‘cause you assume that all these people, especially if it’s friends that tell you, that they 
know what they are talking about, but I don’t do that to be honest.”. While he claims not 
to be swayed by the opinions of others, he does relate that there is a grace period, 
where the player is 'giving it a chance'. It seems that this is the final step in a selection 
process, where before this step the player is forming an idea of what it might be like to 
play the game; working out if they are possibly the kind of person who might engage in 
it, before actually 'giving it a chance' and presumably testing those expectations against 
the actual experience. Some data was collected with a subject (NA, a man in his 
twenties) trying games he had downloaded, but not yet installed and tried out. Neither 
of the games he selected were deemed ‘playable’ enough to continue with for more than 
10 minutes or so, and he didn’t have a great expectation to support a great deal of 
trying out. One game, Angels Vs. Devils (Enigman Software TBA),  failed to deal with the 
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thematic elements in an interesting enough way, and the other,  Söldner (Wings 
Simulations 2004), was slow to develop (a military game with a long ‘boot camp’ 
sequence) and was of poor quality (slow loading times and a number of bugs were 
encountered). NA suggested that he even game extra time to try the games out as he 
believed that’s what I expected in the process of observing him try out new games, 
saying that he would have given up after a minute or so, uninstalled the application, and 
deleted the game from his disc: “What I would normally do now is press the escape 
button and uninstall the game”, which he further expanded upon in the unrecorded post 
interview debrief. So in these instances NA has little investment of expectations and as 
such is demanding that the game prove itself to him immediately or he will become 
disinterested and will stop playing almost immediately. 
Examples of where potential players become actual players through successful trying out 
are presumably all the games that a player would state that they do ‘play’ or have 
‘played’. Examples in the research of players actually successfully trying a game out are 
more difficult to show as I collected no data showing a successful set of initial 
interactions followed by a report of continued play. Perhaps the closest is the personal 
anecdotal experience of having seen novice players picking up Nintendo Wii controllers 
for the first time and enjoying the experience... though there is no evidence that they 
then went on to engage in this activity in any other context than the one that these 
initial experiences were part of.  
5.3. Play 
While researchers such as Aarseth (2003) have argued that play must be the central 
object of study for games research, this project has essentially settled on a study of the 
conditions supporting engagement in play. That is the actual act of playing is bound into 
a social psychological praxis which informs the conditions of engagement; the actual 
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engagement itself being a successful realization of the supporting factors of 
identification, expectation, context and so on. This is due in part to the differences in 
methodology, where the methodology used here might be said to be the first steps of a  
heterophenomenology of reported player experiences, Aarseth has traditionally focused 
on the artifact and their imputed meanings explored through personal play experience. 
That is much games research deals with the game and how it facilitates play while I have 
developed a theory of how and why players make the choices they do; what experiences 
do games provide vs what kinds of experiences are players seeking to engage in. These 
are two sides of the same question. 
Approaching this problem from the perspective of the generalized player, I can state that 
the degree to which a player engages with a game is the degree to which they have 
found a game which conforms to the ‘am I the kind of person who would play this game 
in this context?’ question. This question could resolve to an entirely negative answer (No 
I’m not the kind of person who engages in playing the games I am aware of, in any 
context I can think of.), but anything other than a purely negative case will have a player 
finding features of certain games agreeable enough to engage in, at least sometimes. 
Other conceptions of play which relate to such concepts as immersion or Flow are 
suitable for some players in some contexts, but fail to address players for whom such 
deeply engaging states of mind are deemed to be undesirable.  For example OA, while 
being engaged by the novelty of a fresh graphical approach, interaction method or game 
mechanic generally avoids engaging in solo game play, as he feels that time he has 
spent doing so in the past (where he may have been deeply engaged) could have been 
better spent. He engages with games to learn about the creativity of others to become 
inspired, rather than 'wasting time' trying to overcome 'pointless' challenges. To study 
OA actually playing a challenging game might suggest that he could or would engage in 
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it. He might for example demonstrate the reported hallmarks of a Flow experience. 
However, left to his own devices he would not be engaged as he would not voluntarily 
initiate play with such a game. So if we were to study how videogames might induce 
Flow states, or how they might support co-located and online socialization, or how they 
might induce immersion, and so on we would need to study each of these hypotheses 
individually, in the knowledge that not all players will be seeking the type of engagement 
we are studying. Indeed Czicksentmihaly states that, with respect to the concept of 
Flow, that any activity is potentially a Flow activity, as long as the individual initiating the 
activity is initiating it as something that they really want to do (Csikszentmihalyi 1990) 
Put simply, my theory of play is when a potential player has passed through the selection 
phase and has found an experience that is indeed the kind of game that this individual 
would engage in, may do so. Just as an individual will be selecting on multiple features 
of identification, it is the positive features that they will engage with, at least initially. So, 
as mentioned earlier, CB may be looking for a game and context within which she can 
have a fun experience with her friends. So as long as a game encourages friendly 
competition or collaboration, and she has friends present who want to join in (and there 
are no friends present who would feel alienated by this activity), then she will initiate 
some kind of game on her Wii; engaging with the identified positive features of certain 
Wii games which allow for social play.  
Games, contexts, the space of available games, and indeed players are not fixed, so as a 
player may be engaged by a game in one state it is not given that they would be 
engaged for every similar state. A newer, better game might be obtained; the progress 
of the game might become too difficult, stale, or broken;  a subtle shift in a group 
dynamic might mean that games slip down the hierarchy of social options; the player 
might feel that they have outgrown a game or might  have simply satisfied their 
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immediate need and become bored for now. Playing across multiple sessions requires a 
positive sum of factors every time. Indeed even during one session, as the factors 
change the player’s perception of the factors change and a sliding interpretation of 
whether the game is engaging will continue to develop. In extreme cases of Flow-like 
engagements the positive factors will outweigh the negative up to a point in time where 
the player is physically exhausted. In other cases the player will simply decide that they 
have had enough and that it is time to stop.  This weighting of factors over time will be 
dealt with in the next chapter, setting out the way in which the engagement is 
negotiated. Why a player stops playing then, is simply when the weighted value 
judgement factors result in a negative sum. Some games have a strict narrative 
progression or story, some have a loose narrative progression (begin, develop, end), and 
some are potentially infinite, but these forms do not dictate when a player will finish 
playing.  Depending on the nature of the shift in weightings over the course of the 
session this termination in play could be forever or until the next suitable context and 
desire arises, but will happen at any time the player feels that they would be happy to 
stop. So, say a game that breaks a covenant of trust (such as the Football game that 
changes the behaviour of the ball to favour the opposition) might be dropped forever, 
while a game that has been ‘finished’ in one configuration might be set aside at a 
suitable ‘break point’ until motivation to play it in other configurations arises, a player 
who is feeling fatigued and frustrated might cease until they have the energy to return; 
and a group might decide to engage in a different activity for the remainder of their 
gathering, not precluding the possibility of a return later. 
As Selection rests on the infinite variability of human cultural awareness (including the 
practices of sub-cultures and doctrines of societies) and how individuals identify with 
their roles within this sense of culture, play is predicated on this sense of identification 
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and is also infinitely variable in performance. There isn’t a single design feature which 
will engage all players. However there are general features which could damage a 
player’s engagement. Generally put many of these features could be categorized as poor 
quality, punitive play, or lack of fairness. 
While issues relating to the quality of the graphics, sound, usability and general stability 
might well be noticed while the potential player is trying an individual game out (for 
example during the observation of NA he seemed to constantly weigh these features), 
quality issues might arise at any point in the interaction. If the game reaches a point 
where it starts to crash persistently; if the player gets stuck due to a bug (rather than by 
deliberate design) or if some other obvious quality problem arises while the game is 
being played in earnest then this fact will add a negative factor to the sum of value 
judgements. Consider the example of CA reflecting on why he disliked Bubsy (Accolade 
1993) so much: 
JS: What made it particularly bad, as opposed to other platform games? 
CA: It was hard, and for the wrong reasons. You sort of had to play and die, 
and die to get any good on it. You didn’t really know where you were 
going, and it was glitchy. The control of the character was pretty poor, a 
bad character at that. It was slow in some places, then stupidly fast in 
other places. 
He includes ‘glitchy’ to refer to the poor quality of the game, and adds this to the list of 
negative features he felt the game presented. 
If the player is repeatedly forced to perform the same unchallenging action over and 
over in order to progress to the next real challenge, or they are repeatedly expected to 
guess the outcome of events with few clues to allow them to surmise the outcome again 
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they may well apply a negative value judgement. For example BA becomes frustrated by 
games that force him to move his avatar through environments he has already explored 
to fetch things he has already found in order to solve a puzzle very much like the last 
one, so that he might continue with his explorations of the rest of the game (a common 
mechanic in the Resident Evil (Capcom 1996) series of games), which work against the 
features he values such as solving puzzles or exploring. While NA found that fighting 
multiple waves of very similar, but easy to defeat, enemies in Prince of Persia: Sands of 
Time (Ubisoft 2003) boring, potentially for similar reasons. JA mentions this effect in a 
different way, that of trying to get back to the point in a game with a structured 
progression when ones ‘save game’ is not available, in relation to an earlier passage in 
the interview where he bemoans forgetting how to play games while he is away for work 
for extended periods we then much later discuss the opportunity to ‘dip in and out’ of a 
game:  
JA: I’ve left it alone and come back to it and I’ll start again, “Go, ok just here, 
fight him, go here, fight that. Oh yeah, go to that room, shoot that wall…” 
JS: Yeah, story driven games do that I reckon. 
JA: Yeah, that’s [unknown] not story driven and I can still dip into that. 
JS: Yeah, I mean the whole thing like if it’s a linear game, you start at point A 
and if it’s crashed and you’ve lost your save game or something… 
JA: Gone to another computer. 
JS: Then you’re starting at point A again, and you’re like, “Oh no, not this bit 
again.” 
JA: “Let me get past it.” Ah, but you need your save game..  
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This passage suggests that it can be very frustrating to overcome the challenges already 
overcome (especially if they are puzzles) and be presented with a story which has 
already been heard. CA complains of the ‘randomness’ of Bubsy (Accolade 1993), where 
through no fault of his own the player is ‘killed’ or ‘sent back’ regularly, which CA found 
intensely frustrating. 
CA: Yeah, you know, you didn’t feel like you were doing anything because you 
were good, but because… You know, you never got the satisfaction of 
doing a good jump or anything, that it was just so glitchy and random. 
Really that… 
JS: It was like, “Ah, phew, it didn’t break this time.” 
CA: Or, “That guy wasn’t there this time when I jumped.” It was a fairly 
terrible game. Terrible music, not very good level design, just falling for 
like 3 pages and then not knowing where you’re going next. Fairly poor. It 
was a quid though. 
This last example of punitive play could also be said to be unfair. There are other 
examples of lack of fairness which are not necessarily punitive, but may be due to a 
design which does not apply an even balance where it might be expected. For example 
my own personal experience of playing a game an edition of the Electronic Arts’ series of 
FIFA Football games where, at a high difficulty setting, I noticed that the ball favoured 
the computer controlled opponents; simply moving to the feet of the computer controlled 
players as if magnetized, preventing my own players from obtaining possession. As soon 
as I noticed this I refused to play the game ever again, even at lower difficulty settings 
where the ‘cheating’ might not occur. In this instance the game had broken a covenant 
of sports games; that skill is the determining factor of success and thus if the game can 
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bend the environment (in this case the illusory physics model) and overtly cheat then 
the player is forced to likewise look for unrealistic exploitations of the game engine, and 
thus the game stops being the kind of game the player thought they were playing. 
Factors which might build up to encourage a player to carry on playing, assuming that 
they are ‘in’, having identified with the activity and initiated a play experience, seem to 
be quite complex. The challenges provided by the experience were commonly referenced 
by subjects. Striving to ‘beat’ a game is a key factor for some, and if we assume that 
Czicksentmihaly’s (1975) thesis relative to challenges is reasonable, potentially a key 
factor in having players have ‘one more go’. Challenges exist at different levels and are 
of different types though. Not all types of challenge will engage all players in the same 
way, and the variability in the skill of individuals will determine if they become bored (too 
easy) or frustrated (too hard). It seems that whatever the challenge many types of 
engagement are related to a sense of progress with players gaining skill, gaining points, 
advancing a story and so on. This principle of progression however is not universal. 
When an individual is using game playing as a social locus or as a means of ‘passing the 
time’, moving through a game’s narrative or gaining increased skills (or whatever) are of 
peripheral concern.  
As humans behave in an infinitely variable way, with an infinitely variable set of concerns 
the only general rule we can apply is that if a person has identified an activity as worth 
doing they have a good chance of doing it, that is they have personally identified with 
the activity and possible outcomes they will seek it out and engage in it. If this activity is 
gaining a mastery or skill of a level needed to meet the requirements of a game or to 
defeat their friends or strangers; if this activity is in following a story progression and 
seeing how their actions influence it; if the activity is something to occupy their waking 
mind without serious effort to pass the time; or if it is to have a fun activity in which to 
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spend a few minutes with friends, then these are the types of games that will be sought 
and engaged with in these ways. Players might be frustrated by challenges, stories, 
‘pointless’ play, or a need to socialize as much as they are engaged by these things, 
dependant on what they value and identify with, and what the specific contextual 
demands are. Not merely as a selection process, but as a play activity. 
5.4. Reflection 
A player might well have some conception as to what kind of activities they will seek out 
based on the kinds of activities they have engaged in in the past. Closely related to the 
process of Selection, a player’s reflection on their past play experiences has a strong 
effect on their reasoning about their attitude to future offerings. Explicit reflections seem 
to rely on the gross, most memorably good or bad features of an offering.  If a player 
has experience of playing a game and found it enjoyable, for whatever reason, then they 
might try to replicate or build on that experience by either playing that game again or 
seeking out offerings with apparently similar gross features. Conversely, if upon having 
played a game the player has no sense of net cultural worth they will avoid games with 
similar gross features. This negative case accounts for cases like DA who ‘completed’ 
Super Mario World on the Gameboy, but felt that, on reflection, there was no value in 
having done so. In order to avoid wasting his time on other valueless activities he 
decided that ‘computer games’ in general were not for him and would be avoided. That is 
not to say that an individual who comes to a conclusion such as this is some kind of 
ultra-rational being who looks at every potential activity in their lives in an instrumental 
manner, never taking up with anything ‘trivial’ or anything which cannot give them an 
obvious material return.  Rather they do not identify with the activity or the outcome of 
engaging with the challenges (in the case of DA completing Mario) of a game. Finding, 
on reflection, that the cultural or material ‘rewards’ do not outweigh the cultural or 
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material costs. In cases where individuals have encountered many different offerings, 
these reflections on summed value judgements will become increasingly sophisticated. 
As the individual experiences an increased number of offerings they will be comparing 
these experiences on increasingly narrow sets of criteria. Returning to CA’s thoughts on 
the relative merits of the Final Fantasy series is quite revealing of this point: 
CA: There were some serious flaws I think with the… erm… the game. VII was 
quality IX’s good, but VIII I don’t really know why it’s so poor. 
JS: Do you think it might be the graphics? 
CA: The graphics do smell a little, but I dunno, when I first played it I did 
really quite like the graphics. I think there were a lot of bits in the game 
which were dull, like the fact that you couldn’t skip the spells or the 
summons, and some of them went on for like 2 minutes. The fact that you 
had to fight this dinosaur really early on, and the only way you could kill it 
was to attack it with the same spell with just one person. I was like 10 
minutes of actually doing this thing all the time, and it wasn’t enjoyable it 
was ted… just peed you off, and there was quite a few bits like that, where 
it was just like monotony, where it felt like it was just filling up time rather 
than just trying to progress the story in any way, or actually get you 
somewhere, and there’s quite a bit like that. Good intro though. 
JS: I know what you mean; the graphics were very sexy sometimes. 
CA: The card game I didn’t really get into and like… The sub-game with the 
cards, whatever it’s called. 
JS: Can’t remember now. Yeah, the way you could change the rules in it as 
well. 
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CA: I’m sure there was good bits in there. I did play all the way through, but it 
didn’t catch, grab, you know, engage me in any way like Final Fantasy VII 
or IX did. You know maybe the characters weren’t even good enough. 
The conversational style of the above quote, with CA and myself sharing our experiences 
of Final Fantasy VIII is an example of how reflections are socially guided as well as being 
an individual’s personal cultural evaluation. Discussing the merits of different offerings 
and types of offerings amongst peers may well ‘pull up’ or ‘push down’ an individual’s 
interpretation of their activities to some degree. These ‘peer reviews’ will be added to an 
individual’s knowledge base they may have built up based on their own experiences. 
Similarly, and in attempting to relate their own experiences to their peers a player might 
come upon realizations of a positive or negative nature further influencing their 
interpretations of their past activities. 
The above example suggests that we should view all of the data collected in this 
programme of research as examples of explicit, expressed, reflective thoughts. Each 
interview entailed the subject reflecting on their choices, formulating post-hoc 
justifications of their current position relative to their experience of gaming; looking for 
examples that illustrate these positions; phrasing these examples in a manner which 
they feel is acceptable in the context of the interview situation. This final feature of 
explicit reflection within an interview context means that in analysing the data I have 
had to account for the context of the interview. For example interviewing GA and JB both 
together, as a 30 something man, friend of the family, with another 30 something female 
‘chaperone’ (by default) relative in attendance, raises a number of socio-cultural 
questions. How freely expressive will they be to myself as an adult man who they might 
perceive as being from their parents’ social group with these other individuals in 
attendance? It would be easy to logically elaborate on their statements, but rather the 
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comparative nature of the GT methodology has provided some insights into their 
positions and motives. For example that JB trades games with her school friends, but 
says that she does not talk about or discuss games at school: 
JS: You say you swap games with your mate on your Gameboy and that... you 
don’t really chat about it at school with anyone, about what the good 
games are and what the bad games are... 
JB: No, not really. 
This observation might suggest, with the theory I am proposing here, that while she is 
the kind of person who would play the occasional game she is not the kind of person who 
would enter detailed discussions and analyses of games with her peers; the trading then 
is a way for her peer group to share games that they have enjoyed without being seen to 
be the kind of person who would be entering into deep analyses of game offerings.  We 
can see the opposite in the case of HA, HB and OB, three post adolescent,  self identified 
gamers, for whom the ideas behind a game and how their choices relate to those of their 
peers are important factors in engaging and will be discussed freely. 
5.5. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in 
this section 
1. Players do not engage with a gameplay activity 
suddenly, mysteriously, or spontaneously, without 
considering the context of that engagement  
2. A process of engagement usually occurs which includes 
phases before and after actual physical game playing 
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3. Prospective players select gameplay activities based on 
such things as the suitability for a context, specific 
game features, or familiarity 
4. Players discover suitability, features, and familiarity by 
methods such as polling the trusted opinions of others, 
engaging with marketing, associating the gameplay 
activity to others, by relative availability of the activity 
or product, or by actively trying the activity out. 
5. The factors the player selected (and engaged with) are 
then constantly evaluated, in context throughout play. 
6. When play is not physically occurring the player is 
explicitly and implicitly reflecting on whether the 
gameplay experience (or experiences with features in 
common with the played experience) as so played still 
meets the entertainment requirement it was selected 
for. 
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6. Core Category: Negotiated identification of and 
with a sense of Cultural worth. 
This final theoretical chapter presents the theoretical memos that tie together the idea 
that individuals will take up play activities that they identify with, and that there is a 
general process of selecting, playing and reflecting which shapes the summed 
identification over time, to formulate an integrated concept that players’ relative 
identifications with games are negotiated.  
In order to prevent confusion in my use of the pertinent terms, I feel that it is important 
to stress my intended usages: 
negotiate 
  • verb 1 try to reach an agreement or compromise by discussion. 2 obtain or bring 
about by negotiating. 3 find a way over or through (an obstacle or difficult path). 4 
transfer (a cheque, bill, etc.) to the legal ownership of another.  
“Negotiated” in the sense I will use it here is intended to both convey that there is a 
progression with a resolution (3), and to convey the sense that there is an explicit (with 
others) and implicit (with generalized others) discussion (1 and 2) involved in an 
individual determining if any videogame offering can be identified with and hence 
engaged in. 
cultural 
  • adjective 1 relating to the culture of a society. 2 relating to the arts and to 
intellectual achievements.  
culture 
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  • noun 1 the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement 
regarded collectively. 2 a refined understanding or appreciation of this. 3 the customs, 
institutions, and achievements of a particular nation, people, or group. 4 the cultivation 
of plants, breeding of animals, or production of cells or tissues. 5 a preparation of cells 
grown in an artificial medium containing nutrients.  
society 
  • noun (pl. societies) 1 the aggregate of people living together in a more or less 
ordered community. 2 a particular community of people living in a country or region, and 
having shared customs, laws, and organizations. 3 (also high society) people who are 
fashionable, wealthy, and influential, regarded as a distinct social group. 4 an 
organization or club formed for a particular purpose or activity. 5 the situation of being 
in the company of other people.  
“Cultural” in the sense I will use it relates to both the customs of groups of people, and 
that games themselves may be deemed to be artistic artifacts. 
An excellent instantiation of this usage come from 19th century anthropology: 
“Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” (Tylor 1874) 
This section, in dealing with individuals’ evaluated and summed identifications may seem 
to be dealing with individual propensities rather than cultural values. It is my intention in 
this chapter to show that they are one and the same; that an individual’s perception of 
the value of a game is cultural and formed as a psycho-social function. A review of the 
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literature shows that the idea that an individual’s attitudes are to a greater degree social 
and cultural values is not a new perspective.  
“In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form 
of a somewhat definite imagination of how one’s self – that is any idea he 
appropriates – appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is 
determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self 
of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass  self: 
“Each to each a looking-glass 
Reflects the other that doth pass” 
 As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them 
 because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do 
 or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we 
 perceive in another’s mind some thought of out appearance, manners, aims, 
 deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.” 
  (Cooley 1902) 
Obviously, when Cooley wrote the above there were no videogames, there was barely 
even a cinema industry. However he noted that once so constructed, the ‘looking glass 
self’ as an ideal personal entity affects the individual’s personal perception of action: 
“Once formed and familiarized the ideal self serves, like any ideal only more directly, as 
an incitement to growth in its direction, and a punishment to retrogression. A man who 
has become used to imagining himself as noble, beneficent, and respected has a real 
picture in his mind, a fair product of aspiring thought,  a work of art. If his conduct 
violates this imagination he has a sense of ugliness and shame; there is a rent in the 
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picture, a rude shapeless hole, shattering its beauty, and calling for painful and tedious 
repairs before it can be tolerable to look upon.” (Cooley 1902) 
 So when I say that an individual is looking for gameplay experiences which when the 
individual asks “Am I the kind of person who would play this game.” they might be able 
to answer in the positive we could relate this question to Cooley’s concepts of the looking 
glass self and the ideal self.  The following quote also from Human Nature and the Social 
Order will make this relationship between my observed sentiment and Cooley’s ideas 
more apparent: 
“A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination 
of or appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that 
appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The 
comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the 
imagined judgement, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or 
shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed 
sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind.” 
So when an individual asks “Am I the kind of person who would play this game?” they 
are also asking “If I play this game, what does that say about me?” and “If I saw 
someone playing this game, what would that tell me about them?”. If any of these 
questions fail to match up to their own self-idea or ideal self then they are unlikely to 
consider it to be an activity they should be engaged in and will avoid it. So for example 
BA rejecting games which encourage somewhat realistic representations of murder (i.e. 
Metal Gear Solid (Konami Computer Entertainment Japan 1998)) is likely to be due in 
part to his not wishing to be seen to take pleasure in violent activities. Similarly DB’s 
rejection of games with ‘babyish’ graphics is likely to be due to his emerging sense of 
adulthood, where to be seen to be engaging in activities designed for children would be 
194 
 
unacceptable. These sentiments then are expressions of the ideal self, so that BA will 
state with confidence that he, personally, doesn’t enjoy the violence of Metal Gear Solid 
and DB will state that he didn’t enjoy the graphical style of Final Fantasy VII, rather than 
that they feel that they will look bad if caught playing games such as these. While it is 
obvious to a student of videogames that there is no actual violence involved in playing 
Metal Gear Solid, and the depiction thereof is obviously unrealistically sterile and almost 
cartoonish; and that Final Fantasy VII is far from ‘babyish’ in terms of narrative themes 
and ludic complexity, certain elements have been identified by these two subjects as 
unacceptable with respect to their sense of ideal self. 
As stated in the chapter above, which introduces the concept of summed value 
judgements, my theory is that for any single offering (game, genre, hardware platform 
and so on) an individual may hold a set of weighted sentiments of the type discussed 
above. These sentiments or sub- value judgements are not fixed but vary over time and 
by context, as discussed in the chapter which deals with the process of engagement. To 
explore how these value judgements vary is the purpose of this chapter, and is the 
central hypothesis of this thesis (that an individual’s engagement with a videogaming 
offering is determined by a negotiation of values to a sense of net cultural worth), and 
the following sections will attempt to clearly map the negotiations involved in arriving at 
a net identification through the cyclical process of selection, play, and reflection. 
6.1. Selection as negotiation of potential 
As previously suggested, the space of potential gameplay offerings is not fully known by 
any individual, rather individuals form impressions of what offerings exist and what the 
nature of those offerings are from a variety of sources. These impressions are then 
contrasted with the sense of identification to determine if this activity is possibly one in 
which the individual feels that they can engage. The source of the information also helps 
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to form this sense of identification, and the impression of the offering might not be 
formed simply on surface features such as themes, graphics, or characters, but at this 
stage, for many individuals, these features are more important than they are at any 
other phase in the engagement. That is as long as computer or video gaming in general 
is an activity that the individual can, in principle, reconcile with their sense of 
identification. DC, DA and NB have all concluded that videogaming is not something 
which will provide them with any benefit that they can identify with and that gaming is 
‘for’ other people: children, people who lack creativity, and “mainly for boys” 
respectively. As DA (a performing artist) says: 
DA: Put it this way: I can’t really see a philosophy or arts student play 
computer games all day.  
Investigating the attitudes of those who reject games is interesting. The general attitude 
is that games are a ‘pointless’ or worthless activity. In trying to find out why such 
people, as well as marginal players such as OA, AB and AC (respondents who expressed 
an interest in playing games, but expressed various levels of reluctance based on having 
other interests of higher priority) , are less inclined to engage in games as an 
entertainment medium relative to other activities, results in a number of justifications: 
Games are too time consuming (e.g. OA or AA); games do not provide any new 
knowledge or novel experiences (e.g. OA or DA); games are primarily sedentary (e.g DA 
or DC);  games and gaming hardware are financially expensive (e.g. IA or AA); games 
do not allow players to express themselves creatively (e.g DA or OA).. These 
justifications can be viewed in two ways. The first view is that these sentiments are 
expressions of investments relative to returns; that in these negative cases there is no 
substantive worth in playing. The second is based on the observation that, some might 
view these ‘investments’, ‘costs’, or negative factors and ‘returns’, ‘benefits’, or positive 
196 
 
factors in the opposite light; that the pleasure of playing is a reward worth investing in. 
What differentiates, say DC’s sense that games are anti-social with HA, HB, and OBs’ 
experiences of becoming too involved in the social politics of playing certain online 
games?  
OB: I used to play World of Warcraft quite a while ago; a couple of years ago 
now and I played that with a few friends... he <indicating HA> was 
playing it for a short time as well, but then he stopped... cleverly. 
HA: My Girlfriend was going to leave me so I decided to stop that game. It’s 
not a good game to play. Have you played it before? 
JS: No. No, so many people in the research community that just live on it 
though. 
OB: It takes up way too much time. 
HA:  Too much time. 
OB: And when you reach the end of the game it becomes a job. That you have 
to do this and this to keep up with this, and then it gets all political with 
everyone else who’s playing the game and... 
Also 
HB: Yeah I stopped playing Counterstrike when he <indicating HA> had a clan 
and I was in it, and he started wanted to get sponsored and stuff and I 
was like: I just want to play the game man! 
These quotes demonstrate that in playing certain games, these respondents felt that the 
investments (engaging in meta-game social organisations) detracted from what they 
valued (the core experience of playing the game). It is the first hypothesis of this thesis 
that players must identify with the perceived net ‘investments’ and ‘returns’ in order to 
engage. However each individual views the factors from a different personal and social 
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perspective, which gives each factor more or less weight. I propose that this weighting is 
cultural and based on a individuals sense of who they are and what kinds of people 
would or should engage in different activities. 
So in selecting a game (or games in general, or a particular console, or whatever), if a 
player’s identification with the benefits is sufficiently strong while the costs are perceived 
as sufficiently tolerable, then there is a chance the player will engage with the game if 
they encounter it. 
The following section examines a few examples of possible costs and benefits and how 
they seem to have been reconciled by different individuals for them to have arrived at 
their position; how they have essentially implicitly negotiated their position via a ‘looking 
glass self’ style interaction with the imputed attitudes of a generalised other. 
6.1.1. Visual representation 
DB stated that he couldn’t engage with Herdy Gerdy or Final Fantasy VII because they 
were ‘babyish’, a criticism which this researcher has never heard levelled at either game 
before or since:  
DB:  Herdy Gerdy. I don’t really like it. My mum kind of likes it, so it’s kind of 
her game. Not mine. 
JS: So you don’t like it. What don’t you like about it? 
DB: It’s kind of babyish.  
Upon quizzing DB about Final Fantasy VII he suggested that he was upset with the main 
presentation of the characters, in that, again, for most of the game the characters are 
presented as ‘babyish’ (or we could say ‘super-deformed’ to use the English translation 
of the Japanese description for such a large head on small body style of character 
design). It seemed that for DB his adolescence and sense of emerging manhood were 
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not compatible with playing a game where the characters looked like small children most 
of the time, no matter how adult or ‘sophisticated’ the narrative, complex the gameplay 
mechanics, or well structured the challenges (which admittedly may have been strong 
attractors resulting in him engaging with the games despite the negative connotation of 
the graphical presentation). 
Contrasting DB’s failure to negotiate past the pitfall of super deformed characters is KA’s 
attraction to ‘cartoon’ style graphical presentations. Being a 20 something woman who 
values ‘fun’ and ‘being silly’ in some of her leisure time she had found that she could do 
so with certain offerings available for her Nintendo Gamecube. While she might find 
other pitfalls or benefits once playing a game (see below) she would be drawn to a game 
if it had suitably ‘cartoony’ graphics. Games should be fun, cartoons are fun, and thus 
games with cartoon graphics are acceptable for a fun loving young woman to play, 
whereas realistic presentations of characters in realistic settings might not engender this 
sense of fun in quite the same way. 
6.1.2. Thematic 
The actual themes represented in a game may also be points of identification. At the 
simplest level this could be that sports fans will identify with games that attempt to 
replicate or simulate some aspect of the sport of which they are a fan. So Football fans 
will feel that they are indeed capable of engaging with football games (either playing 
matches or managing teams). Those that do not engage with the represented sport will 
not identify with the theme of the game and so any engagement with the game will be 
based on other factors. 
For example IA considers himself to be a football fan, and hence seeks out football 
games to play. For him the accurate representation of the theme is very important. The 
graphics should represent the game as realistically as possible; the names should be 
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accurate; and the commentary should be as convincing as possible. As if he identifies so 
strongly with being a football fan, that only the most accurate representation of the 
sport in terms of kit, names, rules, competition structures, commentary will satisfy this 
identification. 
On the opposite side to this sense of identification with a theme is the example of OA 
who states that he is not the kind of person who enjoys watching boxing, and as such is 
not the kind of person who engages with ‘fighting’ games (otherwise known as beat-em-
ups). 
JS: So of the types of games that you really just wouldn’t touch... 
OA: I wouldn’t really play a beat-em-up game anymore... it would have to be a 
bloody good shoot-em-up, and a simple shoot-em-up like Raiden, and it 
doesn’t get much better than that, because that’s just full on mayhem and 
I think that does actually get your adrenaline going quite fast... 
JS: Well shooting games and beat-em-up games are quite popular types of 
game, so, you know, why do you think people are attracted to them? Why 
do you think people play them? 
OA: Well fighting probably because of the machismo to go with it... I suppose 
people who are attracted to violence as well... I don’t know. I guess I’m 
not the kind of person who would watch a boxing match...  
 This is a direct statement of identification and requires little further explanation (he 
doesn’t see himself as someone who likes violence or pugilism in any form), other than 
that elsewhere in our interview he expresses the sentiment that he engages with games 
for the novelty of the graphics and interaction. So we might suppose that he may engage 
with a sufficiently technically novel beat-em-up for a short period in these ways, but 
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otherwise would find the other features of such a game demotivating rather than 
engaging and would not seek them out: 
OA:  I can respect the amount of work that’s gone into the inbetweening each 
pose and getting all the technicalities to work... 
6.1.3. Potential for time passed 
That players select games in order to pass the time might seem like a trite statement, 
however there are multiple ways in which a game can be structured which will have a 
direct impact on the perceived time commitment. Even before a game is played the 
potential player may have in mind an impression of the time commitment required and 
this impression will be identified with as either a positive or negative. Essentially taking a 
cumulative interpretation of the other points of identification and then seeing the 
potential time commitment as an amplification of this stance. This amplification of 
identification is similar to the impression of a challenge as stated in the following section 
which deals with how players identify during play. Negotiating the value of a play activity 
via this function of an investment modified via identification is a key justification for 
many. Are they the kind of person who would spend their valuable time in this activity? 
For example AA indicates that it is difficult to justify the time to play; that he might 
manage an hour of chess occasionally. Is this activity going to last long enough and soak 
up enough free time to be valued in light of other investments? For example JA looking 
for games that will give him something to do while he is cooped up on site, at work for 
extended periods. Is this activity going to require too much investment, in terms of time, 
in order to get any other return? For example HA stating that he felt he had to stop 
playing World of Warcraft to keep his girlfriend from leaving him. While some videogame 
rejecters might see games as a ‘waste of time’ (e.g. DA) some game players see games 
as a means of ‘passing the time’ in the same way as one might play a puzzle in a 
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newspaper, while other game players are happy to engage as long as they don’t have to 
engage in ‘slog’ activities in order to get out what they want; in that they want a sense 
of achievement, an advance in a story, or a fun social interaction say (e.g. NA relating 
that he got bored with a game that demanded that he fight the same monsters over and 
over in order to progress the story). That is to say, while we have been dealing with 
obvious points of identification up to this point, with potential players’ senses of what 
things appear to be, this feature deals with what the activity means to them.  These 
points are probably best illustrated with examples. 
The two best examples to illustrate this point of negotiation are possibly OA and JA. To 
summarise much of what I discussed with OA I could say that he identifies with gaming 
in principle and would be happy to explore them briefly to so that he can feel that he is 
aware of the state of the art at present, but he feels that ultimately he should be 
spending his time in activities which seem more valuable: creating his own works; 
advancing his knowledge in other areas; or resolving issues in his life (such as his career, 
home, or social relationships). Having spent time in earlier years engaging with games 
he is aware of how time consuming they have the potential to be and prefers to avoid 
such a drain on his time at this stage in his life. In contrast to OA’s position is that of JA 
who works in short intense bursts away from home, and uses games in two ways. The 
first is to provide him with an extended distraction (something to occupy his mind) 
during periods of ‘down time’ while away from home on assignment, and for this purpose 
he chooses games for his laptop which provide him with a deep and extended 
experience; something which will soak up 8 hours at a time. The second way in which he 
uses games to soak up time is when he is not on assignment and is at home for several 
weeks at a time waiting for his next assignment; for this purpose he plays games which, 
while still capable of occupying him for fairly extended periods, are more easy to ‘pick up 
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and put down’, allowing him more flexibility in his interactions with his partner and other 
responsibilities as well as the hardware he has available to use (where PC games are 
commonly more ‘involved’ than console games). It seems that in contrast to OA JA feels 
that he is quite comfortable where he is, keeping himself busy with his career which 
satisfies his need for self-improvement, actualization, or fulfilment while at the same 
time having plenty of spare time. In light of the other factors of identification JA feels 
quite comfortable spending these periods of ‘down time’ engaged in play, seeking it as a 
valid leisure activity for someone such as himself, a fulfilled and busy individual. 
Other subjects interviewed in this study have various relationships with the time they 
might spend playing games; such as AB who indicated to me that he felt too busy with 
his studies to spend time playing and PA who initially started playing as a way of 
engaging and spending time sharing an activity with her son.   
While time spent might be viewed as a material investment, there are occasions where 
subjects value the time spent playing and do not see it as a ‘cost’,  while the financial 
cost involved in obtaining a game is difficult to conceive as ever being deemed a 
‘benefit’. None of the subjects interviewed expressed the view that they played in order 
to spend money where they did express the view that they played in order to pass the 
time. So only some costs are culturally relative. 
6.1.4. Social possibilities 
Social possibilities of playing a particular offering are numerous, but depend on the 
potential player’s sense of identification with the game or device. Social possibilities 
range from being a focus for co-located play with friends and family (e.g. CB indicating 
that she mainly uses her Wii when friends are around) to being a ‘must have’ status item 
within a group of peers (e.g. MC indicating that he likes to get games on the day of 
release).  There appear to be several socially motivated factors when obtaining a 
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particular offering: The prospective player could be intending to play the game with 
friends; they might be looking for an opportunity to engage with an online community; 
or there is a possibility that certain players might feel that owning the game or device as 
an object has some kind of social currency within their peer group, and hence need to be 
the first to obtain it. 
6.1.4.1. Negotiation of possibilities for group play 
That players might select games based on the perceived potential for group or 'multi' 
player possibilities is a clear example of socio-cultural identification. An individual who is 
negotiating this factor during selection is implicitly stating, "I am a social person; I have 
friends, thus I would like a game that that I can share with my friends.". This is not 
necessarily to the exclusion of solo play however; rather there may well be an element 
of selecting for social play possibilities in some of an individual’s negotiations. For 
example KA enjoyed Super Monkey Ball (Amusement Vision 2000) and stated that she 
would look for a similar game again. She also stated that she didn’t really engage with 
the main part of the game (a puzzle game involving rolling balls across obstacles), but 
focussed on the mini-games (simple multi-player game elements using similar 
mechanics to the main game). However she still enjoyed games with no specific multi-
player possibilities. 
This type of negotiation then requires the potential player to see that a game has been 
designed with multi-player possibilities. They must also imagine that the gross factors of 
the design would be acceptable to their intended playmates, such that the theme, 
mechanics, control system, difficulty, complexity and so on will not prevent any 
playmates from joining in. The material investments will also be weighed against how 
likely it might be that the correct social conditions will be achieved often enough to 
justify the expense.  The number of supported players may also factor to a lesser 
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degree, in that if a game supports involvement by too few players then it may be 
rejected as being somewhat anti-social. Essentially the selecting individual needs to 
know that the game will be well received by their group of potential playmates; that 
there will be no factors which will put off or alienate this intended group. 
An example of a player negotiating this feature is where a sport fan engages with a 
game partially based on the available possibilities for playing with (against) their peers. 
A football fan (IA for example) may well have an expectation that opportunities will arise 
to challenge their friends, who are similarly engaged by football, to a game or even 
some kind of tournament, and will engage with the game on this premise.  They might 
be fairly confident that the theme might well be well received by their football loving 
friends. These friends might also be expected to understand the complexities of the rules 
and have some skill in playing other, similar games. If there are friends who dislike the 
represented sporting theme, they will not be included in this consideration, but rather 
the selecting player must be fairly confident that a gathering of suitably receptive friends 
might be possible at some point in the future. So the player is negotiating the 
possibilities of a football game with respect to the potential for group play; they are 
negotiating between the offered possibilities and the imagined or expected attitudes of 
potential playmates.  
6.1.4.2. Negotiation of possibilities for online play 
Just as a player might be working out if there will be good opportunities for group play 
with respect to a certain offering, so, in this modern era, they might also be trying to 
work out if there will be good opportunities for online play with others with respect to 
certain offerings. While both somewhat social, negotiating this question is different from 
the question of group play, as while a player seeking a group social experience with 
peers will be concerned with the tastes of those peers and other factors relating to the 
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group dynamic, the player seeking an online gaming experience will be concerned with 
and negotiating the space of such features as the size and type of the ‘online 
community’. While they might be keeping in mind the possibility that they might be able 
to play with friends remotely, this is again different from the considerations that would 
be made when negotiating the possibility for group play in that the player does not need 
to predict, in advance, some physical gathering of receptive peers. Rather they will be 
hoping that opportunities will arise where they are online and playing at the same time 
as their similarly engaged friends. For example AB told me that his brother gave him the 
games and equipment to play online, presumably because he was keen to play with 
someone he knows across the internet, while HA, HB & OB state that the possible online 
community is a factor in their selections for certain games. We can state with confidence 
that online play is a factor for some, and the variables to be negotiated are not the same 
as for co-located group play, but are likely to be more related to the dynamic of the 
online community. I will demonstrate why this is so in a later section which deals with 
negotiating the value of playing online which when viewed in the cycle of select – play – 
reflect will obviously affect future selections.   
6.1.5. Supposed challenge or activity type 
As well as the somewhat obvious negotiations at selection of acceptable themes and 
visual presentation styles, players will be forming an impression of what they will be 
doing to play the game. Games in general present a very broad spectrum of available 
activities to potential players. It might be argued that the 'interactivity' or capacity for 
players to act is what separates games from other media such as cinema, television or 
print. This capacity for action will have potential players determining if the actions 
themselves are aligned to that individual player's sense of identity as they select the 
activity. For example a player who feels that they should be engaged in intellectual 
pursuits (such as BA) will be seeking games with strong puzzle elements: “What attracts 
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me to game play is the problem solving aspects of the game. Hence why I like Resident 
Evil, because very often they present you with puzzles and, you know, problems: In 
order to get through a door in order to get through another door etcetera etcetera. So I 
like things that present problems, and then you have to find a solution around them.”. 
While players who wish to demonstrate their mastery over technology (HA, HB & OB) will 
be looking for skilful competition in some of their selections. This negotiation can work 
both ways, with potential players shying away from offerings involving activities, 
challenges, or challenge structures which they cannot identify with. For example BA does 
not want to invest time obtaining the manual skills in order to play a game and as such 
will avoid games which demand a high degree of hand-eye coordination. This can be 
expressed as the player seeking games that they are likely to be good at such as AA 
who, identifying himself as somewhat 'musical', would seek 'Karaoke' games due to 
identifying with the challenge type. Similarly expressing a failure of identification with an 
offering in general can be expressed as a perception of excessive difficulty, such as GA 
stating that she wouldn't play certain games (in interview with myself and her sister 
JB):. 
GA: Tomb Raider. Hate that. 
JS: Yeah? Why? 
GA: Can’t do it <laughs> 
JS: It’s too hard? 
GA: Yeah 
JB: No you just get to a certain stage on it and it just stops on you. 
GA: I don’t like fighting games... well I like Tekken, but not like machine gun 
stuff... and driving games, because I always crash. 
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Obviously this perception of the available challenges and other active features (the arc of 
the narrative or the ergonomics of the controls say) of play will only truly be resolved 
once play has initiated, which I will explore later in this chapter. There is however a 
factor where player build up expectations. These expectations will be formed from the 
usual sources (reviews, packaging information, supposed genre, discussion with peers 
and other trusted parties, and so on) and modified according to other points of 
identification. This negotiation is not necessarily how difficult, long, or complex the 
challenges or challenge structures might be, but is a negotiation of the very essence of 
the activity itself. A good example of this distinction is where DA, having played Super 
Mario Bros. years ago and rejected gameplay in general as an activity without merit, 
then states that he would be interested in trying out the Nintendo Wii due to the extra 
physical dimension of the control system.  
DA: There’s this game now, I don’t know what you call it, this new game where 
you play squash, a virtual squash where you have to physically move 
JS: Yeah Nintendo Wii? 
DA: Yeah? 
JS: Wii Sports has Tennis and Golf and... 
DA: What do you call it? Nintendo... 
JS: Wii W. I. I. 
DA: OK, Nintendo Wii. I can see why people might be fascinated with that and 
I can see the attraction there, because you need to physically move and 
it’s challenging, but I don’t see why people would find it interesting to sit 
in front of a screen pressing all sorts of keys. 
This quote suggests that the previously available activities offered by home gaming 
systems were not suitably physically active for his sense of being a physically active 
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person. Other players hold a more open attitude to the activity in general, allowing them 
to consider gameplaying as one acceptable leisure pursuit amongst others. Indeed all 
those interviewed who did play games seemed to hold an individual, overall position 
relative to the global concept of 'videogame' playing. Where the individual held gameplay 
as something that someone like themselves might engage in, we are then exploring 
which games and to what extent. Where a subject has wholly rejected the general 
activity (such as in the case of DC who told me that she would never contemplate 
playing a game) we can see that this rejection is a composite of value identifications 
driving them away. That is DC sees games as juvenile while she is an adult, sedentary 
where she is active, and anti-social when she is actively social.  
6.2. Play as negotiation 
Once a player has reached the point of accepting an offering as suitable or agreeable 
(that they are likely to be the kind of person who would play such a game or with such a 
device), they will then be disposed to the possibility of playing it. This engagement as a 
state of disposition is not fixed, in that it is not such that a player who is engaged by the 
idea of playing will then set about playing the game 'fully' (as the designer intended); 
rather it is such that the negotiations between the player's sense of identification, the 
imagined reactions of their social context, and the actual experience of playing the game 
(or with the device) are fully initiated. Initially there is a sense of traversal from wanting 
to play the game to 'actually' or 'really' playing. This phase might be seen as 'giving the 
game a chance' and lacks a clear end, unless the match between expectations and the 
actual experience of play shows that the game dramatically disappoints the player. We 
could say that for every new element that is introduced throughout the playing of a 
game the player will be 'giving it a chance', but this is increasingly subtle with the player 
also having extra investments in play (having spent the time to gain skill, develop 
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characters, engage with the narrative or whatever), rendering the impacts of 'bad' new 
elements less destructive to engagement than they might have been if they had been 
revealed when the player first initiated play. 
We could break the identity negotiations, leading to a sense of net cultural worth, with 
respect to actively engaging with a game through play, into 3 theoretical perspectives: 
Negotiation as the challenging of assumptions and testing expectations; the ongoing 
negotiation of the dynamic quality of gameplay; and the negotiation of worth 
determining continued engagement. 
As with the previous sections of this thesis these perspectives are not distinct, but are 
intended to broadly illustrate the central hypothesis that players engage with a 
videogame offering as a negotiated sense of cultural worth via a summation of personal 
identifications. 
6.2.1. Trying out as negotiation 
This sense of trying a game out or giving a game a chance comes out quite clearly in 
certain parts of the data. That a player is forming an idea about what a game is even 
before they sit down and 'have a go' is central to this part of the thesis. The player 
having zeroed in on an offering that might potentially be the kind of thing that a person 
like themselves would play (with or on) must then find out if the imagined case is borne 
out by reality. Does the game provide the kind of activity they are looking for? Is the 
theme realised in the way they expected? Are the graphics of the type suggested in the 
reviews and advertising materials? Can a sufficient number of players join in and play 
together? Is there a suitable online community the player feels comfortable with? These 
initial interactions will have the player trying to determine if the principal factors of 
engagement identified during selection are as expected or if the difference between the 
presentation of the encountered features and the expected features forces the sum 
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sense of value to become unacceptable. If the resolution of this re-evaluation 
(renegotiation) is that the net sense of worth is no longer acceptable, the game will not 
be 'played in earnest' and will probably be set aside. However the material investments 
already made may have the player persevere. For example, if they spent a great deal of 
time and effort finding and obtaining the game, or if they had spent a relatively 
substantial sum of money on the item, they will be more inclined to see what the game 
has to offer than if they had simply been given the game or had otherwise obtained it for 
very little cost. 
Another example of a 'trying out' variable which may influence how much the player is 
prepared to persevere with a game with as yet unproven value is that proposed by CA 
whereby a game which the player has heard great things about may be given 'more of a 
chance' than a game which has been poorly rated by trusted parties. 
From these 2 examples of factors which influence the player's sense of trying out we 
might say that there are at least two variables dictating the amount of time and 
attention a player will give a game before forming their own opinion of 'goodness' or 
'badness' and these are expectation and investment, both positively correlated to the 
degree to which the player will give the game a chance. 
An example of this type of negotiation was found when experimenting with watching 
players encounter games for the first time (NA interview). Although the data wasn't 
really rich enough to pursue the method further, the simple fact that a player brings 
preconceptions to bear on what the game will be which is also modified by the total 
investment made was enough cause to keep the data from that single trial. NA felt that 
Angels vs Devils (Enigman Software TBA) had a potentially amusing theme, but that 
ultimately the theme was not well realised and the game (which he had little knowledge 
of, other than the title and a brief description, prior to playing) was ultimately dull and 
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uninspired. He stated that having downloaded the game, he would have given the game 
even less time (less of a chance) than he did, but he thought I wanted him to critique it. 
JS: Do you always watch the intro movies? 
NA: No but... 
JS: Only if they’re good? 
NA: I just thought that today I had to do that. I dunno. 
And: 
NA: What I would normally do now is: press escape button and uninstall the 
game 
JS: Do it. 
NA: But... 
JS:  I’m not bothered. Do it. 
NA: Alright, let’s see what happens after that. 
 He had little investment in the game having downloaded it for little cost and had no 
expectation of quality and as such was only going to give it a couple of minutes to prove 
to be an amusing diversion if anything, but persevered in the artificial setting of the 
recorded data collection session. 
At this stage of trying out the player has decided that they are the kind of person who 
would play the game that they hope or imagine the game to be when initiating play, and 
must determine if they are the kind of person who would play the game as it turns out to 
be by actual playing it. As such at this stage the player is evaluating implementations. 
So the player already feels that they are the kind of person who might play a war 
simulation game say (NA and Söldner (Wings Simulations 2004)), but is interested in 
how this is implemented. Does it force you to complete a virtual boot-camp (bad)? Is it 
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fairly realistic (good)? Can you play it multi-player (good)? Do the graphics show off the 
capabilities of my PC (good)? Does it exhibit a number of bugs and glitches (bad)? Can 
the player achieve a level of competence fairly rapidly (good)? If the implementation is 
not 'broken' (suffering from quality issues say) and still resolves to a positive sense of 
worth then it will remain in a state of evaluation, but based on increasingly subtle 
criteria. 
The context of these initial encounters will also influence the player's interpretation. They 
may feel that the game is likely to be something they might enjoy (or not) but change 
their mind when they encounter the game. For example CA felt that Wipeout (Psygnosis 
1995) was potentially a game he might enjoy, but found that it was far too difficult. This 
is likely to be due to the context of the initial encounter, where he was playing with 
friends who had extensive experience playing and would insist on playing at a level 
requiring skill which CA had not acquired.  
CA: It’s alright, but I think it’s one of them games that you’ve got to practice a 
lot to get good at, because I just… 
JS: It’s not that bad actually. 
CA: …smashing into stuff. 
JS: …because the level you start off at is really easy. It’s basically getting used 
to the controls. 
CA: Maybe that’s where I fell down, because I was playing with people that’d 
played it loads. Playing stupidly fast things and stupidly fast tracks. 
An interesting counter effect is where a player encounters an offering almost accidentally 
and finds themselves engaging with it; discovering that their assumptions about the 
experience might not have been accurate and that they are indeed the kind of person 
who might engage with the offering encountered. This can be seen with the two mothers 
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interviewed (PA and MA) whom independently would have been unlikely to have engaged 
as such, but in playing with their sons (in order to spend time in a shared activity, and to 
help him solve a puzzle respectively) they both found that, in this context at least, there 
are features and qualities of certain games that a person such as themselves could 
reasonably engage with.  
In summary the early encounters with an offering have the player evaluating the 
features of the game (in accordance with the hypothesis of seeking a sense of net 
cultural worth), comparing them with expectations, influenced by context and will put a 
degree of effort in the evaluation directly proportionate to the overall expectation and 
amount of investment made.  
6.2.2. Negotiation throughout play 
Once a player has selected an offering and then encountered that offering without being 
'put off' they may be said to have identified it as a game that they would be disposed to 
play; they are now definitely the kind of person who would play that game in that 
context. However many games are not a simple interaction repeated over and over again 
(as games such as Tetris (Soviet Academy of Sciences 1984) might be said to be), but 
often progressively introduce new elements to the player as the player gains skill, 
tokens, or progresses through the story or different challenges and levels. As such for 
many games the player will be constantly evaluating the offering as they go; shifting 
their sense of identification in light of new elements. Even though the terrain of the 
game is shifting, the player must always feel that they are engaged in an activity of 
positive net worth or they will stop playing or will not return to play in future sessions. 
The degree to which they have already formed an identification will influence their 
degree of perseverance, such that offerings with which the player has formed a strong 
personal connection (by developing characters or other 'actors' and objects, engaging 
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with a story, or developing skill) will be much more resilient to problems such as a 
particularly difficult challenge, a bug, a displeasing plot direction, or any other 
unexpected negative experience. This feature of personal investment of identification is 
most apparent when discussing cheating. 
In the discussions about cheating with various subjects, a strong sense of personal 
identification and cultural reflection was revealed. Using cheat codes, hacks and FAQs 
was mainly viewed as negative, robbing the player of a sense of achievement and 
potentially breaking the sense of challenge/reward. Reintroducing the example where JA 
felt that he was unable to enjoy playing Project Gotham Racing (a driving/racing game 
which 'rewards' the player for successfully winning races with new cars and tracks) once 
another party had used a code to unlock all of the available cars:  
JA: Colin McCrea you got the… you can pull nice slides and everything, but 
that’s part of rallying. Instead of having cones, you’ve got a tree and if 
you hit the tree your bumper falls off and your car knacks up a bit, and 
you’ve still got the rest of the day’s stages to go, with a bit of a knacked 
car. Realism in rallying, and that unlockable aspect, where you just start 
off with a few cars and progress through as your skill gets better. I like 
that. 
JS: I was reading somewhere about this unlockable aspect. I think it was in 
some game design thing where there was someone at Codemasters, or 
somewhere, were saying that they’d always get phone calls from people 
going, “It’s got a picture of a ‘blah’ on the back, I want to drive one of 
them.”, and then they have to explain that you have to unlock it, and 
some of ‘em just don’t want it, they just want to play it all now. 
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JA: That gives it a really small shelf life as far as I’m concerned. It’s like with 
Project Gotham I nearly got to the end, well I got over three quarters, and 
then [my girlfriend] says “Oh well if you just do this, you can unlock all 
the cars.” I got massively disinterested in it after that. It’s only recently I 
started picking it up again just for the driving element. 
JS: So what? It was like you already knew what all the goodies were, or you 
hadn’t achieved what you’d set out to achieve or something? It’s like you’d 
cheated to get there. 
JA: Yeah the cheating element was, for me, a bit of a disappointment. 
JS: Why was it disappointing though? Was it because you had everything 
straight away, and you were playing it for curiosity to see what it was, or 
was it because you’d… 
JA: It just basically put in there all the cars. So you just take out the top car, 
the Ferrari F50, and took that round and raced against every other car and 
just massively burnt everything off. I didn’t really look at the cars I didn’t 
have, like the Aston Martin and that TVR and the Porsche GT2. Straight to 
the top car. I didn’t go through those, I didn’t appreciate the cars. Doing it 
properly I got up to the Delphino. I was just off getting the Ferrari F355 
Spyder, that was my next car to get. I know that if I tried it again now 
that I’d be so rusty. The only reason I like playing it now is because I like 
tearing around in a believable setting in a believable car, doing things that 
I’m not allowed to do in that setting. 
He felt that this act of cheating robbed him of his motivation to play; to gain and 
demonstrate his skill at using lesser vehicles in order to receive and subsequently learn 
how to use faster and more exciting vehicles. In that having used the most exciting cars 
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in the game had left him with nothing to aim for. We might relate this motive to Malone's 
(1981) factors of intrinsic motivation; suggesting that JA has been robbed of challenge 
(there are no more prizes to aim for) and no longer has any curiosity about the ultimate 
rewards (having tried out all the best cars). Looking at other motives to cheat however 
suggests that while Malone's three factors (challenge, curiosity, and fantasy) have some 
power, players are still engaged in a negotiation of value through identification with 
various elements of play. Take HA, HB & OB's perspective on cheating and seeking help 
for example. They express the sentiment that they would rather give up on a game if 
they find an insurmountable problem than cheat to overcome it, but would consider that 
to be a personal failure. They consider it a matter of pride that they would play any 
game, they have determined to finish, on the hardest difficulty setting (where one 
exists). The only time they would ever consider ‘cheating’ is when they have finished the 
game and want to see what extra features or 'Easter Eggs' the designers have hidden in 
the game.  
JS: So you won’t cheat using a FAQ or cheat code if you’re stuck on it? You 
would keep plugging away or give up? 
HB: I wouldn’t give up 
OB: No real giving up 
HB: If I wanted to clock it I wouldn’t give up. Like Devil May Cry 4. I played it 
half way and gave up, because the layout was crap. I didn’t like it because 
it was repetitive so I gave up because of that, but it wasn’t hard. Like if 
something’s hard in a game you want to get past it... in the game; if I 
want to clock it anyway. 
So while they might be said to be demonstrating behaviour consistent with Malone's 
factors (engaged by the challenge of the game and then curious about the hidden extras 
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in the game) that HA, HB & OB would abandon a game suggests that even where players 
value challenge above all else it can act as a negative motivator. This suggests that there 
is a super factor, determining how much challenge a player will tolerate, and that that is 
a sense of net cultural value. 'Am I the kind of person who would persist at this game?' 
'Am I the kind of person who is bothered enough about the outcomes of this game to 
spend time gaining enough skill to overcome this challenge?'  
These reflections on challenge and cheating might suggest that we should re-examine 
the common interpretation of Csikszentmihalyi's theoretical concept of Flow (1990), 
where, using the most simple summary, a player might be said to become most highly 
engaged when their abilities are most closely aligned with the challenge or difficulty 
encountered, such that they can only just overcome that challenge. This theory, as so 
summarised, does not explain why one player might be quite content to fail at a 
challenge dozens of times before finally overcoming it while another might give up at 
that challenge after one or two failures. It is my hypothesis that this difference comes 
down to a net sense of value, with the player's identification with the offered challenge 
being a factor alongside their sense of identification with a wealth of other features. 
Indeed some players (OA as an example) shy away from some of the key effects of Flow, 
not wishing to get lost in the experience and lose track of time, feeling that time spent in 
playing is worthless. This also suggests that players are not engaging with a game 
simply in order to Flow, but are engaging for 'higher-order' purposes. Indeed a closer 
reading of Csikszentmihalyi's theory suggests that an individual must find an opportunity 
for 'meaningful' personal advancement or growth before they will accept and strive to 
overcome a challenge. This perspective is closer to my own observations than that an 
individual's skill must closely match the current challenge, which is the aspect of 
Csikszentmihalyi's work which is most commonly quoted in the literature. 
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So just as players seem to sum the factors of a game to a sense of net worth while 
selecting a game to play and then test these assumptions and re-evaluate the sum in 
their early interactions with a game, they can be said to be resolving this sum through a 
process of constant evaluation or negotiation throughout their experience with the game. 
Of the factors which seem to shift over time as a player engages with a game that have 
been encountered in this research I have noted: 
6.2.2.1. The ability to 'put down and pick up again' 
That a game should be easy to 'put down' seems at first to be the opposite of 
engagement, if we imagine that engagement is some compulsion to play. However the 
expression that a game should allow the player to gracefully exit and return to where 
they left off is one that was expressed several times (i.e. JA, KA). 
KA:  Play Super Mario (Sunshine) and Zelda… 
JS:  Yeah. 
KA: Due to the fact that they’re platform games that are easily segmented, so 
you can sort of just do a bit then leave it and go away again. 
And: 
JT: Yeah, it’s like one game where I can dip in and out; another game where 
I’ve got a big long piece of time to play; and the same with the last one. 
In light of the hypothesis of personal identification with the factors of engagement we 
might suppose that this factor may be related to a sense of control; with the player 
feeling that they should determine their own minimum interaction period. A loss of this 
sense of control will discourage the player from playing 'one more level' (or similar) if it 
is apparent that this 'one more level' might take an unacceptable amount of time to 
complete. Similarly JA expressed that he was discouraged from playing a game (Halo 
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(Bungie 2001)) which would require him to re-learn the interaction methods after an 
extended break, discouraging him from 'picking it back up again', while CA felt that 
being forced to perform a single action in order to progress in Final Fantasy VIII  (Square 
1999) was frustrating (along with the relatively long, non-interactive, 'unskippable' 
animations for some quite common actions) as he felt that it was extending the overall 
interaction time for the sake of it. 
It could be that the tempo of play is important to the Flow-like engagement experienced 
by players. A short minimum interaction period encourages 'one more go', so if the 
trials, levels, battles or whatever are short enough, easy enough to access, and fast 
enough to initiate, the player won't be discouraged from that 'one more go' or 'one more 
mission'. If however they are forced to replay large sections of the game because they 
have failed at one knotty problem, wait for extended loading times, or that the next 
'task' will take them a substantial amount of time to complete then they may well be less 
inclined to do so. This idea of tempo will require more extensive research, however I will 
contend that, in general an unnecessarily extended minimum interaction will serve to act 
as a factor with a negative weighting; a militating factor. A player may often feel that 
they are not the kind of person who has the time or patience to wait for the same level 
to load yet again; wait while the same animation plays yet again; or spend a long time 
searching for that next save point so they can put the game down and do something 
else. 
Players seek differently paced experiences at different times and for different contexts 
from killing time (JA) to letting off steam (AC), whether these expectations are met 
might not be due to the minimum interaction period and is more likely to be based on 
the sense of the total interaction period. That is a player, as they play, will be 
determining if the game appears to offer suitable 'depth' to allow them to play for the 
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period they have notionally set aside for the activity.  This perception of what type of 
pacing the game offers will also be negotiated as an identification, in that a player who 
feels that they are the kind of person who would wish to spend an extended amount of 
time playing an involved game (either through the challenge structure or the narrative 
structure) will not be put off by a game that makes increasing demands on their time, 
but may welcome such a progression, whereby a player who sees themselves as one 
who plays games for an occasional, short, refreshing release would be put off by being 
forced to spend more time than they feel they should, and would instead be happy with 
progressions which make greater demands of their skill or other session to session 
demands, rather than long, within session time demands. 
6.2.2.2. Shifting context 
'Doing something else' as mentioned in the previous section could well be enforced by a 
shift in context as the player engages with the offering. While the player might be happy 
to engage at one moment, they might not wish to engage ad infinitum. Not necessarily 
through boredom, but through a change in the immediate context of play. As the ability 
to pick the game up and easily and gracefully exit a session may influence their desire to 
continue playing, sometimes the immediate context might simply no longer be suitable 
for continued play. For example a player who is principally seeking a social experience. 
They may well become engaged while a suitable group of playmates are available and 
engaged, but if that group then become less receptive to play for whatever reason 
(called away by pressing responsibilities or simply boredom say) then the context which 
initially engaged our player no longer exists and the game will no longer engage. This is 
not a fault of the game or device (although it might be argued that a well designed 
offering should pre-empt this possibility in its design and allow this process of 
disengagement to happen gracefully) and a player with a high degree of identification 
and subsequent engagement will be more resistant to such changes in context. Take 
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again the example of JA who in his more socially aware play choices recognises that in 
playing certain games his social context is likely to change (his girlfriend coming home 
from work) which will change the context of play and he would feel less comfortable 
playing a highly engaging game than when he had the television and lounge to himself.  
JT: Yeah, well it depends what mood you’re in, and for me, what environment 
I’m in. I mean, I doubt I could sit here with [my girlfriend], with a PC and 
go, “What I mean, it’s gonna take us a couple of hours to set this 
manoeuvre up, in Ghost Recon, because I’ve got to get this bloke and take 
him all the way round here without getting seen, and then put him here 
and crawl him up to his sniping point, and then we’ve just got to wait for 
the bloke to walk past…” I mean for somebody who likes cartoony 
adventures, that’s just not gonna cut the mustard is it? 
So as he plays he is negotiating the sense of suitable context, and where the contextual 
factors militate against his enjoying the game he will be less inclined to continue playing, 
and he is doing so with a consideration to what he imagines the tastes of his partner 
might be. 
So as a player plays with an offering they are likely to be implicitly asking 'am I the kind 
of person who would continue playing in this context?' as they were asking ' am I the 
kind of person who would play in this context?' as they initiated play. 
6.2.2.3. Developed engagement 
As suggested in the discussion of negotiated tempo and pacing, some players engage 
with a sense of increasing involvement (over simply increasing skill say). We can see this 
development as a player identifying with the overall development of the game elements. 
That is, as the player spends time and energy developing structures within the game 
they can start to personally identify with those structures as their own. A personal 
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investment of this type might come from a number of sources such as the progression of 
a branching narrative, the collection of various types of game tokens (reward points or 
other kinds of 'prize'), the collection of game objects (characters, vehicles, weapons, and 
so on), or even the progressive customisation of in game elements (characters, vehicles 
and so on). As this investment increases over the course of an overall engagement with 
a game, this motivation to continue playing increases in proportion with the investment 
made. CA expresses this need as a need to personalise the experience through 
customisation (changing the names of his characters in role playing games to those of 
his friends), while BA expresses this need as a desire to shop and collect the various 
tokens and objects available in a game: 
BA: The fun part was the aspect of finding the money and buying the goods. 
So it presented a shopping aspect; which was the same feature that you 
found in Ratchet and Clank. So you pick up nuts and bolts and then you go 
shopping, because when you think about it, people love to shop.  
Here BA is partly playing the game to collect a fund of in-game tokens (‘nuts and bolts’) 
that he enjoys exchanging for new in-game assets (‘shopping’). 
This type of progression, and how it can be broken, is evident in the example of JA and 
his desire to make progress through Project Gotham Racing (Bizarre Creations 2001), 
which was subsequently damaged by the act of a 3rd party cheating on his behalf, in that 
he no longer needed to earn the new cars, and thus any sense of achievement or reward 
he was looking forward to was removed. 
The negotiated sense of identification is quite evident here. The more the player is 
allowed to influence the outcome of a game the more the game becomes 'theirs'. Those 
are their WiiMe's on their Wii, that is their garage full of cars, their football team, and 
they have personally brought about the current state of the narrative by their choices. As 
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they are, as I have already argued, the kind of person who would play this kind of game, 
as they influence the game according to their own actions and tastes, they become the 
person who is playing this game rather than merely the kind of person. The game 
becomes ‘theirs’ a reflection of them.  
6.2.2.4. Social Development  
Similar to the effect of developing the sense of becoming the player rather than merely a 
possible player is that a player can develop a sense of social development within certain 
offerings. This is particularly true of online play, where ones presented player persona in 
the online world can become socialised into that world in quite sophisticated ways. While 
it is not the intention of this thesis to explore in any depth the complexities of how this 
socialisation comes about for Online Multi Player Games (especially Massively Multiplayer 
Online Role-Playing Games or MMORPGs), I have already introduced players who have 
become engaged in online communities to some degree. What is interesting for the 
purposes of this present theory is how these social investments (making 'friends' and 
forming teams, parties or clans) act as a means of relating a player's sense of personal 
identity within the context of playing the game. For example DA expresses 
understanding as to why an individual might find the act of engaging in a less solo 
fashion with a game, but states that he would not see himself as the kind of person who 
would find such an experience valuable, preferring to socialise in the real world.  
During a discussion of the kinds of people who play games and whether they 
were the same people who would engage in non-game virtual worlds: 
DA: I think technically minded people might be inclined to do both: like puzzle 
solving/computer games and this virtual reality/Second Life thing. 
Someone perhaps less technically minded, yeah this virtual space, this 
Second Life perhaps I think, but if so I think it might be more of an 
224 
 
ephemeral craze. I can’t really see someone who is a bit more, in inverted 
commas, ‘open minded’ and less technically inclined to spend 8 hours a 
day in a virtual chat room, which is what it is. 
And later during a discussion about what he did like to do with his spare time: 
DA: Socialising. I like being with people. I like talking with people. I like 
conversing with people... engaging with people.  
An example of how such communities can act as both a motivator and a de-motivator is 
expressed by HA, HB & OB. Their experience of becoming deeply involved with certain 
online communities shows that while the development of a skilled team of players is 
appealing for these 'hardcore' gamers, the fact that this may involve real people who 
don't appear and disappear at the flick of a switch, and as such the fun of having an 
available group of well matched online playmates can become tiresome when man 
management of the team becomes increasingly necessary. To their minds they are the 
kinds of people who play games for wholly other reasons than to engage in the trials and 
tribulations of someone else’s life. 
So in terms of negotiating these social factors as a sense of personal engagement, to 
some players the appeal of having a set of trusted and decent playmates is apparent, 
where the facility to play against others online is available. However, some are likely to 
find that they are not the kind of person who wants to micromanage other people in 
terms of competition schedules and training sessions, or that they are not the kind of 
person who wants to spend a large amount of time engaged in activities to support the 
play activity they identify with, and so games with these features detract rather than 
attract. 
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6.2.2.5. Negotiation of Desired Freedom vs Linearity 
Players appear to value both freedom and clear well defined objectives, both in terms of 
the games they select and as a discovered feature of a game as they play. While a player 
might well be playing a game for a number of other explicit factors they may well find 
themselves frustrated by the lack of clear objectives (as predicted by Csikszentmihalyi's 
theory relative to challenges) or they may conversely find themselves frustrated by the 
lack of opportunity to explore and develop one's own path through the game. An 
illustration of this discovery of the relative merits of a linear path through various games 
can be found in the interview with KA: 
JS: Yeah, I get that with Resident Evil. You were talking about story lines as 
well. 
KA: Story line's very planned and very restrictive. 
JS: Yeah, like, "Go down here, talk to this bloke and then..." 
KA: Uh huh 
JS: Yeah... but there's a certain extent of that in Zelda. 
KA: Yeah, but you've got more freedom to, sort of like, bugger off and do other 
bits, and come back again. Where as with Resident Evil, there isn't anything 
to go off and do, then come back. The same with Luigi's Mansion. 
JS: Yeah. What about Jet Set Radio? 
KA: Well you kind of can, you can sort of quit out and go and collect different 
souls', and come back again. It is structured in a way, but you can bog off 
and do other things. 
JS: Yeah. 
KA: Super Monkey Ball's great, because it just gets lots of people involved in 
doing really silly things. It's really easy to give [younger relative] for her to 
just mess around with. It's not even... it's not very complicated. 
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JS: Well have you played the single player missions up to the really hard ones? 
KA: <laughs> I can't get past the easy ones, let alone the really hard ones. We 
need to get Super Monkey Ball 2. 
JS: What for the... just for the extra mini games? 
KA: Yeah. 
JS: You think Monkey Ball's more about the mini games than about the actual 
central game? 
KA: Yeah, because the central game is pretty repetitive and boring, with... you 
know, you do it a few times and you master it and it's done, where as the 
mini game you can actually, sort of, play lots of players and... party type 
thing going on. 
 
The above exchange clearly illustrates the negotiation of linearity vs freedom performed 
by KA in her recent gaming experiences, in that she is interested in playing games with 
clear objectives, but is frustrated by too much restriction. Being able to 'bugger off and 
do other bits' is important to her where a game like Super Monkey Ball, which is 
presented as a linear series of increasingly difficult challenges supported by some 'mini-
games' which use similar mechanics, is frustratingly linear or repetitive. Obviously the 
above transcript touches on a wealth of other categories mentioned elsewhere in this 
thesis, but that KA has approached, identified with, and engaged in playing only certain 
aspects of certain offerings does suggest that she may well have not pre-empted the 
degree of game linearity, and rather this feature of play was discovered and negotiated 
into being seen as a salient factor with a negative weight.  
Conversely another conversation with a similarly aged female gamer suggests that some 
players discover that excessive freedom can frustrate as much as too little freedom. JC 
expressed that she found games with excessive 'wandering about' to be boring, and that 
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clear, well defined objectives were essential for her ultimate enjoyment of a game. She 
may obtain and set out to play a game only to discover that she is required to explore 
the game world in order to find objectives which is frustrating. Her preferred game style 
is that of the 'standard' First Person Shooter (FPS), where she is given a mission 
objective, and must use her skill to complete that objective before moving to the next 
objective or level. She stated that her experience of 'western style' Role Playing Games 
(RPGs) is that she gets bogged down in doing 'side quests' (objectives which do not 
advance the central narrative) and looses track of, and interest in, the main thread of the 
story. 
As KA's preference is balanced and JC's preference is for direct objectives, MC uses his 
desire for a degree of freedom to differentiate between two games within the same 
franchise (Need for Speed: Most Wanted (EA Black Box 2005) over Need for Speed: 
Carbon (EA Black Box 2007)); where he told me that he did not like Carbon as much as 
other games in the series as it lacked elements of free roaming, police chases, and car 
modifying relative to say Most Wanted.  
Exactly how one might explain this relative desire for freedom as a negotiation of self-
sense is not clear, but there is certainly an expressed general preference for a relative 
degree of freedom which players discover and resolve as either pleasurable or 
frustrating, just as they might negotiate other discovered features as they play. It might 
be possible to elaborate this preference and come to the conclusion that some users see 
themselves as non-conformist or creative in some way while others see themselves as 
skilful and up for a challenge perhaps, but this degree of elaboration would be against 
the spirit of this research. I can state that negotiation on this factor is similar to other 
negotiated factors and is likely to be resolved in a similar way. 
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6.2.2.6. Negotiation of factors resulting in shifting focus. 
It is likely that as players move from the negotiated factors of selection to factors 
associated with play there is a shift of emphasis away from surface factors (thematic, 
graphics and such) toward ludic factors (game mechanic, challenge and such). That is 
players might find that they feel that they are the kind of person who would play a game 
with a particular graphical style say, and as they play the game become less concerned 
with the particular graphical style and more concerned with the actualities of playing the 
game; meeting the challenges or progressing through the story for example. 
KA demonstrates an instance of this, in that she states a selection preference factor for 
games with a cartoon like graphical presentation, but then in describing her experiences 
of playing through certain games she describes features relating to the challenge 
structures. This suggests that for her the graphical style is a reason to initiate play, but 
in order to maintain engagement she requires that a game grant her a degree of 
freedom in the challenges offered. With more experienced players the shift from 
identifying with attractors to negotiating the active pleasures of playing may be more 
subtle, due to their increased experience of having played more games and their 
enhanced research into what play experience to expect, but is likely to be present. For 
example HA, HB & OB talk of seeking cutting-edge technology in their selections, but 
then of defeating challenges and engaging with the community of players for games that 
they are trying to 'beat' or become skilled at. The attraction will still remain, and any 
shift within the game which denies the player features which they initiated play for in the 
first place or vice versa will have the player re-evaluate the game based on the feature, 
but in light of the new sense they have of the value of the game based on their 
experience with actually playing the game (and the attendant investments made; as 
discussed above). This might explain in part DB's attitude toward Final Fantasy VII, in 
that while multiple graphical styles are used, and while he was engaging with the 
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challenges presented, he realised that the graphical style which was most prevalent in 
the game was the 'babyish' super-deformed style, which he couldn't identify with, 
dragging him back away from the challenges to evaluate why he had initiated play in the 
first place. In his book exploring 'casual' games Juul (2010) suggests that these surface 
features or 'narrative' elements are those which the user engages with first. I suggest 
that these are factors which may have greatest influence early on, but are part of the 
overall evaluation of factors both at selection and during play. 
A strong indication of this shift of emphasis is where mothers engage in play with their 
offspring. The two mothers interviewed initiated play primarily to engage with their sons, 
but found that having done so they were engaged by the sophistication of the challenges 
offered, shifting their emphases from “I am the kind of mother who engages with things 
their son loves” to “I am the kind of person who is clever and dexterous enough to 
overcome these sophisticated challenges.”   
6.2.2.7. By Session vs Session to Session 
There appear to be two types or phases of negotiation during play. Ask a game player 
what they are playing right now and, even in the absence of their actually, physically 
interacting with a game at that precise moment in time, some answer is likely.  This is 
due to the sense that they might be 'in the process' of playing a game or several games. 
They have not rejected the offerings and intend to return to them at some point in the 
near future. We might say that the player is then 'between sessions' as opposed to 
negotiating the merits of continuing to play within one session. This latter phase being 
where a player sits (usually) down to play a game and does so until some combination of 
factors has them put the game aside either permanently or temporarily. 
The letter of these two types of negotiation could quite easily be considered in light of 
the basic version of Csikszentmihalyi's Flow theory, with the player engaged in meeting 
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challenges or otherwise making progress, stopping when the activity becomes untenable. 
For example JA playing Diablo II (Blizard North 2000) until too fatigued to continue. 
The former negotiation, where a player has decided an offering is something that they 
could be said to be playing even when they are not actually doing so has less to do with 
the common reading of Flow theory and has more to do with both what a player is 
prepared to admit to playing and what a player has found to be agreeable. The sense 
that they might be looking forward to the next opportunity to play, to make progress, is 
consistent with a more close reading of Flow theory, but I contend that the player has 
negotiated a sense of value with respect to that particular offering such that they are in 
a state of self-sense compatible or culturally acceptable engagement, rather than a 
sense that the player has found the 'meaning' (Csikszentmihalyi's usage approximating 
to 'personal significance') of the activity in a general sense by virtue of it being simply 
intrinsically motivating by producing a state of Flow in the player. This state of being 
engaged by a game while not actually playing the game can be viewed as a type of 
reflection, where the player might be wondering about the merits of a game, or specific 
solutions to challenges or potential plot directions even when they are not actively 
playing. If this reflection results in the player determining that the outcomes would not 
be worth the effort of returning to the offering they might not return despite being highly 
engaged as they played in previous sessions. This effect can be seen in the stated 
behaviour of OA who knows he might well become highly engaged by certain games, but 
finds this (we might say Flow-like) sensation pointless. He ultimately derives no pleasure 
from videogames as an activity in their own right, and will avoid 'wasting his time' on 
them when he could be engaged in activities he has determined have a greater net 
cultural value. We could say then that OA has on occasion found value in the moment, 
he will rise to the challenges offered by certain games, but ultimately finds the 
experience wasteful.  
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OA: Well you’re kind of consuming, you’re not erm... like you’re consuming 
when you’re watching a film. It is kind of down time... and you’re not 
creating anything yourself by just playing it. It might give you stimulation 
like anything else, to give you ideas towards doing something else, but 
you can also feel quite lazy and just sit there for hours not doing anything 
apart from playing the games... and once you you’ve worked out how a 
game engine works and the types of puzzles it’s going to throw at you, 
you’re not really pushing yourself in more than one direction. 
And later: 
OA: ...and there is that aspect that I feel... it’s not whilst you’re playing that 
you feel that you’re wasting your time, it’s when you discover how much 
time you’ve spent playing something... and it has been quite enjoyable, 
but then you think “Oh I could have done something worthwhile today.” 
Other players relate how they are sometimes keen to get back to a particular game and 
will look forward to finding out what the game has to offer when next they play. 
The difference between these two types of negotiation are subtle, but we might say that 
as a player is actively engaged in 'hands-on' play they are implicitly asking themselves 
questions such as “Am I up to this challenge?” “Is this next bit going to be as good as I 
might expect it to be?” while when they are not actively playing they are asking “Was 
that last session 'worthwhile'?”, “Based on the experiences I have had, will I find value in 
future play sessions?”. The latter of these negotiations is essentially a local reflection on 
past experiences. Local rather than global, as we are interested only in reflections about 
the offering just experienced rather than a general reflection about broader offerings and 
implications. This act of more global reflection is discussed in the section below. 
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In the sense that players can be notionally playing a game, it is apparent that players 
can be notionally playing many games at once, and will return to a game dependant on 
context and the degree of engagement they have with the game. So a player can hold 
multiple negotiated positions at once. Some players such as KA have stated that they 
will get engaged by a single offering above others and will feel drawn to 'complete' it (in 
KA's words she must “rush through”). This suggests that she has negotiated a sense of 
value for one offering which is much greater than that of others that she might be 
currently playing. Others (particularly JA) suggest that the context of play will determine 
which game they will choose to return to, which suggests that the negotiation of context 
is a strong factor in the negotiation of relative value between games which are currently 
being played; in his case 'involved' games are valued when bored at work and 'light' 
games are valued when at home with his girlfriend. 
6.3. Reflection as negotiation 
The above discussion of the negotiations which occur during 'hands-on' play and 
between individual play sessions leads neatly into the last phase in the interaction loop 
to be covered. While players are conducting fairly complex cultural negotiations as they 
select and play with games, past interactions will shape their value judgements and feed 
back into these negotiations. 
Obviously as most of the data which informed this thesis is interview data this thesis 
puts forward a theory based on the reflections of game potential players. What is 
important to the theory as developed is that these reflections do provide us with some 
insight into user behaviour. Though it is known that people might often express an 
attitude contrary to their behaviour (LaPiere 1934) using methodologies such as CGT 
which essentially build up a composite of opinions from multiple sources on multiple 
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subjects to derive a general theory about the attitudes of subjects helps to mitigate this 
effect. 
What is apparent from the data (including general observations) is that there are two 
types of reflection, implicit or tacit reflection and explicitly expressed reflection. So there 
are times when an individual appears to be forming an opinion that can only be based on 
their past experiences and there are times when individuals' experiences with various 
offerings can be heard being openly discussed respectively. 
The act of tacit reflection is difficult to demonstrate other than in the player, when 
quizzed, relating their preference (or dislike) of new propositions to past experiences, 
but struggling to put their finger on why they have this value position other than in 
relation to those same past experiences.  It is when a user tries to relate the qualities of 
an offering to others that the reflective player must make value judgements as to what 
factors to highlight and espouse or reject. These judgements will be contingent on the 
audience (including the self), and this is a key part of the cultural negotiation. Using 
Cooley's Looking Glass Self again, we would assume that in relating the qualities of an 
offering to others, the conversation will be shaped by the reflective player's sense of how 
this conversation is likely to proceed, who the audience is and how the player imagines 
his views might be received by this audience. This social effect can be seen in some 
parts of the data where my own position is polled by subjects rather than them simply 
launching into a exposition of their own attitudes and opinions about their experiences. I 
was a stranger to about half of the individuals interviewed and so when an individual is 
explicitly stating a preference we must assume that it is socially biased by the audience 
of that opinion; friend, acquaintance, or stranger.  
That is not to say that a theory based on socially shaped attitudes is worthless. For 
example the disdain expressed by HA, HB & OB towards the Wii is a good example of 
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social factors influencing the culture of a small group, shaping their opinions and 
influencing their behaviour to some extent (if we assume that they are not lying when 
they say that they haven't used their Wii much recently). They state that it is for casual 
gamers and families, people who 'don't really play games'; they also criticise it for the 
lack of precision in the control system; and they raise the advertising campaign as 
'evidence' of their points. The advertising campaign for the Wii console and the games 
available for it has been carefully constructed on behalf of Nintendo to focus as on the 
players of the games as much as the games themselves'; showing individuals who might 
be seen as stereotypical 'non-gamers' (middle aged people, whole families, women and 
so on) having fun interacting with the game and each other. With this campaign the 
intention seems to be to state “These are the kind of people who would play this game. 
These people are like you.”, which seems to have been somewhat successful in general 
(based on reports of sales figures). However HA, HB & OB have taken the opposite 
message to that intended by the advertising campaign (that of inclusion) to read the 
advertisements as stating “This is not a product for 'hardcore' gamers such as you.” and 
as such have drifted away from the console and the games available for it in general. A 
brief conversation with HC shows that the advertising campaign is apparently having the 
desired effect on some people, in that she told me that the Wii as an offering is “More 
inclusive”, presumably unaware that the Wii supports a similar number of simultaneous 
players to other contemporary consoles which also have a various simple multiplayer 
games, and that the motion control style wand employed as an input method might be 
said to less physically ‘inclusive’ when compared with the camera based, whole body 
object detection system available for one of the other competing games consoles (Xbox 
360 Kinect).  
This effect of advertising on an individual's (or indeed a group's) reflections regarding 
the relative merits of various gaming offerings could be said to be a type of rhetoric 
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(Walz 2003), with the creators of the games and marketing campaigns arguing for 
attention from the gaming audience. However the degree of penetration of advertising to 
the gaming audience is not clear. In fact the reflections of games players barely touch on 
advertising as a factor in their opinion forming, other than in the instances already 
discussed. 
Another feature of the reflections of players is that game play is a personal activity. Much 
of the discussion of games uses first person pronouns, which is interesting when one 
considers technical literature on videogame design (Saltzman 2000) suggesting that the 
designer must focus on character and story as initial design considerations. Likewise 
talks by such luminaries of the industry such as Ian Livingstone stress that character and 
characterisation are key points of engagement for users. Rather it seems that in 
reflecting on their past experiences players are more likely to be concerned with what 
they did rather than 'who they did it with' in terms of playable characters. While a 
character can form part of the theme and hence be part of the selection and initial 
engagement negotiations (e.g. IA telling me that in terms of football games he looks for 
accurate depictions of teams and players) players will be engaged as they play by the 
ludic structures of the game as well as the characters. The player is the actor in the 
game, and the character and story will act to frame the player’s actions, but not the 
actor performing the actions. So a player will not state that they are displeased with 
Solid Snake's apparent disregard for human life, but they might state (as BA) that they 
do not, personally, like killing people in games. So a player is negotiating a game such 
that they are the principal actor. “Were the things I did in this game acceptable for me?” 
rather than “Were the things the character I was controlling acceptable for them.”. This 
first person nature of the negotiated reflections is most apparent for games which have 
no discernible characters or story, and is also telling where a game has multiple 
characters under a player’s control. In this latter case the player talks about what they 
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did (such as JA deploying his troops) not what their units, tokens, players, or team 
members did. So in terms of reflection a player might well be reflecting on their personal 
first person (I killed the enemies or I scored a goal) experience rather than a purely 
impersonal third person experience (Solid Snake killed the enemies or David Beckham 
scored a goal). This first person form of reflection suggests that games are experienced 
in a wholly different way compared to films or books, and that the player’s actions form 
the core of the experience and the main extent of their reflections. Some players might 
be comfortable personally assuming roles with morals distinct from their own (stealing 
cars and murdering rivals are fine in the context of playing the role of Tommy Vercetti in 
the shady world of Grand Theft Auto: Vice City (Rockstar North 2002) say), but not for 
others (sneaking up on enemies and snapping their necks to help Solid Snake uncover a 
global military conspiracy in Metal Gear Solid (Konami Computer Entertainment Japan 1998) is 
just unacceptable for some). Whether those who shy away from morally grey actions 
only do so in their game playing and not necessarily in the films and television shows 
they enjoy is impossible to say in this research, but it seems that even if the characters 
and context of the game are morally grey or satirical the fact that they are the ones 
being asked to kill or steal results in personal reflections of action.       
Essentially then a player will remember obvious positives and negatives from the games 
they have played in the past. They will implicitly reflect on the relative value of these 
experiences, and will feed that knowledge forward into their selections of future 
experiences. These reflections can be modulated by influences outside the general 
experience of play, resulting in the player re-evaluating their imputed value structures in 
light of cultural evidence. This last point can be further illustrated beyond the effect of 
advertising with players explicitly negotiating with each other the merits of offerings. For 
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example my own conversation with CA (a close friend) where the formal norms of 
interview break down and I try and convince him to revisit Wipeout: 
JS: The difficulty level thing though… 
CA: Yeah. 
JS: Wipeout. 
CA: I didn’t really get into that. 
JS: No? 
CA: Nah. I did a little bit, when [a friend] got it, but… 
JS: [something about having been into Wipeout for the Playstation] 
CA: It’s alright, but I think it’s one of them games that you’ve got to 
practice a lot to get  good at, because I just… 
JS: It’s not that bad actually. 
CA: …smashing into stuff. 
JS: …because the level you start off at is really easy. It’s basically 
getting used to the controls. 
CA: Maybe that’s where I fell down, because I was playing with people 
that’d played it loads. Playing stupidly fast things and  stupidly 
fast tracks. 
JS: It’s impossible. 
CA: Just smashing from side to side which is not… 
JS: It’s like playing tennis against Tim Henman, you’re just gonna lose 
until you get pissed off and put it down. I’m sure if you showed me 
Toejam, if you showed me one of the later levels I’d be like, “This is 
rubbish. It’s pointless!” 
CA: Yeah. 
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Read as a conversation between two friends, discussing the relative merits of various 
games we can see that there is a reflective interpersonal negotiation. This negotiation is 
likely to then have an effect on future game selections and interactions in that if a close 
friend says that one would be the kind of person who would engage with (and 'enjoy') an 
offering, as long as I keep in mind this new and alternative reading of the merits of the 
offering, then I might be. 
Another interesting example of reflections about past experiences resulting in a 
negotiated position is the implicit negotiation of DA, who after having completed Super 
Mario Land (Nintendo 1989) on the Gameboy over a period of time, came to the 
conclusion that playing games was of no value. How he came to select the activity as 
having possible cultural value is not known, but that he decided, having done so, that he 
felt that it was not a worthwhile activity is strongly stated in his interview. 
DA: Oh, you know whenthe first Nintendos came out... Super Mario was it? 
Again, I did used to play that. I actually quite enjoyed it when it first 
came... because my cousin had a Gameboy... again, my cousin, ten years 
later... he had a Gameboy yeah the Gameboy thing... I actually quite 
enjoyed it... again for about a week – two weeks – three weeks – 
something like that... just thought “Right this is boring. Wasted way too 
much time. Got to do something else a bit more productive.” 
Presumably he was engaged by the act of playing at the time, and the exact social 
conditions and explicit negotiations he has had subsequently are not clear, however I can 
state that this experience and his subsequent reflections on that experience have 
resulted in his assuming a position which can broadly be described as “I am not the kind 
of person who spends his time engaging in these activities.”. Comparing this experience 
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with other experiences he has concluded that he finds much greater value in other 
activities. 
So players reflect on what their past experiences of personally playing a game or games 
have been, and weigh up whether to go back and play again. Some players have 
resolved that there is no value in going back, while others have not and will return to a 
game or games in general with the sense that they are the kind of person who would 
play or continue to play.   
6.4. Summary of key theoretical categories introduced in 
this section 
1. Total value, as a sum of identifications, is negotiated 
throughout the process of engagement  
2. Such negotiations can be noted in selecting (such as 
when the prospective player is exploring possible 
features, the potential for group play, the potential for 
online play, or proposed challenge types), playing (such 
as when the player is trying a game out, actively plays a 
game for a while, exploring the ability to quit and rejoin 
the game gracefully, is subject to a changing context, 
develops investment in the game, develops social 
structures within or about the game, finds the degree of 
linearity in a game, shifts from engaging with stylistic to 
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ludic features, and is considering multiple sessions of 
the game), and reflecting on past videogame play 
experiences. 
3. This constantly negotiated sum of value judgements 
drives an individual's engagement with and videogame 
offering 
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7. Summary of theory 
The three preceding chapters represent three primary hypotheses: 
Sub hypothesis 1: In engaging with a videogame offering a player is finding a 
sense of net cultural worth, via personal identification. 
Where cultural value may be expressed as the degree to which the individual feels they 
are “the kind of person who would engage in this activity?” in a similar way to Cooley's 
'Looking Glass Self' 
Sub hypothesis 2: A player's engagement with any videogame offering starts 
before they actively play it and continues into reflections about it after they 
have played it. 
Core hypothesis: A player's sense of net cultural worth of any videogame 
offering is a negotiated state which varies over the course of their engagement. 
Where obviously the Core theoretical category or hypothesis is a composite of the the 
two major contributing hypotheses (which are in turn composites of a wealth of other 
theoretical ideas and hypotheses). 
This last core hypothesis is the ultimate aim of the CGT process. This hypothesis, and 
the contributing sub-hypotheses, can be said to be 'grounded' in that they have been 
semi-inductively derived from data from the domain of study. That is they are not 
selected and then subsequently validated against domain data as in an experimental 
methodology, where hypotheses are derived theoretically and then validated through 
testing against domain data. Rather the hypotheses derived from a Grounded Theory 
methodology are constantly data and theory triangulated and could thus be said to be 
'validated' as they are derived. Thus we can say that these hypotheses have shown their 
utility in accounting for the primary concerns of game players, but have been derived in 
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a manner contrary to traditional, validative methodologies. That is the data driven 
method of derivation provides some confidence that null-hypotheses derived from those 
presented above will be unsupported by data. 
So null-hypotheses of: 
Null Sub-hypothesis 1: In engaging with a game, the major effect of that engagement is 
not due to the prospective player's sense of net cultural value via personal identification, 
but is rather due to some other effect other than net identifications. 
Null Sub-hypothesis 2: A players engagement with a videogame offering is not influence 
by their formed opinions before play or their reflections after play, but is only formed 
during play with no reference to extra-game context or factors, remaining stable over 
the course of an interaction. 
Null core hypothesis: A player's engagement with a videogaming offering is not primarily 
due to their negotiation of the factors of engagement over time, especially where that 
negotiation relates to that player's sense of cultural value in play formed as a summation 
of their identifications with salient features of the offering in question. 
Evidently these hypotheses are a little too complex, containing too many clauses, for 
experimental validation. So any such attempt at reverse validation would require a 
degree of decomposition back to the expression of sub-sub-hypotheses of the order of 
easily predicated statements. These statements can be found in the theoretical chapter 
summaries. It was in constantly comparing (or triangulating) data and theoretical ideas, 
that lead to the development of these atomic statements or hypotheses which in turn 
lead to the higher order theoretical categories or hypotheses presented in this section. 
Due to the data driven nature of the method by which these atomic hypotheses were 
derived, no further attempt at validation is intended or desired. 
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However we should not preclude any possibility that these hypotheses could not be 
modified. If novel data, which was not recognised, thus not sought and included in the 
performance of the methodology, were to be identified, then it could be compared to the 
existing corpus of data and might potentially result in a modification of any of the 
hypotheses presented here. 
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Section C: Summaries and conclusions 
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8. An open account of the implementation of CGT 
The following chapter is presented with the purpose of serving two functions. 
The first function is to provide information about both my understanding of the CGT 
methodology and precisely how I achieved the results presented in this thesis (over and 
above the idealised process presented in the methodology section). With this information 
I hope that the reader can gain a detailed insight into the work performed and thus have 
an enhanced ability to evaluate the theoretical results. 
The second function is to act as a guide to any reader interested in using CGT in their 
own research. The lessons learned in the production of this thesis were hard won over a 
number of years, and an open exposition of the procedures I employed and the lessons I 
learned may well help a new user of the methodology. Hopefully acting as a useful 
supplement to both the literature detailing the methodology itself and the literature 
containing the results of having applied CGT (but with little practical explanation of the 
practicalities of that application). 
The first subsections of the chapter tell the story of how this research programme 
progressed. Explaining what practical decisions I made and what I actually did. From this 
account I hope that the reader will be able to evaluate the nature of the resulting theory 
while also gaining insights about what a CGT based research programme might consist 
of. The later chapters set out lessons learned from this process in terms of commonly 
misunderstood elements and how I have interpreted them, and possible difficulties a 
junior (specifically a Ph.D. student) researcher might face in following all the advice set 
out by Glaser. 
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8.1. Early phases 
The selection of GT as a methodology was based purely on the received notion that the 
direction of the research should be generative and free from 'grand' theory (where such 
theories might exist). These promised features were attractive as I felt that there was no 
sufficiently 'complete' theory which really explained what was going on when players 
engaged with computer and video games. 
At an early stage in the research process I had developed a potentially spurious research 
question. My understanding now allows me to suggest that in attempting to pin down my 
research in this way I was clearly influenced by the work of Strauss and Corbin (1998). 
This influence is quite understandable as my primary source on the methodology up to 
that point had been  “Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techniques”; which is commonly available, and being co-authored by one of the 
originators of the methodology and seemingly a good 'cook book' for the practical 
application of GT. It is probably the most commonly referenced book on the subject. 
So in taking a summary view of Strauss and Corbin and an interpretation of the 
academic requirement for (at least tentative) validation of results and accountability, I 
began by applying the following procedures: 
 Perform an extensive open interview with a known games player (recorded to 
MiniDisc)  
 Transcribe the entirety of the interview, in longhand, to a transcript book 
 'Code' by noting conceptual ideas for each sentence or phrase in the margin of 
the transcript book 
 'memo' by noting similarities between codes and possible logical sampling 
dimensions in a separate book of memos. 
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This cycle was repeated a number of times until it became apparent that the mass of 
different conceptual 'codes' and theoretical memos being developed produced an 
extensive paper trail which had the potential to quickly become difficult to manage. 
 
8.2. Computerisation 
In order to keep track of these codes and memos as the project went on I set about 
looking for a suitable piece of software with which to manage my research. 
Atlas.ti (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development GmbH 1993) seemed to suit my needs 
best, as being designed with a conception of GT in mind it allowed me to tag data with 
codes and codes in turn with memos.  
I then set about transferring my project into Atlas.ti. This transfer resulted in a 
rationalisation and remodelling of the codes and memos as they stood.  
From here the remaining endeavour seemed straightforward: I would record interviews, 
transcribe them into a text editor, encode them line by line in Atlas and create memos 
about the codes and other logical ideas as they seemed pertinent. I would stop when the 
concepts being encoded were no longer new. These 'saturated' codes would then be 
categorised and structured into a network of concepts, or some other rational structure, 
which would then be my theory. 
8.3. Discussing the approach at conference 
It was when I presented this conception at a European conference that two excellent 
questions were asked. The first question related to my definition of “theory”. The second 
asked if I had identified a core category. My inability to answer either of these questions 
confidently had me rethink my approach and return to the literature on the methodology. 
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It was during this re-examination of the GT literature that I discovered the extent of the 
schism between Glaser and Strauss in terms of the fundamentals of the endeavour of 
generating a Grounded Theory. Key to this discovery and most instrumental in the later 
reframing of the project was my acquisition of Glasers' books Theoretical Sensitivity 
(1978) and Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (1992)(both published by Glaser himself 
via his Sociology Press). The latter of these two books has Glaser critique Strauss and 
Corbin chapter by chapter, arguing at each step that Strauss (he dismisses Corbin's 
contribution) had failed to grasp what was intended by their early joint work (1967) and 
that Basics of Qualitative Research did not describe a Grounded Theory approach at all. 
Whatever the details of this disagreement, and while Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis 
is laboured, bitter and at times evangelical, Glaser's critique of Strauss and Corbin 
highlighted pitfalls which I myself was starting to stumble into. Principally amongst these 
pitfalls was that the approach I had been taking up to that point was what Glaser terms 
“complete conceptual description”; an infinite concept naming endeavour. What I should 
be aiming for, and what was implied in the conference question relating to what my 
product should be, was a 'theory'. That is I should be trying to trying to develop a 
hypothesis which, as far as the data shows, explains or accounts for the majority of the 
variability in the domain; the 'core category'. This core category seemed a much more 
satisfactory target than some nebulous network of an infinite set of codes. 
With this new target in mind I set about restructuring the project in Atlas to account for 
the need to develop strong categories of observations. By printing off all of the individual 
codes and physically clustering them into categories before renaming each in Atlas as a 
named property and associating each property into a greater code labelled as a category. 
By restructuring in this way I hoped to achieve a more categorical understanding of my 
data, more closely aligned with the focus on categories my refreshed understanding of 
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the methodology. Essentially I had taken my Straussian codes (as salient concepts) and 
categorised them resulting in a hybrid project neither completely Glasarian nor 
completely Struassian.  
8.4. Speeding up 
Once the project had been restructured by the sorting of conceptual codes I resolved to 
speed up the iterations. Part of this attempt at streamlining the project involved me 
recognising the new focus of CGT on comparative categories no longer noting 
'interesting' concepts in the data, but only noting interesting new categories or new 
properties of existing categories (a much more Glasarian method of coding), which 
drastically reduces the the total number of codes. Another major departure from my 
previous methods was to eschew full transcripts and code directly from the data sources. 
That is I was using the facility available in Atlas to code from sources other than text. So 
I was recording interviews, converting the recording into a format compatible to Atlas.ti, 
loading the audio file into Atlas and coding by tagging sections of the audio with category 
or property codes. 
As I performed a number of iterations in this way my memo creation activities were 
primarily concerned with the relationships between derived codes (as Glaser would term 
them 'Theoretical Codes') as well as occasional abstract theoretical ideas about how the 
whole project might be described. 
As I sought further guidance from the Glaser's writing about the methodology I realised 
that this line by line analysis of raw data was too slow to enable me to create and 
analyse a broad spectrum of interesting comparisons in a reasonable time frame. So the 
coding became even more streamlined, tagging whole sections of dialogue with 
comparative codes, rather than just single utterances ro short exchanges. 
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8.5. Switch to field notes 
As I gradually streamlined my procedures I began to see the merits in Glaser's 
preference for field notes rather than recorded interviews and observations. In taking 
field notes the researcher has already done a first conceptualisation; capturing the 'gist' 
of what the data collection iteration was about and what the subjects' concerns were. So 
the process is much quicker: field notes require very little preparation compared to any 
recording method (grabbing a pen and some paper to note down what someone just said 
or what was just witnessed rather than carrying around recording equipment and then 
obtaining the subjects permission to record their words and actions); field notes are 
mainly summaries of what was discussed and what the subject expressed and so are 
potentially shorter in number of words and easier to manipulate; and they are already 
textual in form making them easier to search and manipulate. 
In essence field notes do the job of line by line conceptual analysis of raw data that is 
suggested by Strauss. Rather than picking through data to elicit concepts for further 
analysis the researcher explores the first order concepts with the subject and writes 
them down along with interesting individual positions, concerns and quotes. 
This decision was not taken lightly. Having never used them before I was not confident 
about what should be included a field note. I was nervous that I might not capture 
enough of what was being discussed in an interview when compared to raw interview 
data. I was also aware that 'scrawls' in a notebook jotted down during or after an 
interview or observation are less easy to justify as 'evidence' later when compared to 
accurate recordings of proceedings. However, as noted below, as I began to saturate a 
reasonably narrow set of concepts these concerns were less problematic than at the 
beginning of the project where the concern of the data collection and coding was much 
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broader. Thus the benefit of the speed and efficiency of field notes outweighed the 
concerns.  
As this realisation about the merits of field noting dawned I also realised that I had a 
candidate core category, and in moving to field notes I could more rapidly focus on this 
category in further iterations as I guided interviews to cover this concept more than 
others in order to achieve saturation. This went hand in hand with a stronger realisation 
that the categories discussed in the literature were codes. Rather than codes being 
conceptual descriptions of data they were interesting groupings of concepts. As field 
noting has done much of the conceptual analysis there is no need to invent a conceptual 
meaning for everything the subject says, instead the researcher is noting points of 
comparison within the concepts present in the field notes. Coding is not the marking of 
concepts, coding is the comparing of field noted ideas to develop categories of ideas. 
8.6. Final Coding Iterations 
As I interviewed subjects and created field notes, with the intention of saturating the 
core category, further advice from Glaser become pertinent and started to make real 
sense. Key amongst these ideas was the concept of the 'interchangeability of indicators' 
where saturating the properties of a category yields properties which are not distinct 
enough to be analytically interesting. One could quite happily swap any of the properties 
and still not modify the analysis. Saturation then is not to find every case that proves the 
concept, but to generate interesting conceptual categories supported by enough 
indicators or properties to be theoretically interesting. Categorical concepts are key, the 
indicating properties are investigated to determine if new categories are possible.   
Saturation then becomes a saturation of ideas, as indicated by the memos collected, not 
saturation of concepts as indicated by the codes. This focus is again an example of 
focusing on features which are theoretically interesting, and while an attempt is made to 
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saturate categories such that categories are no longer being noted and a single super-
category which accounts for as many of the other categories as possible is discovered, 
finding properties of these categories which do not themselves yield other theoretically 
interesting categories is not the aim of saturation. 
With this conception of saturation realised I quickly found that I was developing no new 
categories, only new properties of existing categories, and while I didn't yet fully 
understand the extent of the requirement to memo fully, I felt that I had achieved some 
level of saturation in the project. 
8.7. Sorting 
When I felt I had achieved a good degree of saturation of the category of personal 
identification, which at the time I had identified as the (likely) core category, the next 
stage in the methodology was to sort materials into an integrated, coherent theory. 
In discussions with other users of the methodology I found that sorting is often 
neglected, presumably being seen as unnecessary for some reason. This meant that 
obtaining advice on the sorting process would rely on my interpretation of the literature 
and not on the reported experiences of my contemporaries. 
Returning to a close inspection of Glaser's writings I found that sorting involved 
structuring memos to relate to the core category while recognising that one is aiming 
for a written product. So in my case I was attempting to suggest the relationship 
between my memos and the core category of personal identification, with the aim of 
producing a thesis. While the category codes are important in generating theory, memos 
are the objects used to actually capture the theoretical thoughts and hypotheses. 
In order to achieve this sort I converted my memo book into individual paper memos by 
printing them out and cutting them into strips. I then began to relate each strip to the 
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core category, trying to build up several main themes or chapters. It was at this stage 
that I realised that I hadn't previously fully understood the central position that memos 
take in the endeavour, and as such my memo book was potentially too thin to create 
enough material for a thesis.  
With the existing memos partially sorted I set about writing (long hand on new strips of 
paper) down the theoretical ideas I had had over the course of performing the research, 
but had neglected to write in the form of formal memos. I also went back to the codes to 
determine if there were theoretical codes and ideas within them that might not have 
been fully represented in the memos so far. These new memos were possibly equal in 
number to the printed, existing memos, and gave me enough material to cover my 
broad theoretical position. Also as I progressed through the sorting process other memos 
were generated when I saw new theoretical relationships between the memos and within 
the emerging structure.  
As the sorting progressed I felt that 'identification' was not an adequate concept to 
account for the memos as a whole. Accounting for this inadequacy by developing a new 
category of a shifting, negotiative progression of identifications I could achieve the best 
coverage; accounting for memos relating to the stages of engagement as well as 
multiple, possibly conflicting, points of identification. 
8.8. Writing 
The sorting process had left me with three piles of memos, which would be my 3 broad 
theoretical chapters (see above). The last remaining major part of the process was to 
write these into a coherent thesis. I realised that while I could break these piles down 
further into broad subsections, due to the short note style I had taken in my memoing, 
writing would not be a process of mechanically ordering memos into a coherent story, 
but would be a akin to writing a super-memo guided by the micro-memos I had literally 
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stuffed into a number thematic envelopes. Taking the memos as a guide as what to 
cover in my explanation of the derived concepts. Using codes to guide me to useful data 
to illustrate my points where necessary, the codes having done their job in the other 
direction  and influenced the theory they would not need to be a central feature of the 
thesis. Indeed the structure of the codes and the sorted structure of the memos were 
now different, and so trying to represent both structures in the thesis would only serve 
to muddle the structure and the overall coherence of the theory. 
Another element to include in the write-up was references to relevant literature. Glaser's 
advice is to consult the literature as sorting is being finalised and represent the 
knowledge gained as memos to be further sorted into the theory. Previously I had 
avoided directly relevant literature, as once I had begun to attempt to follow Glaser's 
version of the methodology I followed his advice and stopped reading new literature 
about theories of videogame play in order to remain grounded.   
8.9. Apparent myths of GT from a CGT perspective 
Having described the process I performed it is obvious that I have encountered many 
problems and held many misunderstandings as I proceeded. In my conversations with 
others and encounters with GT in the literature these misunderstandings (and ultimately 
the purpose of a grounded approach) seem to be more common than they should be, 
therefore I think it might be prudent to lay out my understanding of various elements of 
the methodology which often seem to be occasionally presented ways contrary to my 
present understanding. 
8.9.1. GT is a qualitative data analysis methodology 
While GT is concerned with the qualitative analysis of data, this is not the full purpose of 
the methodology but a feature of or method within it. This misapprehension is of 
particular annoyance to Glaser and he has co-written a paper specifically targeting this 
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myth (Glaser and Holton 2004). Essentially GT is a complete system of theory 
generation which takes a domain and seeks to evaluate the qualities of a number of 
sources of data relating to that domain in order to arrive at a hypothesis about the most 
powerful variable of that domain. Qualitative data analysis would commonly be 
understood as any single method for analysing qualitative data for some end or other, 
possibly within a tick descriptive methodology such as Ethnography, not as part of an 
integrated abductive methodology of abstracted theory generation. 
8.9.2. GT is Inductive 
While GT is purportedly inductive (Glaser and Strauss 1967), it has been a philosophical 
doctrine for hundreds of years that true induction as an epistemological position is not 
tenable. While the general experimental scientific methodology has taken a more 
deductive position to the development of theory, GT uses a somewhat inductive position, 
which in order to not fall foul of the problems inherent in attempting to understand the 
world inductively actually accounts for the deductive sensibilities of humans and results 
in an abductive or retroductive position. That is a theory is sought which accounts for as 
much of the data found in the domain as possible and is guided by that data to arrive at 
this position. So while, in rough terms, the experimental methodology collects 
hypotheses and then validates them through empirical means, GT generates hypotheses 
that should be well founded or grounded rather than experimentally validated. The 
quality of a Grounded Theory hypothesis is evaluated by how well it accounts for the 
data and as that data was collected with respect to a certain domain it is hoped that the 
hypothesis accounts for the variability within the domain, however the researcher's 
subjective impressions are explicitly used to form this theory, the theory does not arrive 
automatically from the application of the methodology. 
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8.9.3. GT coding captures the meaning of a datum which can then 
be compared to other implied meanings 
No, coding in GT is the process of forming categorical concepts rather than 
categorisation being the step which follows coding. A category code should capture the 
connections between data not imputed meanings in isolation. That is not to say that only 
gross categories are captured. Where categories exist the variability within the category 
is captured as properties of the category. While meanings are important they are derived 
from the researcher's sensitivity to how data compare, explicitly. 
8.9.4. The ultimate aim is to create a structured network of codes 
Not as such. The ultimate aim is to arrive at a hypothesis which deals with the (more 
likely 'a') key dependant variable in the domain. This hypothesis will be supported by the 
mass of theoretical thoughts produced throughout the project (abductively) which will be 
supported by a semi structured mass of data comparisons in turn. So the basic 
theoretical unit is the code, but the working theoretical construction is the memo. How 
these memos interrelate as a mass is less important than that they can be sensibly 
related to the core concept. 
8.9.5. GT is iterative, following the cycle of collect data > code 
data > memo codes 
Partially true. The process of data collection and encoding is fairly cyclical, but memoing 
occurs throughout. It is also true that the researcher is trying to avoid logical elaboration 
and focus memos on the codes, but memoing a hypothesis or theoretical idea does not 
literally occur after coding and can (and should) happen during coding, immediately after 
data collection, during sorting and during writing as well as between coding and data 
collection sessions.  
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8.9.6. Coding is best performed via a line-by-line analysis of raw, 
transcribed data 
In trying to build up comparative codes by poring over every line of a transcript, 
utterance in a recording, gesture in a video recording, or whatever raw data has been 
captured is cumbersome and slow, potentially missing some broad early themes in the 
mass of micro analyses. Glaser advocates field notes in his research and in reasoning 
about the merits of this practice in the light of CGT we can draw some conclusions. Field 
notes have the following advantages over micro-analysis: broad themes can be captured 
readily and simply; minimal equipment is needed; minimal effort is needed to bring 
them into a project (either paper based or computerised); they can be performed post 
hoc; they can be captured ad hoc; and they have an effect of performing a first pass 
conceptual analysis (using the researcher's sensitivities to determine what should be 
captured). While this approach has weaknesses (chiefly among them being the reliance 
on the skill of the researcher to produce good quality notes with minimal bias), the 
speed and coverage it allows quickly outweigh them. Where a line by line analysis is 
advocated is in the line by line, or point by point analysis of field notes, not raw data. 
8.9.7. As GT is data driven, the data is the most critical aspect of 
the final presentation 
GT is not a Hermeneutic or Phenomenological exploration of, and re-presentation of a 
domain. It is a method of deriving abstracted theory from a domain. Therefore the mode 
of final presentation does not seek to re-present elaborated data to expose truths 
therein, but proposes theory in the form of hypotheses for the reader’s consideration. 
The sense of quality for a Grounded Theory is not whether the study demonstrates true 
interpretations of data, but whether (in virtue of having been derived from domain data) 
the theory seems to fit the domain; is relevant to the actors or stakeholders of the 
domain; works in accounting for the domain in general, outside the data collected; and 
can be modified to improve fit, relevance, and workability in light of new data.   
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8.10. Challenges in applying CGT in a Ph.D. project 
While CGT has many benefits for certain projects it does present problems in any 
academic setting more geared toward 'predictable', validative research especially early in 
a researcher's career. The following sections attempt to draw on my experience to elicit 
some of the issues and how they might cause problems for someone attempting to use 
the methodology in a Doctoral research programme, as I have. 
8.10.1. There is little agreement as to what the Grounded Theory 
approach is 
Possibly most apparent when one explores the disagreement between the originators 
(Glaser 1992). Almost every different account of GT as a methodology positions it in a 
different place relative to other types of research, and proposes different 'methods' with 
which to perform it effectively.   
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
The mass of conflicting views can be quite overwhelming. Seemingly the most obvious 
solution to this state of confusion is to obtain the 'how to' guide published by one of the 
co-originators, which happens to be readily available from all major outlets, and work 
from that. Depending on what one is trying to achieve, obtaining Strauss and Corbin’s 
well distributed guide could be either a curse or a blessing. I personally found that while 
it was instrumental in getting me started I needed to look elsewhere to find out where I 
was supposed to be going to achieve useful results.  
Also in dissemination of the final product of the work, one can find that epistemological 
and methodological concerns of reviewers can derail attempts to present the resultant 
theory; papers and presentations becoming explorations of the validity of the 
methodology rather than the fit, relevance, and workability of the resultant theory.   
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8.10.2. Glaser advocates that one does not develop a research 
question at the outset of the research. 
Validative research places great emphasis on placing the research in context as early as 
possible, removing this emphasis allows the research to explore the bounds of the 
domain of interest broadly and at will. 
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
It is common, at least in the United Kingdom, to pass through several formal phases 
during the process of attempting to obtain a Doctorate by research. These phases 
require reports to be written outlining, in increasing detail, ones intent. It is common to 
be asked to provide a research question such that one’s supervisory team can evaluate 
the likely contribution and success of the research. Rejecting this need would require a 
deep understanding of the proposed methodology and supreme confidence (from both 
the candidate and the academic staff) that a valuable result will occur 'in spite' of having 
no firm question. 
I myself presented a very broad question when entering the final phases of the 
programme, but even this seemed a little bit narrow on reflection. I eventually took 
Glaser's advice and simply stated that I was researching the domain of players’ 
experiences of videogame play. It did take time to move away from the initial research 
question though. 
8.10.3. There should be no upfront literature review 
In order that the researcher might avoid validating others' theories rather than 
developing one grounded in data, Glaser advocates that the researcher should avoid a 
review of the directly relevant literature before the sorting phase of the research. While a 
general reading programme is encouraged, to maintain sensitivity to theoretical 
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possibilities in the data, the domain literature is seen to have a detrimental effect on 
grounding. 
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
As with the development of a research question, it is expected that early in a research 
programme one develops an understanding of the literature directly relating to the 
proposed programme, in order that it might evaluated in terms of position relative to the 
current thinking in the domain. To reject this need might not be seen as a benefit to 
building a theory from data, but rather poor scholarship, as if the resultant theory does 
not directly address the contemporary concerns of the field an expert in the field (rather 
than a domain actor) might ask why those concerns have not been addressed.  
8.10.4. There should be no discussion of the emerging theory 
before it is written up 
The argument here is that in discussing the theory with peers the inevitable feedback 
will influence the researcher and move them away from forming theory only from the 
data. Also in expounding findings a degree of the excitement of discovery will be lost, 
the researcher having spent their emotional energy relating to a concept in its 
exposition, becoming less fascinated with it later on. Discussions with others should be 
about methodology and methods, not findings. 
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
Part of the process of performing a research degree is that one is expected to grow into 
the role of a researcher or academic; during this training one’s tutors and supervisors 
will want to evaluate one’s progress throughout the programme. In order to do this they 
need to know what one is doing, where one is going, and how much progress one has 
made. This 'requirement' is also a problem when one comes to engage with peers, in 
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that one might seem insolent in refusing to answer questions about what one is 
researching beyond a domain description and a methodology outline. 
Another problem with this rule is that the means by which academics are evaluated is 
based in some degree on their publication record. If in using CGT an emerging academic 
has published far less material than their peers, then when seeking their first academic 
position they will be viewed less favourably than those that have followed a more 
traditional route, who may well be more extensively published. 
8.10.5. The preferred method of data collection is field noting 
rather than recordings and transcripts 
Glaser advises that one use post hoc field notes over electronic recording and 
transcription of data. This advice is intended to help the researcher maintain 
responsiveness to the domain (not being constrained by the requirement to carry 
recording equipment and seek permission to make such recordings whenever necessary) 
and rapidity in data collection (where the need to transcribe data is likely to slow the 
process of collecting and analysing data considerably). Also Field notes have the effect of 
forming the first level of theoretical analysis. If the researcher is not noting everything in 
the domain verbatim, then they will be applying their own sensitivities to what seems 
important and worthy of note. 
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
In many traditional modes of research it is expected that the researcher will be able to 
point directly to data to prove or verify in some way the derivation of the results. To this 
end it is somewhat expected that a transcript of the data will be made. While field notes 
can be presented as evidence in a similar way, the preliminary abstractions they include 
results in them being seen as less reliable, especially where the researcher is learning 
how to become skilled in creating field notes. 
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This potential lack of skill on the part of the researcher would likely be true of a research 
student. 
Indeed during my attempt at GT I started using transcripts for the reason that they 
captured more about the domain than I felt confident I would be able to put into field 
notes. In fact I wasn't sure what a field note actually was. Later in the programme 
though I did move to using notes rather than transcripts for the reasons outlined; that is 
speed and focus on a subset of the domain. 
An interim period where I recorded interviews but did not transcribe them before coding 
proved to be problematic during the later writing activities as recordings proved more 
difficult to scan in order to extract illustrations for theoretical points. 
8.10.6. Qualitative data analysis software is difficult to find with 
the flexibility to assist in the management of the CGT process 
How one manages the data collected and the codes and memos developed is a fairly 
minor issue, but one that needs some consideration when starting a CGT project. 
CGT requires extreme flexibility in the way resources are managed. Ideally any solution 
would help the researcher manage data sources, how data can be compared to produce 
categories, how these categories can have properties which are derived from the data, 
how these category and property substantive codes can themselves be encoded to 
create theoretical codes, how these codes can influence memos, and how these memos 
will need to be sorted by a process of fracturing and reforming in order to make the 
structure of a thesis. 
The closest match in terms of functionality, at the time this programme was initiated, 
was possibly Atlas.ti as was designed with an interpretation of GT in mind 
Potential Impact on Ph.D. Researcher 
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In this digital era much of the work of researchers is performed with computers, from 
data collection to thesis writing. As such it is likely that many of us would desire a 
computerised solution to performing many of the operations of the Grounded Theory 
methodology. I found that a compromise must be made between the convenience of 
having a computerised solution to manage the data sets and much of the analysis and 
printing products to paper to maintain flexibility when the software becomes too 
restrictive. This compromise might take some time and effort to balance. For example 
Atlas.ti applies a more or less Straussian (explicitly hermeneutic) conception of GT and 
as such it does not naturally support differentiating between categorical codes from 
property codes and does not support theoretical codes., but solutions are possible using 
the labelling of codes and memos in specific ways. 
8.11. Summary of applying CGT 
The Grounded Theory Methodology as related by Strauss seems reasonably 
straightforward at first. However when one attempts to apply a Glasarian conception of 
the methodology the process seems to be unduly vague in specification. It takes a 
number of leaps in ones understanding to realise that this apparent vagueness is in fact 
intended to be an expression of flexibility and that the researcher is encouraged to 
develop responsive personal strategies in their exploration of the chosen domain. Other 
than this requirement to 'get' CGT the advice given by Glaser intended to maintain 
grounding and minimise 'forcing' can present particular problems to a Ph.D. candidate. 
The combination of 'no talk', 'no research question', and 'no literature review' along with 
a general lack of understanding of the methodology by fellow academics can serve to 
isolate the fledgling researcher. These same features can also have the effect of placing 
the candidate at a disadvantage in some important respects relative to competing peers 
as they potentially attempt to complete their apprenticeship and become a professional 
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academic. They are likely to be relatively under published, under read, and may have 
formed fewer constructive professional relationships than those following a more 
traditional methodology which encourages direct engagement with ones chosen field 
from the outset. 
While I feel I have an understanding of both a novel and powerful methodology, and the 
domain I have chosen to study, and would argue that CGT is a very interesting and 
powerful approach to generating theory, I would not recommend that anyone use it in 
pursuit of a Doctorate. Obviously where the parent department has extensive specific 
experience in CGT then my warning would be tempered, but the likely lack of 
engagement with others interested in the specific domain of study and their publications 
would still remain a concern. 
It seems fairly common for researchers at this level to borrow features from GT 
(Fabricatore et al. 2002; Brown & Cairns 2004; and Sweetser & Johnson 2004) while still 
maintaining a scholarly connection with their chosen domain. It seems that a more 
Straussian methodology is more agreeable in this respect, and this closer match between 
the requirements of the individual researcher and the demands of the usually validative 
demands of academic rigour might further account for the popularity of Strauss's 
approach relative to Glaser's. 
However, once I had understood a few of the features of Glaser's methodology I would 
not have been comfortable creating a boundless conceptual description of the  chosen 
domain as Strauss seems to encourage in his version of GT, and felt committed to 
developing as full an understanding of CGT as possible and thence a good theory of 
videogame play, which explicitly related to a single key concept. Though I would implore 
Dr Glaser to collect a number of his publications into an easy to digest and commercially 
published guide to his methodology (including the inherent flexibility) so that those of us 
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who end up attempting to follow his scheme can more readily understand what we are 
getting ourselves into and can become proficient in the execution of the methodology 
much more rapidly than with the present arrangement of numerous self-published books 
and personal seminar tours. 
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9. Concluding discussions 
This chapter is intended to round out a number of the things presented in the chapters 
above. The sections below explore if the theory seems 'complete' and 'good' according to 
Glaser's stated quality criteria (fit, relevance, and modifiability); where this theory might 
sit relative to other theories on similar topics; if this work might contribute anything 
substantial to any associated field; what the limitations of this contribution might be said 
to be; and what further work might be possible or useful from this position. 
9.1. 3rd Party Reviews of the Theory (evaluation of Fit 
and relevance)  
According to Glaser a 'good' grounded theory should demonstrate the qualities of 'fit', 
'relevance' and 'modifiability'. 'Fit' being that the theory should describe the principal 
concern of the domain actors in a way which is obvious and readily identifiable by the 
actors themselves. 'Relevance' should be that it provides a view on the domain which 
allows the domain actors to frame their thinking about their domain in useful ways. 
'Modifiability' is then the scope for re-framing the theory in light of new data or attaching 
new concepts to the theory to improve the fit and relevance for higher level descriptions 
or specific sub domains. 
Obviously, having constructed the theory myself I am confident that it fits the data I 
collected, describing the principal concerns of players, and should then have some 
degree of relevance to secondary actors (games designers) in their understanding of the 
needs of players. However, my personal opinion might not match the perception of those 
active in the domain. In order to evaluate these quality factors I have attempted to poll 
the opinions of as many specialists as possible in the short period of time between 
writing the theoretical sections of this thesis and submitting it for review. This section 
summarises the findings of this small survey. The subsections which follow then pull in 
267 
 
the information gathered from this survey to help explore the sense of 'fit', 'relevance' 
and 'modifiability' of the work. 
Using an online survey service (question reproduced in Appendix C) in combination with 
a short electronic slide presentation (Appendix B), responses were openly sought via a 
regional game research mailing list as well as privately sought from professional game 
developers and analysts. The respondents totalled ten individuals. Eight had attachments 
to academic research into videogame design and theory, while the other two were a 
professional videogame designer (PC, Console and browser games) and a professional 
usability analyst with experience of testing for videogame products (primarily console 
games).  
The survey presentation consisted of a summary presentation of the 2 main supporting 
hypotheses and the core category itself presented as “A player's engagement with any 
videogame product is determined by their negotiated sense of the net cultural worth of 
that product“. The survey questions were intended to explore if the theory was 
understandable and might be said to exhibit the qualities of 'fit' and 'relevance' 
The first observation to note from the responses is that academically active individuals 
were understandably much more critical of the theory than 'craft' actors (those without 
theoretical training or interests, but commercially active in the production of 
videogames). 
The small number of busy 'craft actors' who responded were generally positive. Able to 
paraphrase the theory effectively and encouraged by a theory which focuses on players 
needs rather than games as narrative or ludic objects, and commonly raised industry 
concerns. Their misgivings were that the presentation used didn't include detail as to 
what features players commonly relate to and a gut feeling that there must be 'hooks' 
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which are not socio-cultural in nature. One respondent was confident that these concerns 
were likely to be covered in the full thesis. 
Criticism from the academically active respondents focused either on the level of the 
theory (obviously in a 10 slide presentation the focus was on the core hypothesis) and 
hence the utility of the theory as expressed at this level. One respondent felt that the 
core hypothesis was implicit in all games design including their own work in simulation, 
and such an explicit expression of this tacit concern presented no new workable or 
relevant knowledge. Another respondent struggled with the expression 'net cultural 
worth'. Overall however there seemed to be agreement that the theory expressed 
something potentially useful providing the hypotheses could be backed up with data or 
illustrative examples. 
These findings suggest then that the core category should be expressed in terms which 
are easier to understand. Avoiding possible confusion with technical uses of certain 
terms seems essential without losing the essentially socio-cultural aspect of the 
realisation of personal value judgments, and stressing the continuously aggregated or 
summed sub-value judgements to develop a sense of the personalised cultural value of 
the experience. Perhaps an expression such as 'value seeking', while being at an even 
higher level than the core category as so far expressed, might in some way capture the 
sense that players are looking for experiences that are not 'a waste of time' or 
'worthwhile'. The sense of value seeking is then supported by the two main contributing 
hypotheses of summed value judgements and continuous evaluation and negotiation.   
9.2. Relevance? 
To the 'craft actors' the theory seems reasonably relevant. With the provisos that the 
theory needs to be expressed relative to other concepts of engagement and illustrated 
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with clear examples. The two main respondents from this group (an experienced PC, 
console, and flash game designer and a user experience analyst with experience of 
analysing games) felt that the theory was quite useful in helping them frame designs 
relative to players' wants and needs rather than as isolated objects. The analyst felt that 
he would need the theory framing relative to other conceptions of engagement, but as a 
theory the core category was interesting and potentially useful as another method for 
understanding games and experiences under analysis. The designer suggested that such 
a theory which focussed on players rather than the games themselves would help him 
conceive the design problem effectively rather than focussing on the internal quality of 
the product, which he felt much of the current industry advice suggests.  
In order to make the theory relevant to the intended audiences (critical players and 
active designers) any popular dissemination of the theory beyond this thesis should 
avoid technical terms and abstract expressions of the theory and focus instead on 
relating, with examples, the kinds of sentiments which were expressed by the 
interviewees in the construction of this theory. It might be necessary in this later 
expression to utilise 'in principle' examples outside of the data collected as part of this 
research programme, as the relatively small number of cases used to create the theory 
might not satisfy the audience of such an explanation. Rather the general hypothesis 
should be explained by how we might expect it to apply to a broader range of examples. 
As long as this output is backed up by academic and fully grounded work and qualified 
with provisos the real relevance of the theory would be expressed in how it might inform 
the design or critique activities of the industry professionals. 
The traditional focus of a Grounded Theory is to relate the principal concerns of the 
domain actors back to those actors so that they might gain an insight into their own 
activities. In the context of videogame play I feel it is unlikely that a theory of 
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engagement will help players understand their own engagement in such a way that they 
could use this information to become more successfully engaged. As such the audience 
of interest is both academics, who might form new insights into the activities of players 
and generate useful theories for producing better products, and industry professionals, 
who might be able to frame their activities in a novel way and potentially be more 
successful in whatever videogame design projects they participate in. 
As I will suggest later in this chapter further work entailing the continuous grounding 
and modification of the theory and possible attempts to validate the theory in specific 
design instances should help to satisfy the more traditional validative concerns of 
practical domain actors who might struggle to understand the utility of the grounding 
process  
9.3. Complete? 
In terms of the completeness of the theory, the respondents did seem concerned that 
the theory as expressed did not suggest which 'cultures' encouraged personal 
identification with games as they currently exist, and that there might be 'inherent 
absolutes' of engagement outside of any socio-cultural frame. 
For example in response to the question related to 'fit' (Question 3, Appendix C) the 
following interesting responses were collected, with points relating to 'absolutes': 
“I had never thought if it in those terms, but I like it. I think there is also much to 
be said for inherent absolutes in terms of games that are engaging. Some games 
seem to be inherently engaging and this is not a cultural feature. When the mood 
is right, people will embrace even the most unlikely games (grown men playing 
'tag' at a wedding party, or old ladies playing grand theft auto on christmas day) as 
long as the rule sets for those games are well defined and understood. “ 
Commercial research professional respondent 
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“Explains part of it. It's fair as a reductionist analysis, but I suspect that there are 
other factors that come into play (pardon the pun) “ Academic and videogame 
designer respondent 
In terms of responses where the respondent raised concerns about the nature of the 
cultures being examined, the following responses were collected (similarly in respect to 
the question intended to explore 'fit'): 
“not really - i find one of the key variables - 'net cultural value' - to be too vaguely 
defined to be of much use. “ Academic respondent 
“I can't really say, as I don't understand what "net cultural worth" means. I don't 
think it makes sense to "sum" (add) values (qualities) to get a "net". I'm also 
cautious about "typing" players. However, I appreciate that these explanations 
may summarise the responses you were given. “ Academic respondent 
In part these concerns are an understandable failure to comprehend that for the last 
century or so individual identities are considered to be socially formed into cultural 
structures at a unique and personal level (Cooley (1902), Mead (1934), and so on) and 
that the theory is intended to express the primary concern of all game players rather 
than sub-sets of players, as well as a failure to understand that I intend the theory to 
account for much of what is going on in the domain, not necessarily all. However I will 
argue that some conceptions of engagement, such as Flow, are in fact predicated on 
concepts of value which are socially derived. That is not to say that for some users 
challenges, tempo, or progression say are not important, but that the relative 
engagements for these players must be framed in some way. Why does a player value a 
complex challenge? Why does a player demand a slow tempo? The theory presented in 
this thesis suggests that the variability in player's engagements with these features (as 
much as surface features such as the narrative, rule set, or playable characters) is 
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cultural and framed by a sense of identity. As suggested in the previous section in order 
to make the theory accessible, in future disseminations it may well be necessary to take 
common concerns such as these and express examples of how players might see 
themselves as the kind of player who would (or would not) engage with a game with 
such a hook or feature as the overriding factor in engagement. Take challenge as a 
commonly expressed example of a behavioural driver which might sit outside a cultural 
dimension. Even if we apply a simplified understanding of Flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1990) 
where the challenge must match the player's skill, this match is only a single factor in an 
aggregated identification profile. That is it is not that a game is simply too hard or too 
easy for certain players; a more deep reading of the literature on Flow reveals that while 
it might be in a particular player's power to meet a challenge, it is in fact whether the 
player places value in overcoming the challenge (if the end result is 'meaningful' to the 
player) that determines the amount of effort the player will put into overcoming the 
challenge set. This attribution of meaning (as in what the feature might be said to 
represent) and ultimately value is not a mathematical relationship between the difficulty 
and the players capacity to overcome it, but a complex aggregation of values. It is this 
aggregation of values which my theory has settled upon and which this thesis sets out to 
explore. 
Also, this sense that there must be something else at work seems to be a sense that 
socio-cultural behaviours are underpinned by something more powerful giving rise to 
'inherent absolutes'. Hopefully this full thesis shows that any such hard-wired behaviours 
operate at a cultural level or can be overridden by socio-cultural values.  
So the question of whether the theory seems complete is obviously bound into the 
question of the theory's 'fit' which will be explored below, but I feel confident that with a 
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few clarifications and examples the work could be said to be complete enough to provide 
an interesting perspective on videogame engagement. 
9.4. Fit? 
The consensus of the survey respondents suggests that the theory seems to fit the 
domain it accounts for reasonably well. The respondents to my small survey seem to feel 
that it expresses much of what occurs in players' engagements with games. While they 
have existing concerns from industrial literature, academic writing from other domains, 
and craft practice which they feel would need to be covered off in any future explication, 
there is a loose agreement that the theory does indeed explain a great deal about how 
different players engage with different games in different ways. In that of those that felt 
that they understood the theory as it was presented well enough to attempt to 
paraphrase it also felt that it did indeed account for much of player engagement (4 
respondents including both the videogame designer and the analyst). As suggested in 
the subsection relating to relevance, the deductive concerns raised will need to be 
related to the central hypothesis, but I am confident that, in the main, this is possible, 
and I will attempt to do so below to some extent. It is also likely that in performing a 
broader dissemination of the theory it will need to be modified, adjusting conceptions of 
culture, identity, videogame, and what is intended by the negotiative process in order to 
improve understanding and ultimately fit. Such a modification (as suggested below) is 
perfectly acceptable, and would be beneficial rather than destructive to the theory. 
9.5. Modifiable? 
A well formed grounded theory is never 'correct' or 'complete', rather it accounts for the 
data collected. As more data is collected beyond the completion of this thesis it is 
perfectly possible that the theory should be modified. Indeed even in the sorting phase 
of the research it was found that aggregated value alone did not account for a large 
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portion of the memos which dealt with resolving or negotiating different value 
judgements at different phases or stages in an engagement and that only by merging 
these two ideas were most of the memos and codes covered by the core category and 
hence this thesis.  
Also just as the final 'fit and relevance' survey has raised questions about how the core 
category and the categories that support it should be presented, it is quite possible that 
the act of presenting the theory to others will raise theoretical questions which might 
result in further directions for investigation. These directions could, in turn, generate 
more data, which may be more diverse, for encoding, memoing and ultimately 
integration into future iterations of the theory. 
Further investigation of the nature of the negotiation players perform, with both real 
people and a sense of a generalised other, where the imputed judgements overlap with 
real opinions of others, might well adjust the concept of progressive negotiation as it is 
used in this thesis. Similarly different points of identification and evaluation and how 
they are applied by different individuals to different types of game experiences might re-
frame the “Am I the kind of person who would play a game with this feature, in this 
configuration, in this context?” sense of socio-cultural identification, and hence the 
influence this category has on the theory as a whole. 
It is true that in terms of theoretical sampling massively multiplayer online (MMO)   
experiences such as Massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPGs) like 
World of Warcraft were only invoked by the interviewees as experiences that they felt 
they would not seek. Rather the data collected was primarily related to offline play (both 
solo and physically co-located multiplayer). In terms of the emerging codes and 
theoretical concepts this was fine as an exploration of the 'cybernetic' societies created 
in many MMOs might have exploded the theory into one about online societies and would 
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have lost some of the fit and relevance for offline gaming. That is not to say that a future 
exploration of MO, MMO, and MMORPG play and surrounding attitudes could not be 
specifically performed and integrated into the current concepts. 
Another point to raise and a possible area for modification is that the subjects used in 
interview were, while of varying age and holding differing attitudes to gaming, 
exclusively European and predominantly British and as such the theory is substantively 
grounded in Western European attitudes. It would be remiss to assume that these 
attitudes could be formalised out to all societies and geographical cultures. In exploring 
attitudes which might differ from those encountered in the research as it stands further 
modification of the theory might be required. 
Overall though, I am confident, in virtue of the way the core theory is developed from a 
broad spectrum of grounded concepts, that any adjustment to sub-elements of the 
theory will have minor knock-on effects for the theory as a whole. For example an earlier 
conception of the process of engagement (Salisbury & Fields 2004) had different phases 
which didn't account explicitly for reflection. If this conception were still being used, the 
cyclical nature of the negotiation would be less prominent and as such the core 
theoretical concept might read something like “Engagement as a discovered 
identification of net cultural worth”. While close to the theory actually presented here 
there are obvious subtle differences. Any future modification would be expected to be a 
similarly subtle evolutionary re-framing rather than a revolutionary scrapping and 
starting from scratch. 
9.7. Limitations 
At this point it seems prudent to clearly state where the limits of the research are, 
before setting out, with these limits or limitations in mind, what the overall contribution 
is felt to be. 
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It must be stressed, in a discussion of the limitations of the research, that the theory 
presented is about potential players' relative engagements with games, and nothing 
else.  
Drawing conclusions outside the substantive domain would not be grounded, even if they 
are tempting. So accounting for, say, the design of games can only be addressed via the 
perceptions of players and not via the perceptions of designers. Similarly the way people 
engage with other, related technologies is also outside the scope of the work presented 
here and so I would not make any claims to that effect. 
The construction of the theory was parsimonious and the work should not be read as an 
exhaustive description of all the factors that might influence all players' engagements. 
Rather the core and supporting hypotheses are based on what seemed to be enough 
data to make enough comparisons to develop a general theory via the structured 
methodology employed. As such any recommendations for practice which might be 
developed from this work are in the form of high level points of consideration rather than 
actionable heuristics. While I have some evidence that these points of consideration 
might be of interest to professional designers, I also believe that the lack of a clear 
guidance grounded in design practice might limit the audience to those practitioners who 
take a reflective approach to their work. 
That is, the theory as it stands demonstrates a degree of 'fit' and 'relevance' to the 
domain of videogame play, with few claims as to the utility of the theory to interested 
parties other than game players themselves. 
Another point to stress is that in side stepping stereotypes of players and demographic 
indicators, the theory does not actively engage with sociological thinking. That is not to 
say that there is not a connection, rather I have not made any broad statements as to 
which demographic groupings might suggest certain identities and cultures which might 
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influence the general engagement with games such groupings might have. The idea that 
groups might hold common values is not rejected, rather I have not tried to map how we 
might segment populations into such groups or the totality of the identities and values 
within them. An indication of what 'kinds of people' feel what about what game features 
is then opaque other than the few illustrations I might have in the data. These few 
illustrative examples are not enough to tolerate a numerical validation, but gain their 
utility from their ability to influence the abstracted hypotheses. The means by which the 
research should be judged then are by the methodologically significant 'fit', 'relevance', 
and 'modifiability'. That is do the hypotheses fit the data; does the theory grab those it is 
describing as a good account of their concerns; and can we apply the theory to work in 
many different variations of the domain? The research implicitly tried to cover a few 
demographic variables such as age and gender, but as the core category emerged it 
become increasingly obvious that more arbitrary differences (different nationalities other 
than the predominantly European say) would not change the shape of the core category 
or it's supporting hypotheses.  
A final limitation is that in trying to account for the data without too much reliance on 
'grand' theory, the technical and academic language has been minimised in favour of 
plain language. As such the work might seem insufficiently technical to readers from 
related academic fields. I have had feedback on my final sorted hypotheses and some of 
these responses questioned my usage of certain terms such a 'culture', 'value', and 
'engagement'. While I have attempted to lay out my usage where necessary, the way I 
have used most of the terms in this thesis in their commonly understood senses might 
appear to lack precision to some.  
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9.8. Contribution 
Taking into account the discussion of related theory and the limitations of the work, this 
subsection explores what the contribution of this thesis might be. In this subsection I will 
explore the major themes of the theory and how they might be said to be novel 
expressions in the specific substantive domain of videogame play research. I will also 
explore how the use of Glaser’s Classic Grounded Theory to this specific domain could be 
said to be fairly novel in this domain, and a contribution to the wealth of attempts to 
employ the methodology in general. 
9.8.1. Overview 
This research has focussed on the player experience, attempting to find a unifying or 
'core' theme in the data gathered by interviewing and interacting with those that 
encounter games in their lives, and what it was that engaged some people to become 
players of certain games and not others.   
The resulting theory, that players are negotiating an aggregate sense of value in their 
leisure activities, specifically playing videogames, has some features in common with 
existing theory, but is unique in that it stresses that engagement with a game is 
contingent on the 'Transaction' (as McCarthy and Wright have expressed it) of expending 
certain valued factors in order to gain pleasure from others. The difference between my 
theory and that of McCarthy and Wright is that I highlight that the 'costs' are not fixed, 
hence it is not a single transaction, but a continuous negotiation of and through the 
experience of encountering, playing, and reflecting on the offering. For example the 
difficulty a player perceives in playing a game is modulated by how much the outcome of 
overcoming the challenge encountered is valued. As Juul highlights, this may be a 
consideration during (rather than before) play, but I will stress that the sense of value of 
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the experience, as a function of how the player identifies with the aggregation of the 
experience, is summed across the entirety of the experience of a gameplay offering. 
The constant negotiation of the sense of cultural value (remembering that personal, 
cultural, and social are all different perspectives on the same system of values, mores, 
and habits) provides a sense of relative worth, which may lead to engagement when the 
sense of value is sufficiently positive.  
There are some assumptions implied in this work: that people ascribe representational 
meaning to just about everything they encounter, including games; and that the 
meaning of a thing will be contingent on the context in which they encounter that thing. 
I feel that these assumptions do not invalidate the observation that people also ascribe 
value to those things, in that they interpret the meanings in relation to their own system 
of values and goals (their personal culture or identity), and this identity, while mutable is 
also relatively stable across contexts. 
9.8.2. Identity values driving engagements 
There are also other areas we might examine, such as the psychology of reward 
schedules, or the influence of tempo on the response of a player. However these 
examinations assume that a player is already playing in an agreeable context, whereas I 
have highlighted a view that for the player to get to the point of playing in the first place 
(or return to playing) they must first see the value in doing so. 
So how can this theory inform the work of others? It is my belief that, practitioners 
should realise that potential players must not see playing their games as a waste of 
time, a culturally empty or worthless activity. Fortunately Nintendo started marketing the 
Wii console during work on this thesis, and, for a certain kind of player, have 
subsequently shown that if the games are constructed in a certain way and aim to 
provide value in ways that non-traditional players can identify with then people will play 
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them. In Nintendos' case they provided two non-traditional positives to players: that the 
console can be used by everyone in an 'inclusive' way,  marketing the playing of games 
rather than the games themselves and incorporating a mimetic control system which 
seems initially 'easier' to operate than pushing buttons; and promoting games with 
supposed health benefits such as Wii Fit (but even the mimetic control system itself 
might seem to be more healthy than traditional mechanisms). In doing so Nintendo have 
shown that the values of traditional videogame players (or 'hardcore' players if you 
prefer) are not the only possible values to consider in the design of 'interactive 
entertainment products' or videogames. If we look further at other people who reject 
games, we can still ask ourselves about which values are games still not supporting. As 
mentioned in previous sections there are those who do not engage in games because 
they seem to feel that there is insufficient cultural cachet in doing so. Either they feel 
that they cannot learn anything useful from playing, or the arbiters of 'cultural taste' 
have not sanctioned them as sufficiently valuable to engage in (e.g. Mark Kermode, a 
respected film critic and broadcaster, wrote in his Guardian column on 11th December 
2009 entitled “Do violent computer games turn us into killers?”: “What I know about 
videogames wouldn't fill the back of a postage stamp. I don't play them and probably 
never will.”). 
So design practice which takes into consideration who the prospective audience see 
themselves as, external to the identification with in-game characters could result in 
alternatively rich play experiences and potentially appeal to a greater audience of 
players. 
In terms of theoretical relationships between my work and that of others in the field, 
much has been published on player identities; either the formation of identity through 
engagement with games (Gee 2003) (Raessens 2006) or the relationship between 
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demographic indicators (i.e. gender, age, or race) and factors of engagement with 
games. In the first instance the theory presented here might be said to go some way to 
repositioning the argument from identity formation through play to play driven by 
existing identities, and in the second instance from gross demographic indicators to 
subtle cultural indicators. So a player might be influenced by a game to see them self in 
a certain light, but in order for them to play the game in the first place they must have 
identified them self as a player beforehand. How we ascertain this pre-identification is 
not by what gender they are, say, but by examining the possible cultural indicators that 
exist in the relationship between the player's identity and the experience on offer. True, 
this relationship might include a raft of demographic stereotypes and archetypes, but is 
just as likely to include such indicators as degree of affinity with technology; past 
experiences of playing games of different types; previous experience with similar 
fictions, narratives, and representations and all other culturally significant factors which 
go into making a sense of personal identification relative to the experience and thus a 
cultural value system. Whether we try to summarise these factors by gender, class, 
education, number and sex of siblings, occupation of parents, race, nationality, income, 
sexuality, or any other socio-cultural grouping  we would be doing so as an analytical, 
stereotypical catch-all. 
9.8.3. Focus on the enculturated individual 
In the exploration of 'culture' in the sense that studies are made of 'gamer' cultures, or 
'game cultures' (these being the social groupings and associated sub-cultural values and 
habits of game players in specific contexts), the theory presented allows an analysis of 
what features of gameplay social groupings such as these reinforce, and what influence 
individual identity has on the formation of these groups. It allows us to ask if such 
communities are groupings of players who commonly engage in the same games and 
gameplay styles or are more sophisticated social cliques born of a greater cultural value 
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system with the playing of certain games as a symptom or factor in this sociocultural 
coming together.  This is not to reject the study of 'game cultures', rather an 
encouragement to view these cultures in a broad sociocultural context.  
9.8.4. Stressing value over meaning 
In terms of the semiotic interpretation of play or games, the direction of this theory 
stresses that it is less important to say what a semiotician feels the semantic meanings 
are implied in an offering and more important to extract the pragmatic meanings applied 
by players to features they feel are salient. So in looking at who players feel they are 
and how playing might express these identities  we shift emphasis from the theoretical 
top-down analysis of the determination of meaning and hence value by reading the 
game as a form of 'text' to a more empirical examination of of the perceived value of 
playing a game, to players other than ourselves, as a form of activity or experience. We 
can then explore the the salient values in terms of the meanings subjects apply to the 
features of a game and thence question where these meanings are formulated.  
Take the oft analysed (e.g. Kennedy 2002)Tomb Raider (Core Design 1996) as an 
example. What is significant about this game? Is that the player character and 
protagonist  is a young woman rather than a man? Did the players who made this game 
into a huge hit on the original Sony Playstation consider this to be a significant factor? 
Would we have noticed the gender and presentation characteristics (a highly stylised 
character model) of the player avatar if the game had been poorly received and sold few 
copies? Was it the characteristics of the player avatar which engaged players and made 
it such a success? How will we know without asking players? If we were to ask the 
question “What is it you enjoy or dislike about Tomb Raider” and the sex and figure of 
the avatar are not significantly mentioned by those polled, is it still a useful analysis to 
stress these features over others? It can be argued (Aarseth 2004) that Eidos's 
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marketing of Lara Croft as a character was seen as secondary to the main attractions 
and distractions provided by the game. Indeed surely she came about as a means of 
producing a character who was emphatically not Indiana Jones while allowing the player 
to have “Raiders of the Lost Ark” style adventures. If the game didn't engage as a 3 
dimensional action adventure with puzzles, in levels that span classical antiquity, then a 
discussion of the gender of Lara Croft and if she is a sex object or feminist symbol would 
be moot, as few would have noticed her existence. Some players may well have 
responded to Lara as either a sex object or a symbol of female independence and power. 
Indeed Toby Gard, the designer responsible for initiating the Lara Croft design, 
purportedly intended her (once it was decided not to use a whip wielding male character) 
to represent a strong, independent, street-wise young woman (Laura Cruz). Interestingly 
Gard supposedly left Core Design after a disagreement about design freedom, including 
a disagreement about the 'sexing up' of Lara Croft. So in terms of design intent both 
feminist and sexist positions are supported. However whichever she is perceived as is 
subjective and potentially has no bearing on the enjoyment of the game for a great 
many players. Critically stressing any single viewpoint or over-stressing the meaning and 
value of the character in such a game as Tomb Raider then emphasises subjective 
'readings' of the meanings and de-emphasises the experience of playing the game and 
the space of possible meanings and values that might well be invoked and thus the 
relative values that might be applied to them by players. My theory suggests that games 
are engaged in by a process of value seeking, rejecting the deductive, critical imposition 
of meanings and thence value judgements upon factors of the game offering in favour of 
empirical exploration of the values of players themselves.  
Likewise semiotic semantics can be reconciled with a more pragmatic philosophy by 
stressing that the questions we ask of and conclusions we draw about the meaning and 
values present in games must be about what is thought and felt about the game's 
284 
 
features by the prospective audience and how we can use these insights to inform theory 
or games design, rather than what one personally thinks about a selection of game 
features and how these might be reconciled with political agendas or grand existing 
theories. It is the process of negotiation of value which describes engagement at its 
highest level that suggests this audience centric view. A synthetic, hermeneutic approach 
to understanding games that does not account for the values and feelings of a broad 
spectrum of prospective players and how these values interplay or aggregate to create 
an overall judgement is then incomplete and weak. 
So to summarise where I think my contribution lies I will highlight the following points: 
 That engagement with a game is contingent on the player identifying with the 
game. That is the player must identify themselves as the kind of person who 
would play such a game. 
 Identification is a process of personally identifying cultural value or worth. 
 In identifying value in an offering a player is making an investment, both in 
using 'resources' to gain a 'reward' and of the game as a culturally significant 
object. 
 The investment is not a singular transaction but is a constant negotiation of a 
value space. 
 That researching game players' engagements independent of studying specific 
games is possible if one considers the identities and attendant values potential 
players bring to the experience of playing. 
Where these are points of interest in the overall contribution of the theory which has 
been summarised as: 
 Players ascribe value to personally salient features of games 
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 The salient features are valued according to how much the player feels they are 
the 'kind of player' who would or would not engage with that feature. 
 These value judgements are summed, resulting in an aggregate or net value of 
the offering to the player. 
 This net value directly drives engagement positively or negatively. 
 Players do not engage with a gameplay activity suddenly, mysteriously, or 
spontaneously, without considering the context of that engagement  
 A process of engagement usually occurs which includes phases before and after 
actual physical game playing 
 Prospective players select gameplay activities based on such things as the 
suitability for a context, specific features, or familiarity 
 Players discover suitability, features, and familiarity by methods such as polling 
the trusted opinions of others, engaging with marketing, associating the 
gameplay activity to others, by relative availability of the activity or product, or 
by actively trying the activity out. 
 The factors the player selected (and engaged with) are then constantly evaluated, 
in context throughout play. 
 When play is not physically occurring the player is explicitly and implicitly 
reflecting on whether the gameplay experience (or experiences with features in 
common) as so played still meets the entertainment requirement it was selected 
for. 
 Total value, as a sum of identifications, is negotiated throughout the process of 
engagement  
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 Such negotiations can be noted in selecting (such as when the prospective player 
is exploring possible features, the potential for group play, the potential for online 
play, or proposed challenge types), playing (such as when the player is trying a 
game out, actively plays a game for a while, exploring the ability to quit and 
rejoin the game gracefully, is subject to a changing context, develops investment 
in the game, develops social structures within or about the game, finds the 
degree of linearity in a game, shifts from engaging with stylistic to ludic features, 
and is considering multiple sessions of the game), and reflecting on past 
videogame play experiences. 
 This constantly negotiated sum of value judgements drives an individual's 
engagement with and videogame offering 
9.8.5. Applying Classic Grounded Theory 
In terms of the contribution made relative to the methodological approach taken, the 
application of CGT to the broad domain of videogame play is novel. While other 
researchers (e.g. Brown and Cairns 2004) report having used a Grounded Theory 
approach in their studies, none report having done so with the full range of procedures 
advocated by Glaser (including entering the domain without a research hypothesis, open 
and selective coding to saturate discovered theoretical concepts, identification of a core 
theoretical category, and sorting theoretical ideas into a coherent theory). As such the 
attempt reported in this thesis contributes to the knowledge base of the methodology as 
well as the domain studied. 
The chapters of this thesis which deal with the methodological selection (2.1.) expand on 
why this methodology was employed and not another. The successful application of the 
methodology yielded results which demonstrate a degree of fit and relevance to the 
domain experts surveyed in the small follow up study, and the result shows 
287 
 
commonalities with the broad sociological background. There are however areas which 
may benefit from further theoretical saturation and thus modification of the overall 
theory. The following section (9.9.) which expands on the possible directions for further 
work and the earlier section (9.7.) which deals with the limitations of the work will 
hopefully help the reader understand how complete this theory is and how successful the 
application of CGT was in terms of deriving an interesting theoretical product. Other 
areas of the thesis, which deal with how the methodology was actually employed and 
understood (2. And 8.), serve to expand on the practical implications of attempting to 
employ CGT in a research programme.  
Hopefully this discussion of the methodology will help readers decide if CGT is an 
approach they could employ in their own research, and if so act as a partial guide to 
some of the key principles. Any insights taken from this attempt at applying CGT must 
recognize that it was attempted by a researcher from outside the ‘tradition’ of GT, and as 
seasoned practitioners have pointed out (McCallin, Nathanial, and Andrews 2011) such 
an attempt is likely to be fraught with problems. Of those problems that I am able to 
reflect on at this stage, I have attempted to express them so that others can reflect on 
and learn from them. 
9.9. Further work 
I must stress again that the theory expressed above consists of a number of hypotheses 
not 'facts' or necessarily axioms. As such it could be argued that they are untested. 
Glaser might argue against such a move (1978) as the methodology should have 
developed a 'good' theory by virtue of its data driven, semi-inductive nature. Surely then 
any validation would, as far as the methodology is concerned, generate more data to 
further saturate and potentially modify elements of the theory? That might be the case, 
but no matter how modifiable the theory, and relevant and useful to those within the 
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substantive domain of game playing, some readers are bound to insist on a more 
traditional process of validation before they believe the findings. Any attempt to validate 
the hypotheses of this theory might prove to be challenging. How does one map out an 
individual's sense of identity? How would one determine the values that this individual 
culture holds? How do we interrogate the individual's sense of the semantics of the 
experience without forcing personally deduced assumptions? How would we separate 
these semantic or semiotic meanings from the values they invoke in the player?  How 
would we observe and potentially measure all these meanings and values in a potential 
player throughout a potentially broad and protracted engagement as hypothesised? That 
is how could we observe and measure their values and interpretations of meaning from 
before they have any knowledge of what we are interested in, to how their reflective 
interpretations of the value of the experience influence all future interactions and 
possible engagements?  
A means of testing these aspects of the hypotheses may be possible, but would certainly 
not be trivial. For example we might imagine that we could design a survey to 
interrogate a well chosen social group with an apparently strong sense of cultural 
conformity (a sense that individuals hold very similar identities and values) in order to 
find out what they value, what they play, and how they communicate this play culture 
amongst themselves, in order to see if there are any useful correlations in this data, and 
if these correlations support of reject the stated hypotheses. If this were possible we 
might try to design multiple surveys to be delivered over a period of time in order to try 
and capture the ongoing negotiation of value in some way. 
We might also try to validate the theory experimentally. For example we might try and 
measure the influence of self-identification on selection and initial play engagements by 
surreptitiously exposing the test group to a number of images or performances of lots of 
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people 'like themselves' engaging in play and the game in various ways (playing, 
spectating, discussing) before taking a measure of their engagement, such as time 
voluntarily spent playing, money spent, or subjective rating of 'goodness'. It might seem 
as if this experiment is already being performed by the industry. For example Nintendo's 
marketing of the Nintendo Wii and associated games focuses on showing friendly, 
familiar faces enjoying the games in nice, familial settings, presumably accounting in 
part for the apparently good sales of the console even though this is not the traditional 
mode of marketing such products. 
Another type of experiment might attempt to resolve the relative weight (and if such a 
relationship exists) of the various gross factors of a game on players' engagements by 
developing a series of games which differ along the dimensions suggested by these 
factors, in a similar way to that of Malone (1981). So say a set of games where it is 
possible to alter the presentation without changing the rules or challenge structures 
would be the simplest example. More complex examples would be to create games with 
a similar presentation but with differences in the mechanics, rules, and challenges or any 
other possible combination of design choices. These games could then be tested for 
capacity to engage in some way (time or money spent, or rating) and the degree of 
engagement compared with the degree of adjustment in the dimensions. Such an 
experiment might also be said to be an ongoing project by the games industry, with 
companies constantly looking for designs which might result in more sales; tweaking 
presentations, narratives, themes, challenges, rules and mechanics. 
Related to these possible attempts at pure validation would be to examine the 
workability of the theory by engaging with designers to find if by considering players' 
quests for cultural value they could develop ideas of use to their practice, and possibly 
result in their designing more engaging games. 
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Outside such attempts to validate or operationalise the theory, further work in 
integrating the theory into the broader corpus of related knowledge would seem wise. As 
the literature is reviewed, theoretical constructions and related hypotheses will continue 
to emerge in relation to a theory at such a high level of abstraction. Many areas of study 
have points of similarity, such as Bakhtin's 'centres of value' (as invoked by McCarthy 
and Wright (2004)) or Juuls stages of engagement (2010), as demonstrated by the 
literature review section of this thesis. Part of the ongoing project then is to engage with 
these areas of knowledge and find further insights in the points of similarity and 
difference between them and the grounded hypotheses.  
Beyond validating the theory or integrating the theory into other related areas it would 
be interesting to modify the work, using CGT again, to account for a broader domain. For 
example it would be interesting and potentially useful to perform a CGT for the 
production of games, rather than the reception. What are the chief concerns of designers 
and producers in the industry? If we could develop a theory related to their concerns, as 
we have developed a theory related to the concerns of players, would we then be able to 
integrate the two theories into a statement of what it means to be a successful designer, 
engaging audiences in an effective way, and how their concerns contribute to or detract 
from their ability to deliver engaging experiences. 
In terms of performing more CGT, the current theory seems to have reasonable fit and 
relevance, but there is the possibility that the theory could be improved. For example 
the theory deals poorly with examples of players playing a game they ascribe with no 
explicit value. In the data collected, DA stated that he played Super Mario Land on the 
Gameboy. He did so because it was lent to him and he had nothing better to do, and on 
reflecting on the experience he felt that it was mindless and a waste of time, but yet he 
played it extensively over a period of several weeks. That is we might argue that he 
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reported having found minimal value in playing the game and yet he obviously engaged 
in it at some level. There is something here worth exploring, as while we have a theory 
which says that DA found no impediments to playing this game initially and hence only 
minimal negative value or investment, other than a small suggestion of curiosity my 
theory struggles to explain why he might consume the game so obsessively, as he 
seemed to have no positive value driving him to do so. While this lack of positive value 
accounts for his current negative stance on playing games, as equivalent to mindlessly 
surfing television channels, there is an obvious issue that the theory of value seeking by 
identification with features addresses poorly.  
In summary there are many directions this work can now be taken: validation, 
operationalisation, integration, or iteration, and any one of them will make the theory 
stronger and more useful.  
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Appendix A: Data collected 
Designation Subject 
description 
Survey notes Data analysed Sampling 
notes 
KA 20 something, 
female, 
graduate 
Open interview 
in  subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection 
Full transcript Opportunity, 
occasional game 
player 
JA 30 something, 
male, graduate 
Open interview 
in  subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection 
Full transcript Opportunity, 
more than 
occasional game 
player, male 
CA 20 something, 
male, 
professional  
Open interview 
with pre-
interview 
request to select 
several 'good' 
and several 
'bad' 
experiences 
Full transcript Opportunity, 
known to enjoy 
different games 
to KA and JT 
GA and JB High School age 
(Teenage (GA) 
and tweenage 
(JB)), sisters 
Open interview 
in  subjects' own 
home with 
reference to 
collection 
Audio file Opportunity, 
younger than 
previous 
subjects, on the 
fringe of 
researcher's 
social group 
DA 20 something, 
male, 
performing 
artist 
Open interview 
in subject's own 
home focusing 
on user's 
general attitude 
to games and 
gaming 
Audio file Selected as 
stated gameplay 
sceptic 
OA 30 something, 
male, creative 
industry worker 
Open interview 
in  subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection 
Audio file Selected as 
known to be a 
recent game 
rejecter (with 
extensive prior 
video gaming 
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Designation Subject 
description 
Survey notes Data analysed Sampling 
notes 
experience) 
NA 20 something, 
male, 
postgraduate 
Open interview 
in  subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection 
followed by an 
attempt to 
observe games 
he had 
obtained, but 
had not played, 
which had been 
discussed in the 
interview  
Audio file Selected as PC 
gamer, down 
loader, and 
Greek national 
MA and DB 50 something 
female (MA) and 
tweenage son 
(DB) 
Open interview 
in  subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection. 
Audio file Opportunity, 
outside 
researchers 
social group, 
male of this age 
not covered, 
female of this 
age not covered, 
Irish heritage 
CB 30 something 
female, 
professional 
Semi-open 
recorded 
telephone 
interview 
Audio file Selected for 
profession, and 
socially 
observed 
attitude to 
videogame play. 
Seeking to 
saturate process 
and 
identifications 
BA 50 something 
male, semi-
retired 
professional 
Semi-open 
interview in  
subject's own 
home with 
reference to 
collection. 
Audio file Selected for 
combination of 
age and 
personally 
stated 
preferences for 
videogaming. 
Seeking to 
saturate process 
and 
304 
 
Designation Subject 
description 
Survey notes Data analysed Sampling 
notes 
identifications 
HA, HB, and OB 20 something 
males, 
postgraduate 
students, friends 
and housemates 
Semi-open 
interview 
conducted 
together in cafe 
Audio file Selected for self 
stated 'hardcore' 
gamer status. 
Seeking to 
saturate process 
and 
identifications 
AA 20 something 
male, 
postgraduate 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
MB Late teens or 
early 20s male, 
student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
NB Late teens or 
early 20s 
female, student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
IA Late teens or 
early 20s male, 
student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
DC 30 something 
female. 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Selected for 
stated total 
rejection of 
videogaming. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
AB 30 something, 
male, 
postgraduate 
student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
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Designation Subject 
description 
Survey notes Data analysed Sampling 
notes 
AC 20 something, 
male, 
postgraduate 
student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
MC 20 something, 
male, 
postgraduate 
student 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
PA 30 something, 
female, 
postgraduate 
student, mother 
Short, targeted 
interview 
Field notes Opportunity. 
Saturating 
identifications. 
Some saturation 
of process. 
JC 20 something, 
female, creative 
industries 
Informal 
conversations 
None Opportunity 
(close friend of 
researcher).  
Provided further 
clear examples 
to memos 
during sorting 
HC 30 something, 
female, 
professional, 
mother 
Single informal 
conversation 
None Close relative of 
researcher. 
Provided 
illustrative  
example for 
write-up.  
JD Primary school 
age male 
Informal 
observations 
None Close relative of 
researcher, used 
to provide small 
illustrative 
examples in 
memos and 
writeup 
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Appendix B: Survey presentation 
Slide 1 
These notes are intended to provide another  method of 
explanation, hopefully helping the  reader to 
understand just what it is I'm getting  at. 
Other than the enclosed questionare further  feedback 
should be directed to me at 
 john_h_salisbury@hotmail.com 
Thanks for taking the time to review my work. 
John Salisbury 
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Slide 2 
If you are interested in the precise methodology I  used 
check the Wikipedia pages for Grounded  Theory 
Methodology as it was Barney Glaser's  version of this 
system of theory generation that I  was trying to follow. 
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Slide 3 
Stating what I was not studying might seem unusual for 
 a grounded theory, but selecting the domain is 
 important. 
While it is possible for players to have fun with a 
 videogaming product 'fun' it is far too narrow a 
 term to capture what players are using 
 videogaming experiences for. 
Another 'thing' I was not interested in, by virtue of 
 using Grounded Theory, was the theories of  others. 
 I set out to develop a theory from data,  not 
 literature review.  
 
 
Slide 4 
309 
 
Pretty much anything that comes up when you raise 
 videogames as the topic of conversation. 
The games that people own and want to own are 
 interesting in that they indicate a material 
 investment in a game which might not be 
 apparent by simply talking to that person, though 
 we have to consider the degree of effort that was 
 taken in obtaining the game amongst other factors. 
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Slide 5 
These sub-variables or hypotheses are  constructed of 
 numerous sub-sub-hypotheses and so on. The 
main  (in the jargon of the methodology 'core 
category')  hypothesis is what is interesting and 
unique about  this  theory, and it was derived from 2 
other  hypotheses, so that's what I am presenting in 
 this summary. I would be happy to explain the 
 remainder in personal correspondance (and  will be 
 aiming to publish a more detailed explication at 
 some future date). 
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Slide 6 
A few terms might need a bit of explanation here: 
 Cultural = "Culture or civilization, taken in its wide 
 ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which 
 includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, 
 and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
 man as a member of society." Edward Burnett Tylor, 
 1874 
Tylor's definition suggests that culture is a concept 
 which is intrinsic to individuals, but many others 
 might not hold this understanding hence my 
 stressing 'personal values'. 
I should point out that my training is in Cognitive Science 
 not Sociology. 
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Slide 7 
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Slide 8 
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Slide 9 
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Slide 10 
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Slide 11 
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Appendix C: Survey questions 
These are the details of the survey questions which accompanied the presentation 
provided in Appendix B. 
 
Introduction: 
Please view the enclosed presentation before completing this 
form 
Please fill in the following fields honestly and be critical 
where necessary. I am seeking both positive and negative 
feedback on my work as part of the process of conducting my 
research project. 
I'm sorry if some of these questions seem a little hefty, but 
I'm limited to 10 questions per survey using a free account 
here on SurveyMonkey. Please feel free to be as brief or 
verbose as you feel is appropriate.  
 
Question 1: 
Your details will be used in strictest confidence. Your email 
will only be used to inform you of progress. If you wish to 
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remain anonymous please don't feel obliged to provide either 
your name or your email address.  
Name: 
Email Address: 
 
Question 2: 
How would you describe your association with videogames 
(e.g. designer, programmer, researcher, player etc.)?: 
 
Question 3: 
Do you think that the main hypothesis presented explains 
much of peoples' engagements with 
videogames? Why do you think this?: 
 
Question 4: 
If you were to explain the hypotheses spelled out in the 
presentation to another, would you feel 
able to do so clearly? How might you paraphrase these 
statements for a general audience? 
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Question 5: 
Do you think that the theory as presented might help you 
understand the needs of videogame 
players? Is there anything which you feel is particularly 
positive or negative in the capacity of the 
theory in promoting this understanding? 
 
Question 6: 
Do you feel that the theory as presented may have the 
capacity to help you in your work or 
research? How is the theory strong or weak in terms of this 
ability to help? 
 
Thanks: 
Thank you for taking the time to consider my work. If you 
have entered your email address I will be thanking you in 
person in due course. 
